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ABSTRACT

"I HAD AL WAYS BEEN OPPOSED TO COLONIALISM"
President Harry S. Truman and the End of European Colonialism

Timothy J. Pifer
August 7, 2008
This thesis is a biographical and historiographical examination of Truman's rhetoric
and handling of colonialism. Truman's position regarding European colonialism is a
worthy topic since it facilitates the study of the United States' treatment of people in
underdeveloped countries and allows insight into Truman's beliefs. The research
methodology and references used for the paper include primary sources drawn principally
from the Truman Presidential Library as well as numerous secondary sources relating to
Truman's Presidency.
The focus of analysis is on Truman and his administration's oratory and diplomatic
decisions regarding colonial issues. The findings show that Truman demonstrated
through both his public and private communications that he opposed colonialism.
Furthermore, the bulk of the foreign policy decisions made by Truman's administration
showed a tendency to oppose colonialism. Nonetheless, Truman aided French efforts to
reestablish control over former colonies in Indochina and this deviation undennined his
otherwise anti-colonial legacy for future generations.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The primary objective ofthis paper is to provide a biographical and historiographical
examination of Harry S. Truman's (HST) leadership on the issue of European
colonialism during the earliest period of the late twentieth century global contest called
the Cold War. Truman's stance on European colonialism is a worthy topic of
examination since it facilitates an understanding of actions undertaken by his
administration and allows insight into the complex character of Truman. This
understanding remains relevant since the ramifications of the Truman White House's
actions regarding former colonies at the end of World War Two still impact people in
Asia, the Middle East, Africa and other parts of the world. Equally important, a grasp of
Truman's actual or de facto policy on colonial rule is critical to any historical study of the
United States' treatment of the people in underdeveloped countries. This paper seeks to
answer the following questions: Did Truman have a consistent foreign policy on the
issue of Europe's external colonies? Did Truman consider European control of
underdeveloped countries as natural or did he see it as exploitation of native peoples?
Did he ever touch on the issue of colonial rule in public speeches or private
correspondence? Lastly, did his private beliefs coincide with his administration's
practice of foreign affairs?

This paper considers these questions and suggests that Truman was hostile to any form
of colonial rule, including the variety practiced by the major powers of Europe. The
thesis of this paper is that Truman demonstrated through both his public and private
communications that he opposed colonialism. Furthermore, the bulk of the foreign policy
decisions made by Truman's administration showed a clear tendency to oppose
colonialism. Nonetheless, Truman aided French efforts to reestablish control over former
colonies in Indochina and this deviation undermined his otherwise anti-colonial legacy
for future generations.
The paper examines the following ideas in order to validate the thesis. First, that
Truman stated while in and out of office that he opposed the concept of empires ruling
other lands and peoples. He made the point that colonialism was contrary to his basic
beliefs and his personal values as an American. Furthermore, Truman's anti-colonial
stance mirrored the position ofthe late Franklin O. Roosevelt (FOR) who had held a
deep-seated opposition to European colonialism, particularly as practiced by the British
Empire. Another facet to consider was that Truman's attitude also seemed to reflect the
American ideal of free trade across international borders and the unfettered movement of
capital. Truman's stand against colonial governance remained firm though later in his
administration it evolved into a form that would fit with his anti-Communist language.
Second, while Truman personally opposed colonial control his administration's
foreign policy approach lacked consistency. At the beginning of his tenure, Truman's
rhetoric took aim at empires and their involuntary control of other regions of the world.
Simultaneously, the nation's foreign policy opposed European colonialism and included
this worldview into the foundation of the new United Nations in the form of trusteeship.
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However, over time, Truman and his key people's bureaucratic strategy evolved in such a
way that they ended up supporting the European powers, and their imperial systems,
which they had previously opposed. The paper will show the basis for this turnabout was
another foreign policy concern, the growing fear of a new imperialism in the guise of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).
The research methodology and references used for the paper include primary and
secondary sources related to the questions about Truman and postwar colonialism. The
focus of the analysis is on the administration's assessments and incentives concerning
colonial issues within the context of the major foreign policy themes of the day, namely
the post-Second World War global instability and the onset of the Cold War. Another
focal point of the analysis is Truman's personal and public position on colonialism and
the impact that had upon the overall administration's policy. The Truman Presidential
Library & Museum's archives in Independence, Missouri provided the bulk of primary
sources used in this analysis. The library resources include Presidential copies of
estimates and intelligence reports from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the
National Security Agency (NSA) and the State Department. The library's vast collection
of oral interviews provided personal observations from people involved with, or
influenced by, the Truman administration's various strategies and conceptual planning
efforts. Truman's own words were available from his memoir drafts, copies of speeches,
logs from press conferences, and private letters. In addition to the material from the
Truman Library, period news articles, books published during that time and shortly after
Truman left office, and Dean Acheson's published memoir round out the primary
sources. Secondary sources relied first upon Truman biographies, such as Robert
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Ferrell's Harry S. Truman: A Life,' Alonzo Hamby's Man of the People: A Life of Harry
S. Truman,2 and David McCullough's Truman3 for contextual information on the man
and the times. Building upon this foundation was the examination of a number of Cold
War histories and several existing academic theses, relating to the Truman
administration, the United States' involvement in Vietnam, colonialism and
decolonization in the postwar period. These primary and secondary sources provide an
examination of Truman, the man, and Truman, the President, during a transitional
administration, which oversaw the passing of the old European order and the
development of a new equilibrium in foreign affairs.

COLONIAL RULE

Before proceeding further, the following discussion will help establish a common
definition of colonial rule as applied to Truman's position on the issue of European
colonialism. First, the terms colonialism and imperialism are interchangeable for the
purpose of this paper when discussing the postwar European empires. 4 A 1972 article on
cultural geography by Michigan State Professor Ronald J. Horvath says "It seems
generally ... agreed that colonialism is a form of domination-the control by individuals or
groups over the territory and/or behavior of other individuals or groups. (Colonialism has
also been seen as a form of exploitation, with emphasis on economic variables ... ).,,5
Thus, this definition would include the safeguarding of closed markets and natural
resources from outside nations as described by the popular historian and prolific author
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Walter LaFeber. 6 The system used by the European powers at the end of the nineteenth
century was one of extracting natural resources from the colonies, using that material to
produce manufactured products and then selling those goods back to the colonies or to
other nations. This system involved a large portion of the world's population and the
European nations who had empires were especially active in the arena of world affairs.
What today may seem like an archaic and outmoded system did not seem so
antiquated in the mid-twentieth century. During this period, the European empires
controlled over twenty percent of the world's land mass and a large share of the world's
economy.7 Despite the large geographic areas concerned, the colonial control, or
imperialism, practiced by the Europeans involved few settlers from the homeland
residing permanently in the colony. Nevertheless, the European nations wielded almost
unlimited control over the governmental and economic affairs of their colonies by means
of an imperial administration managed from the motherland's capital in Europe or
England. 8 This external control over the colonies' indigenous people also increased the
power of the European nations in ways other than economic. One example was the use
of colonial troops in both World Wars to augment the European nations' power. The
additional work force available to the European combatants is one reason the conflicts
were able to go global. 9 Other aspects that increased the empire's power included the
ability to base land and naval forces around the world, which increased the global
influence of the Europeans. Moreover, the historic rivalries that existed between the
European empires produced tensions that increased the odds of direct confrontation.
Since the colonies caused these clashes, and provided the men to tight them, they, in turn,
would be a factor in any foreign affair equation. 10
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From the end of the First World War to the end of the Second World War, the colonial
empires of Europe were at their most extensive and covered a large part of the globe. I I
The British Empire had by far the largest group of colonies and its size recalls the wellknown adage; "an empire on which the sun never sets.,,12 In fact, by the end of the
Second World War the British Empire and Commonwealth included more than sixty
nations around the world.13 Even in the economically troubled period after the Second
World War the Britain Empire was still important, producing worldwide " ... almost a
quarter of all manufactured exports in 1950.,,14 For these reasons when the United States
government focused on the subject of colonialism in the 1930s, 40s and 50s, they were
normally looking at the colonies of the British Empire.
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CHAPTER II
HISTORIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

The foreign affairs focused historiographical interpretation of the larger field of Cold
War history is well established. Throughout the various accounts of the Cold War, the
central question has been; which faction was primarily responsible for the development
of the conflict? The answer to this query has resulted in different schools of thought.
Historians Arthur Schlesinger, Herbert Feis and Louis Halle gave rise to the first school's
interpretation. l Their belief was that during the early postwar period, before the start of
the Cold War, the United States' foreign policy was passive in nature2 and focused on
efforts such as the establishment of the United Nations' trusteeship program. This early
school maintains that despite the United States' best efforts to befriend the Russians, the
USSR-United States conflict was unavoidable. This traditional view also argues that the
Soviet Union precipitated the Cold War because of their aggressive attitude and empire
building. These ideas were dominant until the late 1950s and the advent of the Vietnam
War. Younger historians then started to disagree with that analysis and began to place
the blame in large part on America's efforts to establish a United States-friendly world
economic hegemony. William Appleman Williams3 led the newer school of thought and
its champion was Walter LaFeber. 4 This school's analysis argues that the Russians were
too weak after the Second World War to be a credible threat to the United States and
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therefore could not have drawn the United States into the Cold War. These Cold War
revisionists also portray the Roosevelt and Truman administrations as less than
committed to universalism, the idea that nations should work together for the common
good of humanity. Instead, the revisionists assert that the motivation for both
administrations was self-interest and that they pursued their goals at the expense of other
nations. 5 A later group of historians, led by John Lewis Gaddis and sometimes described
as the Post-revisionism school, proposed yet another interpretation of events. 6 Gaddis'
view is, in some ways, a blend of the previous schools with America's world economic
hegemony efforts being more benign and defensive in nature rather than domineering. 7
This latest school seeks to establish a balance and places the blame for starting the Cold
War on both the United States and USSR. Moreover, Gaddis points out that, for one,
FDR placed the winning of the war and protecting the postwar alliance above all other
foreign policy considerations to include anti-colonialism. s These schools of thought also
include other suppositions on the nature of the Cold War but the theories described here
seem to be the most relevant to the subject of colonialism and America's subsequent
foreign policy.
No unified body of work or specific school of study exists that analyzes Truman's
position on the issue of colonialism. Therefore, it is impossible to ascertain cohesive
trends or contrasting theories based on exclusive publications concerning Truman and
colonialism in the postwar era. Instead, this historiographical analysis draws from
literature concerning the period, associated subjects, and people that were involved in the
ongoing events. This analysis groups together related books and articles to allow the
review of theories and trends that may be occurring throughout the literature. This
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historiographical review begins with a focus on Truman and the published works
highlighting his life.
The review begins by focusing on an examination of some of the foremost and bestknown Truman biographies to gain an understanding of how Truman's administration
related to European colonialism and to look for clues regarding his personal stance on the
subject. Overall, these biographies provide similar accounts concerning Truman's
attitudes though they offer varying perspectives on parallel events. McCullough's
mainstream biography is typical of the others in the sense that he does not deal directly
with the issue of Truman's personal vision of colonialism or decolonization. Rather, the
popular biographer discusses the various crises and ordeals that surrounds the decay of
the European empires and describes how Truman mentally approaches such problems. In
particular, McCullough discusses the birth ofthe United Nations, some facets ofthe
trusteeship system, and the decline of Britain. He also provides glimpses into Truman's
psyche and world-view as they relate to the issue of colonialism. McCullough portrays
Truman as an intelligent, though not brilliant man, and one far more complex than is
recognized by the pUblic. 9 He made a key point when he noted that Truman was more a
man of the nineteenth rather than the twentieth century and an individual who idolized
the concept of Jeffersonian Democracy. 10 However, contrary to Jefferson, who rejected
the idea of entangling foreign alliances, Truman embraced the idea of the United Nations,
at least in the beginning. II Alonzo Hamby, Ohio State Professor of History wrote a
biography that, like McCullough has, claimed that nineteenth-century ideology was the
foundation for Truman's decision-making process. He repeatedly contends that,
reputation notwithstanding, Truman was not rash in his decision-making and fully
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analyzed the input from his advisors. 12 Hamby's Truman was a man who believed that
"one could achieve idealistic ends by realistic means.,,13 In addition, Hamby noted that
Truman tended to deal with problems in the foreign policy arena as soon as they came up
which, in turn, had implications for his administration's overall foreign policy.14
Emeritus Professor of History at Indiana University, Robert Ferrell's biography is
different from the others in that it depicts a Truman who seems less involved in foreign
affairs that delve into the issue of colonialism. Moreover, Ferrell does not examine
foreign policy decisions as deeply as the other two biographers do in their books.
Nevertheless, Ferrell's insights do not differ significantly from Hamby's and
McCullough's instead reinforcing the point that Truman's foreign policy focus was on
other issues, such as Europe's overall well-being and the power imbalances found in
other regions of the world. While scant solid evidence exists in the biographies about
Truman's actual opinions about colonialism, policy decisions made by his administration,
as well as the insights provided his biographers, offer sufficient information to infer that
Truman was ideologically opposed to the idea of imperialism.
A survey of history books covering the period also provides more insight into the
Truman administration's foreign policies and decision-processes relating to the colonial
issue. The vast majority of these books tend to focus on the Cold War aspect of foreign
affairs to the almost total exclusion of other foreign affair issues. In fact, the majority of
history books reviewed here seemed to avoid the subject of colonialism. The ones that
did mention colonialism did so only in passing and then only when talking about the
tinancial problems being experienced in Western Europe at the time. Nevertheless, the
examined history books covered a range of topics such as the Cold War, American
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foreign policy, the Truman administration, Great Britain's postwar history and Vietnam,
which provided some useful infonnation relating to the subject of colonialism.
The Cold War history books tended to touch on the issue of colonialism by how it
affected individual crises rather than in a systemic way. An exception was Yale
Professor John L. Gaddis' 2005 book, The Cold War: A New History,IS where the author
spends a few pages discussing the demise of colonialism after the Second World War.
Gaddis makes some interesting points, beginning with the previously propounded idea
that the First and Second World War's were the root cause ofthe end of colonialism
and that the consequences of these wars were realized twenty or thirty years later.

16
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Additionally, he claimed that Americans, including the State Department, opposed the
concept of colonialism since this antiquated system reflected badly not only on the
Europeans but on the United States as well. 18 However, Gaddis' comments have to do
with the people of the United States and the Truman administration in general rather than
specifically with Truman, the individual. Another well-known Cold War historian and
prominent Emeritus Professor from Cornell University, Walter LaFeber, discusses the
topic of colonialism in the same general tenns as Gaddis though he does not provide as
convenient and encapsulated look at colonialism in the post-World War Two era. On the
other hand, LaFeber's narrative goes into greater depth while focusing more on the
economic aspects of colonialism. One of the most important aspects that LaFeber
touched upon was that Americans disliked the closed markets that resulted from the
protectionist trade methods intrinsic to the European colonial system. Another key point
that LaFeber made was that the dislike of Americans' focused on the largest, best-known
grouping of colonies that was the British Empire. 19 However, LaFeber does not identify
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any particular person in the Truman administration as leading the fight against British
colonialism. He does describe Truman and his advisors as attempting to deal with the
instability of colonies, and former colonies, and contends that this instability had a ripple
effect on a weakened Europe. 2o Both books provide insight into the topic without
providing a complete picture on the issue of colonialism.
There are numerous books discussing the field of diplomacy and United States foreign
policy that touch upon the subject of colonialism. Two of the major works reviewed here
that focus on the United States' perspective of diplomacy are LaFeber's The American
Age: U.S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad 1750 to the Presenr i and Ferrell's
American Diplomacy: A History.22 Ferrell's book provides a brief account ofFDR and
Truman's lack of efforts in Indochina. He argues that they failed to stop the French
government from attempting to re-exert control, particularly in the country of Vietnam
during and after the war, and that this inaction sums up the issue of colonialism. Ferrell
further says that France's attempt countered the trend of other postwar imperialist
European nations who were starting to shed their colonies?3 LaFeber's foreign policy
analysis provides a much broader picture of the United States' response to colonialism.
As in LaFeber's previously reviewed Cold War book, economics again plays a big role in
understanding the American standpoint and he covered Britain's Imperial Preference
System of the 1930's which barred the United States from a number of profitable markets
around the world?4 LaFeber does mention FOR's efforts to break up European
imperialism including the Bretton Woods Accords that attempted to open British
markets. 25 He also comments about the friction during the war between FOR and both
Winston Churchill and Charles de Gualle over the issue of colonialism. 26 LaFeber's
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discussion of Truman and colonialism centered on the problems experienced in Indochina
and, though he was quite clear about where FDR stood on the issue, he is vague on
Truman's stance. In the case of the Netherlands and Indonesia LaFeber indicated that the
United States forced the Dutch government to yield to Indonesian interests. Conversely,
he implied that the Truman administration supported French efforts in Vietnam. 27 Once
again, the authors cited here provide some understanding of events which influenced
decisions regarding the United States' foreign policy without providing either Truman's
or his administration's overall position on the subject of colonialism.
Charles Robertson's 1975 book, International Politics Since World War II; A Short
History,28 looks beyond American centric foreign policies and into the international realm
of diplomacy. Nevertheless, Robertson makes points similar to those touched upon by
LaFeber and Ferrell though he also includes more about colonialism as it relates to the
Truman administration. Robertson, Emeritus Professor of Government Smith College,
links discussion of colonialism together with events during the Second World War and to
activities of the European powers in the immediate postwar period. The basis of this
connection was the decision by FOR's administration to give the British total control
over the Southeast Asian theater of operations during the Second World War. 29 This
decision allowed European imperialists to more easily return to their old colonies as the
Japanese withdrew. Robertson does cover efforts, not touched on by the earlier reviewed
books, of both the Roosevelt and Truman administrations' to end colonialism by using
the United States' influence in the United Nations to help fornmlate the trusteeship
program. He also covers the familiar Cold War themes of declining European power,
destabilization of the underdeveloped countries and the growth of a bi-polar world
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centered on the United StateslUSSR conflict. 30 Robertson contends that Truman was
aware that the European colonial system was waning and believed that the United States
needed to help smooth the changeover from colony to nation in the underdeveloped
regions of the world. He makes that point during his discussion about Truman's Point
Four Program, a program intended to help underdeveloped countries transition from their
former colonial statuS. 3l While Robertson's book does consider the impact of
colonialism on the period, more than the other volumes discussed, his primary focus
remains upon the growing conflict between the United States and the USSR.
Other foreign policy books have examined the subject of colonialism and America's
response in a much more roundabout manner. Nonetheless, they can still provide some
insight into the issue and help to clarify fundamental points. The first book considered is
an example where little mention is specifically made of colonialism yet it is still able to
provide useful information. John Spanier's American Foreign Policy Since World War
II 32 mentions economic factors in a manner similar to LaFeber' s critical appraisal of the
Cold War. The University of Florida History Professor Spanier talks about the
importance of the Open Door trading model to American foreign policy and the
traditional opposition of the European powers to that principle. 33 He also touches on the
impact of the severe weather that occurred during the winter of 1947, which brought the
economic problems of Britain to ahead. 34 Brutal winter conditions immobilized the
country and produced a debilitating effect upon a British economy already suffering from
the decline of the British Empire. This natural catastrophe had the additional effect of
focusing the attention of the United States upon the plight of British and Western
European empires. Another crisis related to the Truman administration discussed in the
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book, was Vietnam. Spanier noted that though Truman was unenthusiastic about the
situation and troubled by the French actions in the region he nevertheless overcame his
qualms and backed France's attempt to reassert influence over their former colonies.

35

This American foreign policy book, with its limited references to colonialism, is typical
for the majority of the books reviewed and illustrates how the reader is obliged to read
between the lines to glean information on the subject.
An interesting exception is a book contemporary to the period. In 1956, the

Brookings Institution published United States Foreign Policy 1945-1955 36 by Professor
of Political Science William Reitzel that provides further information about colonialism
and the Truman administration. This book contains some Truman quotes from a 1946
State Department Bulletin that are anti-colonial. To summarize Truman's statement; he
warns Great Britain and other nations with interests in the Far East that the United States
supports the sovereign rights of native peoples around the world, further that no changes
should occur without the express agreement of the local people and finally, that those
same people should be able to ultimately choose their own government. 37 Reitzel also
makes other interesting points about the issue of colonialism and its affect on foreign
affairs of the period. He talks about the Soviet Union's support for the decolonization
movement in the underdeveloped parts of the world and the motivation behind their
stance. He argues that the Soviet motives are to weaken the Western Block by
diminishing European empires and to further their own aims by appearing sympathetic
and encouraging to the developing countries of the world. 38 Reitzel examines the United
States' policy on the issue of colonialism during the immediate postwar period. The
United States policy adhered to the idea that self-determination was inevitable and that
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everyone would gain from a methodical and orderly process. For this reason, the Truman
administration believed that the United Nations should manage the transition process
from colony to independent nation. 39 The perceived threats to this approach were the
Communists who would attempt to disrupt the changeover and foment chaos and anarchy
for their own benefit. This viewpoint would endure in Cold War policy books during the
ensuing decades until the end of the Cold War period.
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The next three books examined recount events and crises of the Truman
administration with more insight into policy decisions relating, directly and indirectly, to
the issue of colonialism. First considered is Washington correspondent and newspaper
journalist Robert Donovan's work, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S.
Truman. 41 The book's discussion of colonialism centers on the British and French
Empires. These empires were already declining when Truman assumed the role of
President and the United States was beginning to fill the inevitable vacuum they were
leaving behind. 42 In the beginning of his administration, Truman assumed the policies
left to him by FDR without apparent deviation. In an interesting aside, Donovan implies
that FDR, not Truman, began the policy of support for the French return to Indochina.
LaFeber originated the idea that FDR's anti-colonial stand weakened in the case of
Vietnam and other historians then set out to explore his work. 43 Donovan maintains that
Truman was so overwhelmed with urgent concerns when he became President that,
almost by default, he assumed a policy of benign neglect toward colonialism when he
took over in the White House. 44 In Britain's case, the transition from British Empire to
Commonwealth seemed to be progressing well under Prime Minster Clement Attlee and
his Labour Party, as illustrated by the end of colonial rule in India. Truman approved of
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this evolution and his appreciative attitude established a good working relationship
between the two countries through the six years the Labour Party was in power.

45

Nevertheless, Donovan explained that Truman's benign neglect on the issue of
colonialism undermined his Asian foreign policy and brought about the crises in China
and Korea later in his administration.
Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, at the time junior editors at Time and Newsweek
magazines respectively, collaborated on The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They
Made. 46 Published about ten years after Donovan's book, their work paints a similar
picture of the Truman administration while reflecting different motivations for their
actions. For example, the authors point out that Truman was inclined to follow FDR's
lead when it came to foreign affairs and had a long track record of backing Roosevelt's
policy decisions while in Congress and again as Vice-President. 47 They also point to key
differences between the Presidents' foreign policy management styles, which aid in
understanding Truman's policies on colonialism. FDR was directive about his foreign
policy objectives and the means he wanted to use to reach them while Truman was more
of a team player who sought concurrence when dealing with diplomacy issues. 48 The
contention that Truman was more comfortable functioning as part of a team does play
into the overall theme of the book that is about a group of senior diplomats and advisors
to Presidents. Additionally, the idea that Truman based decisions upon consensus
building does help to clarify his record on colonialism, since the authors make the
argument that Truman's advisors were Anglophiles. This pro-British image does
introduce the suggestion that Truman was less anti-imperialist than his predecessor was
in office. Another important point made in the book was that with Churchill out of power
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the government was actively decolonizing the British Empire.49 In fact, the rapidity of
British withdrawals caused concern within the Truman administration and forced the
United States to compete with the USSR over filling the power vacuums created by the
declining British Empire. 5o The ensuing struggle with Russia caused the United States to
drop the dissolution of the British Empire as America's foreign policy centerpiece and
establish new objectives. With regard to the issue of France and Vietnam the authors do
not subscribe to LaFeber's belief that FDR changed the United States' policy direction
rather, they contend the Truman administration's Cold War objectives caused the
divergence in the Vietnam policy from the earlier administration's position. 51
The final book of this trio on Truman and his advisors was A Preponderance of
Power52 by Professor of History from the University of Virginia, Melvyn Leffler. Of
these three histories, Leffler's book provides the most examples of the Truman
administration's efforts to intervene in the issue of colonialism in the postwar period. He
talks about the trend in United States foreign affairs to slow the process and reduce the
upheaval caused by nationalist movements in undeveloped nations around the world. 53
While other books touch upon the perceived phobia about Communist-sponsored
underdeveloped countries' nationalism within the State Department Leffler also balances
this phobia with other influences on Truman's foreign policy. Foremost was Truman the
man. Truman's knowledge in relation to the field of foreign affairs was imperfect54 and
resulted in some major blunders regarding the issue of colonialism. Two significant
miscalculations occurred early in his administration when he underestimated the overall
instability and weakness of Great Britain and Europe and then did not realize that the
nationalist movements in the underdeveloped regions of the world were exploding out of
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control. 55 Both of these missteps showed a lack of knowledge and experience and
resulted in unintended consequences. Another example concerned the issue of overseas
bases and the proposed United Nations (UN) trusteeship for islands in the Pacific. The
retention of these holdings by the United States for military purposes served to undercut
the trusteeship concept and undermined the whole process of decolonization. Both of
these examples demonstrate the challenge of recognizing colonial-related issues, not
identified as such, and serve to illustrate once again why a researcher needs to assess
carefully all available information to understand Truman's position on colonialism.
Leffler does mention that in Truman's first term the administration did attempt to support
a policy of decolonization, to some extent, by calling on the major imperial European
governments to reach some type of an accommodation with the various nationalist
movements. 56 The Truman administration also used their policy regarding granting
autonomy to the Philippines as an example of how to approach decolonization. 57 All the
same, Leffler called these attempts by the United States State Department to influence
European decolonization ineffective and halfhearted at best. 58 In addition, he also agreed
with LaFeber that FDR, despite his previously anti-colonial stance, was supportive of
efforts to return French colonial rule to Indochina before the end of the war. 59 Leffler
concurs with the idea, which remains constant throughout all accounts of Truman's
foreign policy, that the Cold War overrode all other concerns in the area of foreign
affairs.6o He also observed that obtaining millions of dollars through the Marshall Plan
enabled the European empires to shore up their colonies. 61 Therefore, Leffler argues that
Truman's foreign policy decisions, such as implementing the Marshall Plan, were procolonial in nature.
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These three books about the Truman administration do provide insights into the
United States government's response to colonialism in the postwar period and their
accounts are more detailed than the other groups of literature reviewed. They portray
Truman as wanting to follow the plans of FOR. They raise questions about the policies
founded by the prior administration. Then, they consider the impact these previous
decisions had upon Truman's perspective on the subject. Unlike the dearth of
information regarding Truman vis-a.-vis colonialism there have been several accounts
published about Franklin Roosevelt's Presidency that offer arguments about whether or
not FOR was against colonialism in both word and deed.
The generally accepted idea among the reviewed authors is that FOR was against the
idea of empires ruling over a closed economic system of colonies. 62 These books and
articles support the view that FOR's rhetoric was anti-colonial. The first book in a series
of Roosevelt histories reviewed is the 1989 edition of Major Problems in American
Foreign Policy Volume II: Since 191463 which includes an essay taken from a book titled
The United States at War, 1941-1945 by Bowling Green University Professor Gary
Hess. 64 Hess reiterates Roosevelt's known postwar objectives, including one that called
for "the gradual demise of colonial empires leading eventually to independent states in
Asia and Africa.,,65 In the same essay, Hess considers the practical aspects of FOR's
policy as well as the 1945 Yalta accords that establish the idea of the United Nation's
Trusteeship System. The trusteeship agreement wording is sufficiently general that
former and current colonies might, or might not, be included. Then in addition,
Roosevelt, and other participants of the Yalta Conference, decided to put off the selection
of actual territories to be in the trusteeship program until a later date. 66 The vague
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wording of the agreement and delay in identifying specific territories for inclusion was a
deliberate choice made by Roosevelt in order to protect the allies' fragile coalition. 67
Still, Hess argues that FDR was an unwavering champion of decolonization and that he
focused his efforts on French colonies in Indochina to set an example for other colonial
powers, particularly the British Empire. 68 A 2003 book titled Franklin D. Roosevelt and
the Formation of the Modem World,69 reinforced the view that FDR believed colonialism
was not only a bad social and economic concept but that its continued existence would be
the biggest threat to the expansion of democracy in the postwar world.

7o

The contributor

of this chapter, and co-editor of the book Howard Thomas, Professor of History from
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, believes that the British were the
focus ofFDR's anti-colonial stance, which coincides with what Hess suggested in his
essay.7! Howard also agrees that Roosevelt did not waver in his opposition to
colonialism. In fact, Howard thought that FDR's position was undermined after his death
when, at the first meeting of the United Nation's Trusteeship Council, the United States
delegation yielded to European pressure and changed the wording of the council's
purpose from helping territories achieve independence to the more benign term of
attaining self-government. His analysis places the blame for the weakening of the
trusteeship program, and thus its ability to help end European imperial rule, squarely
upon the Truman administration. Other authors also share this view. In a 1972 article,
Hess claims that Truman killed the trusteeship concept by his support for the French
intentions in Indochina. Moreover, Hess blames FDR for not doing enough to protect the
trusteeship idea and guarantee his anti-colonialism legacy. 72
Reverend Wilson Miscamble, Professor of History at Notre Dame University,
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considers the question ofFDR's colonial foreign policy in his 2007 book, From
Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War. 73 He makes the point that
Roosevelt was opposed to colonialism and viewed it as a bigger threat than
communism. 74 He also incorporates the conventional view that FDR kept his own
council when it came to issues of State. 75 Miscamble alleges that the explanation given
to the analysis ofFDR's foreign policy hinges upon the historian's viewpoint, in that
Roosevelt was either a realist or a naIve operator in the realm of foreign affairs.
According to the author, these conflicting interpretations ofFDR's policies rest upon
judgments by analysts about whether or not a decision by FDR had the desired effect. In
some respects, Miscamble does deviate from other interpretations ofFDR's efforts
towards decolonization. He claims that FDR's objective to promote independence for
former colonies always took a back seat to the necessity of protecting the wartime
alliance and ensuring that the United States remained the dominant partner well into the
postwar period. Miscamble contends that the truth of the situation was that Roosevelt's
administration took no practical steps, beyond the President's persuasive rhetoric, to
establish a true anti-colonial policy. 76 Additionally, FDR did not share the particulars of
his policies with anyone; hence, the means used to achieve his goals were open to
interpretation upon his death. 77 This understanding ofFDR's legacy differs from the
other books reviewed which take a stand, one way or the other, on FDR's anti-colonial
efforts. For example, a 1982 book by John Gaddis explains FDR's brilliant use of the
term linkage to describe the combine use of the powers of State to breakup the British
Empire during the war. 78 Conversely, a 1975 article by LaFeber places the blame upon
FDR for reversing his position on the trusteeship program during the later part of the war
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and well before Truman took over in the White House.

79

Lastly, Miscamble embraces

another theme consistent with other Roosevelt histories. While FDR disliked all the
colonial powers in Europe, he focused his efforts on Churchill and the British Empire. 8o
The British centric histories of decolonization in the postwar period point out that they
did more than any other European power to bring about the end of colonialism. 81 Only
two of the researched books about the British Empire discussed the Roosevelt and
Truman administrations to any degree. The first book, British Decolonization. 19461997: When, Why and How did the British Empire Fall?82 by New Zealand's University
of Canterbury History Professor David McIntyre, cites the pressure of the United States
on the British government during the Second World War as a major factor in hastening
the end of the British Empire. He adds that the inception of the Cold War in the late
1940s reduced the impetus for the United States to end colonial rule. 83 This position is at
odds with British reporter Brian Lapping's book End of Empire84 where the author
examined United States policies on a case-by-case basis to assess the overall effect it had
upon Britain's decolonization efforts after the war. Specifically, Lapping cites Palestine
and Egypt as case studies of the United States' efforts to end colonialism in the postwar
period. 85 In the case of Egypt, Lapping also goes on to cite other motives for the United
States efforts to end Britain's colonial power in the oil rich region. He also argues that in
the case of Palestine, Truman was looking more at Jewish voters in the United States than
events in the Middle East when he recognized the State of Israel. 86 These two Britishcentric books agree about the Roosevelt administration's decolonization policy but reveal
a mixed interpretation of United States policies under Truman.
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An additional review of the joint United States / United Kingdom (UK) postwar
foreign policy history provides a more inclusive picture of both the FOR and Truman
administration's efforts toward British decolonization while simultaneously reinforcing
points made in other books examined in this section. The book, The United States. Great
Britain, and the Cold War: 1944-194787 by Texas A&M University History Professor
Terry Anderson, makes Roosevelt's hatred of the British Empire sound even more
vicious than other accounts. 88 Contrary to other versions, Anderson states that the early
Truman administration renewed demands on the British to end imperialism. Moreover.
the author contends that the new President personally disliked the British colonial system,
and was suspicious of Churchill's efforts to enlarge the British Empire after the war. 89
Anderson also makes the point that Truman made an effort at the beginning of his time in
office to continue FOR's foreign policies. 9o Additionally, he claims that the desire to
expand United States businesses into new markets, such as those found in the
economically sheltered colonies of the British Empire, reinforced Truman's
decolonization position. 91 Anderson notes that Truman's position later evolves because
of the Cold War and refocuses on opposing communism rather than colonialism. 92 He
also argues that another factor to consider when discussing the British process of
decolonization was the assumption of power by the Labour Party whose stated goal was
to transform the British Empire into a Commonwealth. 93 Anderson's depiction of
Truman as a new President shows an individual who shared Roosevelt's dislike and
distrust for the British's colonial regime. In the same vein, Ohio State Professor of
History Peter Hahn observed in his book The United States. Great Britain, and Egypt.
1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War94 that the Cold War did divert
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the United States from decolonization efforts and focused attention upon the Soviets.
Nevertheless, Truman's administration still sought to diminish British domination over
their colonies, especially in the Middle East. 95 However, the British Empire was not the
only European power to come under the United States scrutiny. An examination of the
literature concerning the French colonial system provides another viewpoint about the
history of Truman and his administration.
The final collection of literature reviewed for information about Truman's position on
the issue of colonialism concerns the Vietnam histories. As with the other groups
reviewed here, the histories on Vietnam reinforce the idea that Roosevelt was opposed to
colonialism and against French efforts to return to Indochina. However, an entry found
in the 2003 Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War by Purdue University
History Professor Patrick J. Hearden 96 does indicate that shortly before his death FDR
was softening his position and not pushing for trusteeship of the former Indochina
colonies. 97 The fact that Roosevelt was beginning to back off in this area is reinforced by
the most notorious, ifnot the most definitive, history of the Vietnam conflict commonly
called the Pentagon Papers, which indicate a moderation ofFDR's position by 1945. 98 If
Roosevelt had indeed shifted his position this action could indicate whether Truman's
subsequent policy decisions were in fact a continuation of the former President's policies
or a sign of Truman's true feelings. At the very least, questions about the softening of
FDR's anti-colonial stance and uncertainty about policies of one administration
transferring intact to the next indicate a more complex interpretation of events than
indicated elsewhere. Regardless of the underlying reasons, most histories agree that
France's attempt to restore their colonial control over Indochina in the postwar period
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drew the United States into the Vietnam War. In fact, many historians cite Truman's
1950 decision to provide aid to France for operations in Vietnam as the beginning of the
United States' involvement. 99 Other books, such as University of Massachusetts
Professor of History Loren Baritz's Backfire, 100 consider aspects of the Truman
administration's Cold War mentality, such as the Truman Doctrine and National Security
Council Study (NSC-68), as even more evidence to link Truman to America's
involvement in Vietnam. 101 That aside, the fact that Truman provided financial support
to French operations in Indochina provides the most substantial evidence so far that
Truman might endorse colonialism.
At length, one can see that by reviewing the period's literature, drawing upon
associated subjects and considering persons of interest a researcher can identify some
themes that influenced Truman and his administration's position on the issue of
colonialism. For example, extensive analysis of Roosevelt's position concerning
colonialism is available and various conclusions are discernible. First, no doubt exists
that FDR opposed colonialism in any form though there are some questions about the
state in which FDR left the decolonization policy upon his death. Depending upon the
author one can find arguments that Roosevelt had: 1) a robust decolonization program; 2)
an ineffectual program based solely on rhetoric; or 3) a policy that was in actuality
diverging from its originally anti-colonial position. In the same vein, again depending
upon the author, one can find a depiction of Truman as either steadfastly supporting
FDR's legacy or changing foreign policies to a Cold War-centric view of the world with
little room for anti-colonialist sentiment.
The examined literature includes both academic works like the volumes by LaFeber,

26

Gaddis and Hahn as well as books aimed at a broader general audience such as
McCullough and Lapping's. The academic works included many entries by historians
but also contained publications by political science scholars that helped to augment the
inquiry by providing access to diverse methodologies and points of view. Nevertheless,
across this varied spectrum no significant differences were discernable between authors
from the various specialties when they discussed similar material. Real differentiation
was noted when the analysis was divided into subject areas which encompassed Truman,
his administration and the state of colonialism in the postwar period. For example, Cold
War history books place little importance upon the subject of European colonialism and
dedicate little analysis to the issue and even less to Truman's role. The primary
exception is that most of the books and articles do discuss Truman's role in helping
French efforts to reestablish colonial rule over Indochina. Other than that, when the
subject of American anti-colonialism comes up in Cold War literature the issue of
colonial markets closed to external competition is also raised. LaFeber provides the best
description of opening colonial markets when he writes about the United States'
perpetual quest for new markets under the guise of the "Open Door" policy. 102
Another theme garnered from the literature was that the United Nations' trusteeship
program was at the center ofthe United States' decolonization efforts. Both the
Roosevelt and Truman administrations wanted the United Nations to take on the role of
supervising the demise of the European empires and developing the emerging nations in
the postwar period. Complementing this approach was the belief by Truman, among
others, that decolonization should be a deliberate and orderly process. However, the
ultimate impact the trusteeship program had and the support it received from the United
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States is open to debate. Moreover, while the United States expected the United Nations
to establish systemic means to help develop new nations there was still concern that the
USSR would seize control of nationalist movements in the underdeveloped regions of the
world. Thus, the fear of Communist expansion links to the issue of decolonization as
expressed in the Truman administration's Cold War rhetoric.
The effect Truman's other foreign policy programs, the Marshal Plan and the Point
Four Program, had upon the issue of European colonial rule is uncertain. Some accounts
point to the Marshal Plan's funding of European powers as bolstering their efforts to
shore up control in their colonies but these reports are vague about the true intent of the
Truman administration. There does not seem to be a consensus about whether these
programs intended to help the Europeans recover from the debilitations caused by the
Second World War or instead were elements of a unified policy to shore up European
control over their colonies.
The British-centric history books mentioned that the United States applied pressure on
Britain during both the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, to expedite the
decolonization process in Palestine, Egypt and India. As a point of fact, Great Britain
was not the only European country pushed by the United States to facilitate
decolonization. The literature indicates that the Americans also prodded the Dutch
government to settle with its colonies in Indonesia. However, most European countries
wanted to retain control of their colonial holdings. England was the exception with its
accelerated transformation from the British Empire to a Commonwealth under the
postwar Labour Party.
As asserted at the beginning of this historiography section, and confirmed by a review
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of a number of books and articles, no established schools of thought exist which address
Truman's position on the European empires of the postwar period. However, of the
books written that focus on the Cold War and the administration, Gaddis' Cold War book
provides the most persuasive support for the idea that the Truman administration was
against the concept of colonialism. Furthermore, LaFeber's in-depth analysis, reinforced
by the other writings noted here, endorse the concept that Americans have an inherent
dislike of the closed markets that grow from colonial systems. This analysis adds force to
Gaddis' notion about the Truman administration's anti-colonial stance. Therefore, based
upon the sources examined, a reasonable interpretation is that there was an anti-colonial
attitude in the Truman administration. When discussing Truman's private convictions the
biographies naturally provide the best insight into Truman's personal response to
colonialism. McCullough's biography is the most readable and provides an engaging
picture of the President from Missouri. Hamby's Truman is similar to McCullough's but
he backs up his analysis with more in-depth research. They both depicted President
Truman as an intelligent man who, while not brilliant, grew into the job. Additionally,
they portray Truman as practicing consensus building and point up the fact that he was
active in the arena of foreign affairs relating to colonialism. Ferrell's research is welldocumented but does not focus on foreign policy subjects relating to colonialism, such as
international trade, and therefore is less useful concerning the topic of this paper. None
of the biographies captures Truman's dislike for colonialism in unmistakable terms that
provide firm conclusions. As for Roosevelt's legacy on European colonialism and
Indochina, the detailed research and facts in the books by Robertson and Donovan best
capture his deep dislike for colonialism while he was still compromising with the
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European powers over the colonies postwar future. However, none of the books
satisfactorily addresses the conjecture over the meaning and impact ofFDR's decisions to
allow France's return to Indochina.
Even with the themes found in the material examined, no widespread consensus is
apparent about the Truman administration's position on European colonial rule. As a
result, further analysis is required to decipher the information and determine what
Truman's personal and policy positions were concerning imperialism. The remainder of
this paper will attempt to draw upon the material reviewed and the data collected to
provide an answer to the question of whether Truman supported or opposed colonialism
and whether his enacted foreign policies supported his personal position.
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CHAPTER III
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT I WORLD WAR TWO

As discussed in the historiographic section of the paper, FDR appears to be anticolonial and anti-imperialist. Roosevelt's anti-colonial tendencies become more
apparent when talking about FDR and the British Empire. This section will build upon
the information already presented about Truman's predecessor and examine FDR's
legacy on the subject. Also reviewed will be the state of the existing policies about
European colonialism that Roosevelt's administration left for Truman and his team to
deal with in the waning days of the war and beyond. The assessment ofFDR's legacy
win help to clarify the circumstances, both within the government and in the world at
large, which framed Truman's understanding of the world beyond the United States
borders and his administration's foreign policy concerning European colonization.
First, FDR's position on the evils of colonialism did not develop in a vacuum but
rather was the prevailing view among the American population before the Second World
War. However, during that conflict a wartime rapport developed between the United
States and the United Kingdom. Winston Churchill. in his famous 1946 Iron Curtain
Speech at Westminster College in Fulton Missouri, even gave a name to this close
association as the "Special Relationship".l Churchill's speech, given in Truman's home
state a year after Roosevelt's death, indicated that this rapport remained strong even as
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the Cold War was heating up. The unique nature of this bond was no doubt due in large
part to the common history, language, and traditions shared by the two nations. The
affinity alluded to by Churchill in his 1946 speech had contributed to the unprecedented
associations undertaken by the two nations' leaders and militaries which combined their
staffs in order to plan and conduct operations during the Second World War? Just a few
of these joint organizations included, "the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Combined Food
Board, Combined Production and Resources Board, Combined Raw Materials Board ...
and later the Manhattan Project.,,3
In spite of the close relationship, some frictions existed between the two nations. For
instance, historically Americans have disliked anything English, a mindset that goes back
to the colonial period of North America. The American Civil War when the British
entertained the idea of establishing formal diplomatic relations with the Confederacy
reinforced this attitude. The English also profited from doing business with the rebels,
which upset the Northern population. The most notorious example of this profiteering
was when the British built three heavily armed commerce raiders, the Florida,

Shenandoah and Alabama, for the Confederates. The Confederate navy then used these
vessels to conduct wartime operations that included attacking Northern-whaling ships. 4
The Union wartime press angrily described the Confederate-commanded raiders as "Built
of English oak, in an English yard, armed with English guns, manned by an English crew
.... ,,5

In the early Twentieth Century, there had been some popular anger over England's

failure to payoff World War One debts, and in the 1920s and 1930s politicians were
currying favor with the American Irish by running anti-British campaigns. 6 FDR
understood this historic animosity and tried to explain to Churchill how Americans could
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work with the British while still harboring ill feelings towards them. Roosevelt said,
"I've been trying to tell him ... It's in the American tradition, this distrust, this dislike
and even hatred of Britain-the Revolution, you know, and 1812; and India and the Boer
War, and all that.,,7
Despite this historic enmity, a major part of America's Anglophobia later focused
upon various aspects of British colonial rule that many Americans considered archaic,
and not befitting modem times. In reality, American anti-imperialism to a large degree
caused the British central government to alter some colonial policies during the war, such
as promising their prize colony of India independence. The British realized that, to some
extent, future British colonial polices needed the backing of American financial capital. 8
Popular American publications in Great Britain at the time, like Life magazine with its
1942 article titled, "An Open Letter from the Editors of LIFE to the People of England,,,9
further impressed the anti-colonial feelings of the American population upon the British
people. The Life article enlightens the British people about the American viewpoint on
the British Empire in general and the colony ofIndia in particular: 10
... one thing we are sure we are not [emphasis from original] fighting for is to
hold the British Empire together. We don't like to put the matter so bluntly, but we
don't want you to have any illusions. If your strategists are planning a war to hold
the British Empire together they will sooner or later find themselves strategizing all
alone ... , In the light of what you are doing in India, how do you expect us to talk
about 'principles' and look our soldiers in the eye?ll
The editorial pages of other well-known United States publications such as the New York
Daily News and the Chicago Tribune also mirrored this attitude. 12 Near the end of the

war Anglophobia, and its associated rhetoric, had grown to such an extent that it was
affecting public opinion of the United States' closest wartime ally. 13 A national poll
conducted during 1943 showed this anti-imperialist attitude toward the British by
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disclosing that eighty percent of Americans supported rapid independence for the British
colony of India while only twenty percent supported continued British rule. 14 Around
this time, John Hickerson, the State Department's head of European Affairs, also sent a
letter to Dean Acheson which summarized the popular opinion, "As you know, there is
tendency in this country to blame the British in some way for everything that happens
that we don't like.,,15 Furthennore, by the end of the war most of the higher-ranking
representatives in American government felt as did Sumner Welles, a senior State
Department official, "If the war is in fact a war for the liberation of peoples, it must
assure the sovereign equality of peoples throughout the world. ... The age of
imperialism is ended.,,16 A 1975 oral interview with Elbert G. Mathews, a retired State
Department official who oversaw British affairs during the war, verified this belief about
the empires:
I have the distinct impression that during the latter part of the war, when
colonial questions arose, most people in the Department took a Rooseveltian
view: the less colonialism, the better. Yes, I think this is true. It's certainly true of
those I was working with, my own attitudes. In other words, with respect to India,
all of us thought, you know, independence, the sooner the better; they're going to
have lots of problems, but the day of the British Raj is over. 17
Most Americans were not openly hostile to the British, instead viewing them " ... as a
misguided friend unfortunately wedded to a dangerous and outmoded behavior."ls FOR
operated in this domestic environment throughout the Second World War and the Truman
administration assumed the mantle of leadership against this backdrop.
Another aspect of colonialism, which drew public and governmental interest in the
United States, was the issue of trade. In the 1930s, the British government angered many
in the United States when their answer to the Great Depression was the erection of even
greater trade barriers. While colonial rulers have traditionally restricted some access to
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colonial economies, the British, to the particular detriment of American businesses,
intensified the restrictions on outside trade. The British established the Imperial
Preference System that gave trade benefits to all members of the Commonwealth. This
approach included more than just the traditional underdeveloped colonies in Asia, the
Middle East and Africa. The new protectionist rules also included the British Empire's
developed and sovereign countries such as South Africa, Canada, Australia and the
United Kingdom.
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John M. Leddy, a State Department official involved with trade

issues at the time, described the general impression the United States gathered about the
purpose of the British Imperial Preference System:
In other words, it was a way for British industry to get a lock on particular
foreign markets which happened to be politically related to it--the Empire and the
Commonwealth. This affected the underdeveloped world as wen, and not just the
United States. All non-British areas were discriminated against in the British
market by the preference system. Because the preference is nothing more or less
than a tariff discrimination. Therefore, we felt that if tariff barriers and trade
barriers were to come down allover the world then preferences ought to be
eliminated, as a part of that process. The ideal being that you should, generally
speaking, between separate customs territories at any rate, or quasi-independent
areas, apply the principles of the unconditional most-favored-nation clause, or
nondiscrimination . . .. But the great bulk of opinion in the State Department and in
the Government, and I must say I think, indeed, in the Congress as well was that the
British preferential system was an imperial system. It was a colonialist system. It
was one that had bred a great deal of friction between us and the British, and that it
ought to be junked. So that was our position. 2o
Furthermore, others believed that the system created greater economic hardships for
countries that had more limited natural resources, such as Germany and Japan, by
denying them access to needed crops and raw materia1. 21 The economic obstructionist
aspect of the Imperial Preference System is important because it influenced the Great
Depression, World War Two and the early postwar period. Another issue that affected
the Roosevelt and Truman administrations was the developing nationalist movements
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around the world. The movements had been building for some time but the depression of
the 1930s seemed to speed up the process and riots were breaking out in various colonies
around the world, such as the British West Indies. 22
During wartime, FDR had to balance maintaining the alliance while working toward
his goals concerning the postwar world. John Sebrega notes that when Roosevelt was
thinking, "about the postwar world, he did so frequently in terms of the problems of the
prewar world. In other words, he wanted to remove permanently the conditions that had
blighted international affairs during his lifetime.,,23 Roosevelt was a long time disciple of
Wilsonian internationalism dating back to his time in Woodrow Wilson's administration
as Assistant Secretary of the Navy.24 FDR even championed and defended Wilson's
foreign policy beliefs during the heyday of isolationism in the 1930s.25 He also adhered
to the Open Door policy saying he wanted to end "all those artificial restrictions and
controls ... which had created such tragic havoc to world economy during the past
generation.,,26 Given this background, it is understandable that Roosevelt's aim was to
end the chance of future wars through international efforts like those at the Dumbarton
Oaks conference and to establish the economic security freedom called for in the Bretton
Woods Agreement, which would protect against another Great Depression. 27 The
postwar portion ofFDR's overall agenda also called for the United States to take on a
greater role in world affairs, establish some kind of amenable relationship with Russia,
and develop China into a friendly regional power.28 A portion of this agenda, relating
back to his belief in fundamental liberties for all people articulated in his Four Freedom's
Speech,29 aimed at ending conditions such as he saw during a 1942 trip to the British
colony of Gambia, which he described as, "The most horrible thing I have ever seen in
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my life.,,3o More to the point, colonial rule, with its restrictive trade practices and
oppression, was likely to sow the seeds for more volatility and future world wars. 31 The
lofty words of the 1941 Atlantic Charter called for territorial adjustments per the wishes
of the native peoples, affirmed that people have the right to self-determination, and stated
that there should be an end to trade barriers. 32 There are also the words that FDR used
during a 1941 speech to a gathering of the press, '"There has never been, there isn't now,
and there never will be, any race of people on earth fit to serve as masters over their
fellow men .... We believe that any nationality, no matter how small, has the inherent
right to its own nationhood.,,33 Pursuit ofintemational social reform provoked the
cynical British allies who believed that personal hatred and jealousy tainted Roosevelt's
attacks on the British Empire. For instance, the British Foreign Secretary once
questioned FDR's sincerity when Roosevelt called for the independence of Hong Kong,
saying that the President had never offered freedom to any of America's regions like
Hawaii. 34 Still, FDR's primary goal was to maintain the coalition and sustain a
reasonable level of trust with the other alliance leaders. The balance between preserving
the alliance and urging the end of European empires would prove to be a harder challenge
as the war went on. 35
The biggest obstacle to stabilizing the postwar order was Great Britain, with its huge
colonial empire, and its staunch defender Churchill. Churchill, like others in Europe,
understood only that their empires had enabled them to defend against the Germans and
their allies in both World Wars. 36 Churchill's fear was that without the resources of the
British Empire, if another war came the nation would be lost before the Americans could
come to their aid. Churchill understood that various colonies would need increased
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freedoms but believed that they should remain under the benevolent umbrella of the
European powers lead by Her Majesty's Great Britain. 37 Churchill's mental picture for
the future envisioned the traditional balance of power in Europe as radiating out to the
rest of the postwar world. Thus counterbalancing what he expected to be the greatest
threat to world peace, Russia.
Some in Whitehall listened to the American anti-colonialist rhetoric during the war
while others, like Churchill, did not wish to heed the message. 38 These words capture
Churchill's absolute opposition to decolonization, "While there is life in my body no
transfer of British sovereignty will be permissible. ,,39 While not winning every battle, the
pro-empire Churchill was quite successful in fending off many ofFDR's attacks on the
solidarity of the British Empire. 4o When Roosevelt pressed in 1942 for Indian
independence, Churchill feared instability in the region and fought back. He threatened
to resign saying, "I have not become the King's First Minister to preside over the
liquidation of the British Empire.,,41
FDR's stratagem to deal with the threat to world stability caused by European colonial
rule was to implement a variety of foreign policies that would force change. One of the
earliest tactics was establishing the Lend-Lease Act that called for the British to begin
eliminating the Imperial Preference System and open their markets to United States trade
through shared use of navel and air bases in Newfoundland, Bermuda and the British
West Indies. Private messages, published later, showed that tying the colonial trade issue
into the Lend-Lease negotiations was a topic of singular friction between the two leaders.
In that same correspondence, Churchill expressed his fear that the British nation would
become a second tier actor on the world stage.
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Leo Amery, at the time the British

Secretary of State for India, summed up the quandary the British faced by relaxing the
Imperial Preference System because of the American Lend-Lease deal:
We. in our anxiety to secure Lease-Lend and bring America in (to the war), have
never had the courage to say straight out that Imperial Preference is not merely a
matter of economic policy but a natural political right of the British Commonwealth
. ... Imperial Preference means so much to our own export trade and to many parts
of the Empire and we may well find ourselves, all of us, after the war, even more
dependent upon inter-Empire trade than at present. 43
In the end, the British had little choice but to give in and give the Americans what they
wanted in exchange for needed support.
Another example of Roosevelt's early efforts to force change upon the British Empire
came in the Caribbean where the United States State Department promoted public unrest
by opening up a direct dialogue with the locals that served to weaken British control in
the area. The transfer of American naval destroyers to several British colonial Caribbean
bases allowed more American influence and trade into those regions. The establishment
of a United States-instigated joint regional commission, with a decidedly American slant,
to collaborate on air security as well as other economic and social issues, followed the
transfer of ships in the Caribbean. The United States later duplicated the regional
commissions in other British-controlled areas. 44 These anti-colonial actions in the
Caribbean occurred prior to any other United StateslUnited Kingdom tensions over
colonies and probably occurred because of the proximity of the region to America.
A further case in point of Roosevelt's persistence in pursuing an anti-colonial policy
appears in 1943 when he had the United States representative in India publicly advocate
the idea of granting the colony Dominion-status similar to Canada. 45 FDR had wanted to
address this issue ever since 1941 when he had confronted Churchill about it privately.
That 1941 argument had so angered Churchill that the Prime Minister later said that
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Roosevelt "never raised it verbally again.,,46 Colonialism in general, and India in
particular, was the one subject that neither FOR nor Churchill could talk about in civil
terms in what was generally a congenial personal relationship.47 It is somewhat ironic
that while Churchill opposed Germany's domination over the European continent,
nevertheless he believed that protecting the British Empire was his personal mission,
even if it interfered with his affinity for FOR. 48
The most critical feature of FOR's efforts to end colonial rule was the concept of
trusteeship. Roosevelt saw the trusteeship program as a way to let allies manage the
orderly transfer of power to colonies without the chaos that could ensue in the
undeveloped parts of a postwar world. 49 Initially, Churchill and the British were against
the idea, suspecting that it was a ploy designed to remove British influence from various
regions so that Americans could step in with their own informal colonial rule. 50 Being
the largest of the European empires the British viewed themselves as the spokesperson
for the entire institution and they believed that the concept of trusteeship was another
manifestation of American jealousy that they needed to block. 51
England's empire was not FOR's only concern since there were other European
empires that drew his attention. For example, France, with its colonies in Indochina,
forced Roosevelt into dealing with the universally disliked General Charles de Gaulle and
caused the President to be mindful of France's colonial problems. 52 France was a
difficult country for FOR to work with since, as Secretary of War Henry Stimson said,
Roosevelt "hated de Gaulle so fiercely that he was almost incoherent on the subject.,,53
Additionally, Roosevelt thought that France did not deserve treatment as a world power
given their abysmal failure against the Germans. 54 FOR also had a deep-seated feeling
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that France, WIder de Gaulle's inept rule, would fall into anarchy and civil war in the
postwar period. 55 Nevertheless, pressuring the British to release its hold on colonies
during the course of the war had proven difficult, so concentrating on the French seemed
to be an easier tactic since those colonies were already WIder Axis control. 56 Hence,
though the British possessed the most colonies globally, FDR later focused on the French
as practicing the worst form of colonial exploitation and leaving native populations in
terrible circumstances. 57 Roosevelt's ability to compartmentalize troubles does create
some confusion about his true position though, a prime example of which was his
handling of the Indochina situation near the end of the war. When faced in January 1945
with the problem of how to handle the rapid Japanese departure from Indochina, instead
of trying to set up a local government, amid other more pressing troubles, FDR told the
Secretary of State, "I still do not want to get mixed up in any Indochina decision. It is a
matter for post-war."S8
Towards the end of the war, the British used joint commissions, modeled after the
previously discussed Caribbean commission, to their advantage. By 1945, the British
worked colonial development projects through the commissions that gave the impression
that the United States was part of those ventures. Another piece of good news for the
British was that by then the American anti-colonialist rhetoric seemed to have peaked. 59
Moreover, pressures within FDR's administration were growing to reduce the emphasis
on the trusteeship program and anti-colonial viewpoint. Pentagon officials wanted to
retain Pacific territories gained from the Japanese and Roosevelt's White House advisors,
in conjWIction with important members of Congress, were urging a more tolerant
interpretation of the trusteeship program. 60 More significant from the British
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government's point of view, were the positive diplomatic discussions between British and
American officials at Dumbarton Oaks and later at the Yalta Conference where Roosevelt
himself backed off on implementation of the trusteeship program. 61 The scope of the
plan was narrowed so that, while it could be applied to other territories, the program
would only officially pertain to League of Nation mandates that were in enemy occupied
lands62 and "any other territory that may voluntarily (emphasis from original) be placed
under trusteeship.,,63 By agreeing to this wording, the entire concept changed, with the
British becoming exempt from the trusteeship's effects, at least in the short term. With
this modification to the trusteeship idea, Roosevelt also seemed to relax his position
concerning Indochina in that he would not interfere with the return of the French and
other European powers to the area. 64 FDR reinforced this position by agreeing at the
Quebec Conference to let the British retain control of the South-East Asia Theater of
Operations thereby enabling the British to secure former colonial Burma and Malaya, the
Dutch to return to the East Indies and the French to hope for renewed influence over their
old colonies in Indochina. 65 There are different interpretations for this lessening of
American anti-colonialist foreign policy. One view is that FDR was reconsidering his
position on European colonial rule and becoming less anti-imperialist in thought.
The weakening of the trusteeship program at that point in time raises the question of
whether, had he lived longer, Roosevelt might have reversed his policies on
colonialism. 66 The most likely answer to that query is that FOR, being a brilliant
politician, was just adapting to the current situation as he had done numerous times in the
past, and in all likelihood was not about to change his core beliefs. This explanation
argues that the retreat on the trusteeship program was a tactical ploy. The fact that
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Roosevelt did not make any obvious public changes to his attitude about colonialism
during this period reinforces this point of view. Almost certainly, Roosevelt decided to
pull back on this particular issue in the short term, to maintain good work relations with
the other nations and with the intention of addressing it again in the future when
circumstances permitted. FDR saw decolonization as a long-term process as shown when
he said that independence for the French colonies in Indochina could take "perhaps
twenty to thirty years. ,,67 One must also remember that Roosevelt had to balance his anticolonial objectives with his other essential goals: winning the war, maintaining the
alliance and supporting his military leaders. 68 On a strategic level, following the Yalta
Conference, FDR told his cabinet at a meeting on 9 March 1945 that he was determined
to pursue his original definition of trusteeship. Furthermore, about this same time he told
Charles Taussig, a close friend, that full independence should be the ultimate aspiration
for all colonial peoples. 69 Therefore, it is apparent that Roosevelt's easing of the
emphasis on which territories to include in the trusteeship program was not a FDRsanctioned mandate for President Truman to change the United States' established anticolonial foreign policy. Rather, it shows that the subject of European colonialism was a
complicated, intricate issue that took place in the even more complex and multifaceted
arena of foreign affairs.
Truman's Presidential decisions on colonialism need consideration on their merits and
not through the distorting lens of supposition about whether or not they should have
maintained the previous administration's policies since it appears that those policies were
in flux. 70 Even so, this focus on Truman does not mean that one should ignore FDR's
extensive record on the subject. After all, Roosevelt's well-known attitude towards
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colonialism and his foreign policy actions established the baseline for the new regime.
FDR's administration championed the cause of colonial freedom and national selfdetermination all through the Second World War even if the President was occasionally
required to soften his efforts from time to time. 71 Considering Roosevelt's anticolonialist heritage from the perspective of the situation that Truman found himself in on
12 April 1945 does FDR a disservice. To appreciate Roosevelt's anti-imperialist legacy
one should consider " ... the broad outlines of his foreign policy ....,,72 such as his Four
Freedoms speech and the Atlantic Charter. 73
Although the nation and world were changing, some conjectures are possible
concerning the domestic situation that Truman faced in 1945 based upon information
from the prior discussion. The relations between the two English-speaking nations were
warm though there were some public frustrations over Britain's colonial practices. While
people in the United States felt that the entire European colonial system was an outdated
and obsolete institution, the British bore the brunt of United States hostility toward the
practice. The sheer size of the British Empire, the belief that Britain was still a major
player in world affairs, the United States' own colonial history, and the draconian trade
practices still in place from the 1930s, influenced Americans' animosity. As for the
government, FDR's public rhetoric leaves little doubt about the administration's official
position. Though Roosevelt maintained close ties with wartime England, he was
unabashedly anti-imperialist. While decolonization was an issue near and dear to
Roosevelt's heart nevertheless pursuit of those objectives, as demonstrated by the case of
colonial trusteeships, remained secondary to the more immediate goals of winning the
war and maintaining the alliance. Underlying FDR's attitude was the feeling that the end
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of the European imperial system was inevitable and that the true question was how soon
it would collapse. 74 FDR believed that solving the colonial problem could wait until the
United Nations was up and running. 75
At the same time, the Europeans were in a state of flux. The bulk of the European
empires ran from Southeast Asia to the Middle East and included nearly all of Africa.
These empires, and the process of colonial rule, had extended from the Fifteenth Century
until the time of the First and Second World Wars. Before the conflicts, the Europeans
had appeared invincible. By the end of the Second World War, this illusion had been
shattered. 76 As the primary war raged on, the European powers either lost control of their
colonies, such as when Japan seized Indochina and Indonesia, or became engrossed in the
homeland's life and death struggle. 77 These circumstances merged with the insight
within the colonies that the imperial powers were not omnipotent and produced the sense
that the burden of imperial rule could be overthrown. Nationalist movements had been
sowing discord during the interwar years and their impact only strengthened by the end of
the second global conflict. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the Europeans'
weakened condition provided these newly empowered natives an excellent opportunity to
achieve independence. 78 During the war, even the intact British received extraordinary
pressure from its most well-established and critical colonies, India and Egypt, to break
from the British Empire. 79 In the ever-troublesome Middle East, countries also sought
independence and by the end of the war, a hundred thousand or more Jews were moving
to Palestine, which inflamed the situation even more. so Thus, Truman faced a situation of
European empires in flux when he assumed office as the war ended.
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CHAPTER IV
HARRY S. TRUMAN

EARLY PRESIDENTIAL PHILOSOPHY

By the time Truman, "a fanner boy from Jackson County,,,l assumed the presidency
he had been Vice-President for less than a hundred days. Truman had met FDR on a few
brief occasions and did not know Roosevelt's plans and personal policies. 2 Truman had
no knowledge about major programs, such as development of the atom bomb, and did not
have the "need-to-know" required to enter FDR's secret war center, the White House
Map Room. 3 Truman told his daughter in private that Roosevelt, "never did talk to me
confidentially about the war, or about foreign affairs or what he had in mind for peace
after the war.,,4 Moreover, FDR failed to outline his overall foreign policies and
objectives to his staff. After many years in office, Roosevelt had consolidated military
and diplomatic decision-making into his own hands. Even primary advisors such as
Joseph Davies, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and close friends like Harry
Hopkins knew only bits and pieces of the overall design. No one knew FDR's grand
strategy and so no one could advise Truman on what to do next. 5 A Washington Post
article at the time summed up the military and foreign policy situation facing Truman by
saying, " ... President Truman comes into this gigantic assignment under a handicap.,,6
Nevertheless, in the beginning Truman tried to act as his predecessor would have
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wanted. Some people claim that he would point at FDR's image in the Oval Office and
say, "I'm trying to do what he would like.,,7 Other close advisors routinely heard the new
President ask himself "I wonder what Roosevelt would have done?" or "Would he think:
this was the right thing?"g This desire to emulate FDR is not surprising since Truman
had grown up believing in the idea of great men molding history. He recounted to others
that his favorite book as a boy was about notable figures that shaped history, such as
Moses, Caesar, and Genghis Khan. In a letter to a reporter, Truman explained his
historical perspective as "real history consists of the life and actions of great men who
occupied the stage at the time.,,9 FDR had been the President for twelve years, much
longer than any other American President who had held office. He led the country during
the Great Depression and steered the course through the Second World War. For most
Americans Roosevelt embodied the essence of the United States government. Truman
wanted to follow his example. Nonetheless, Truman knew that he was unprepared to take
over making foreign policy decisions and the running of the United States. The contrast
between Roosevelt and Truman is marked when one considers that Truman was a farm
lad from Missouri while Professor Dallek describes FDR as ''the most cosmopolitan
American to enter the White House since John Quincy Adams in 1825.,,)0 In May 1945
Truman said, "I am the last man fitted to handle it and it happens to me.',ll All the same,
by October 1945 Truman made a speech that cited foreign policy aims, which sounded
both anti-colonial and Rooseveltian in its pronouncements,
1. We seek no territorial expansion .... 2. We believe in the eventual return of
sovereign rights and self-government to all peoples who have been deprived of
them by force. 3. We shall approve no territorial changes ... unless they accord
with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned. 4. We believe that all
peoples who are prepared for self-government should be permitted to choose their
own form of government. 12
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Truman also believed, as had Roosevelt, that the United States should be more involved
in the postwar world. 13

FDR / HST DIFFERENT PERSONALITIES

The differences between Truman and FDR are well known but a comparison may help
understand Truman's style in dealing with the colonial question. First, FDR was a
politician who saw the world in various shades of gray, a grand thinker who could make
amazing intuitive leaps. 14 Conversely, Truman's background and training gave him a
different temperament and worldview.
Harry's schooling conspired with his moral and religious upbringing to leave
him with the conviction that personal behavior, and by extension that of societies
and nations, should be guided by universally understandable Victorian maxims,
that distinctions between good and evil were unambiguous, that there were few
gray areas in life. IS
Compared to FDR, Truman was a mental plodder whose strength lay in his dogged study
and perseverance at understanding the many faces of complex problems. Even Secretary
of State Dean Acheson a real admirer of Truman, once said when comparing Presidents
Lyndon B. Johnson and Truman that "They were cut from the same cloth. They both
come from border states ... but Johnson has an A mind and Truman a B mind.,,16
According to Miscamble, the thirty-third President had a" ... distaste for complexity and
his preference for clear and fixed standards along with his hesitation to engage in creative
or conceptual thinking made him susceptible to a very straightforward approach to policy
making.,,17 Not prone to making hasty decisions Truman was a cautious thinker who
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dealt with problems linearly rather than addressing them within an interlocking
framework of policy considerations. The consequence of Truman's method of handling
problems was that American foreign policy decisions appeared to be haphazard instead of
employed in a consistent, systemic manner. In the final analysis, Truman's linear
thinking makes it difficult for a researcher to perceive the President's overarching
philosophy when considering ideas such as anti-colonialism and when examining a range
of foreign policy decisions.
In the end, the biggest difference between the two men was one of management style.

FDR manipulated situations and often put off making choices until a solution presented
itself or something forced a decision. On the other hand, Truman wrestled with a
problem until he had come to a decision about it. This difference in style enhanced the
image of FDR as a detached intellectual while Truman seemed blunt and plainspoken.
Truman's aura of brusque individuality was deceptive though, since he sought the
counsel of able advisors and experienced men, relying upon them to help bridge the gaps
in his own knowledge about international affairs. 18
Unlike FDR's well-known compulsion to centralize policy-making in his own hands,
Truman was more than willing to share the process with his advisors and department
heads, especially in the beginning of his administration. A good example of these
differences in management techniques concerns the conference to discuss the formation
of the United Nations held in San Francisco shortly after Truman assumed office. Prior
to his death FDR had been planning to lead the American delegation. Truman decided to
leave the responsibility for running the delegation to the group's leaders. He provided
personal instructions but was willing to delegate duties to others whom he thought were

49

more proficient in the foreign affairs arena. 19 This style of management makes it difficult
at times to pin down Truman's true feelings concerning a range of foreign policy
decisions that occurred on different dates. Throughout Truman's time in office, this
result was true of administrative decisions that did not reach the top tier of foreign policymaking and therefore did not require the President's personal pronouncement. For
example, Truman had a deep dislike for the Spanish government of Francisco Franco and
was hostile to the idea of congenial relations between the dictator and the United States.
Nevertheless, when the Departments of State and Defense instituted normal relations and
laid the groundwork for military bases in Spain he begrudgingly went along with the
Departments' earlier decisions.

2o

While there are many differences between the personalities of Roosevelt and Truman,
they shared some common traits. Both possessed an idealistic streak concerning the
future of humanity. 2 1 In Truman's case, one might attribute this idealism in some
measure to his background, temperament, or his Masonic training. 22 An example came in
one 1940 speech concerning civil rights where he used the "brotherhood of man" concept
common to Masonic teachings. 23 Not all Masons practice that philosophy; yet, Truman
seemed to when he said, "I believe in the brotherhood of man, not merely the
brotherhood of white men but brotherhood of all men before the Law.,,24 Regardless of
the source of his worldview, Truman does seem to be in agreement with the traits
ascribed to FDR when conversing on such things as idealistic support for the United
Nations, trusteeship and anti-imperialism.25
Another quality that Truman had in common with Roosevelt was the belief that the
treatment of foreign affairs is the same as local and national politics?6 While Truman
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tended toward a stark black and white view of the world, he was also a product of the
corrupt Pendergast political machine that created a seasoned and pragmatic politician
who understood and employed the fme art of political compromise. 27 In Truman's world;
the facts of life dictated that some give and take would be required regardless of whether
one was dealing with Tom Pendergast, Joseph Stalin, or Winston Churchill. This view of
politics allowed both Presidents to compromise on some objectives in order to achieve
other, greater goals but it did result in some inconsistencies and ambiguities in their
foreign policies. These uncertainties are what allow various interpretations as to their
intent and outlook about colonialism. Therefore, one must not only look at individual
decisions but also at the rhetoric and underlying source of their philosophy.

WILSONIAN FOREIGN POLICY

In addition to Roosevelt, Truman, like FDR before him, gained inspiration from
President Woodrow Wilson. During World War One Truman saw service as a young
artillery officer and held a life-long belief that he had fought for Wilson's Fourteen Points
and its League ofNations. 28 Truman once said, "How much misery and suffering the
world would have been spared if we had only followed Woodrow Wilson!,,29 Truman
supported Wilson's idea ofa League of Nations and labeled Congress' rejection of the
concept and refusal to accept the nation's rightful role as a world power a fatal error.
During the mid-l 930s, he deviated from Wilson's idea of internationalism for a short
time when he supported popular legislation devised by isolationist Gerald Nye. Senator
Nye's Committee had published a report, which asserted that arms dealers had unduly
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influenced American foreign policy prior to the First World War and an outpouring of
isolationist sentiment resulted. Truman later called his support ofNye and his isolationist
legislation, designed to keep the United States out of the troubles brewing in Europe, a
momentary error in judgment. Furthermore, Truman described Nye as " ... a demagogue
senator from North Dakota.,,30 Truman went on to support FDR's interventionist policies
as way of making up for past failings. 3! He set forth his position in speeches that said, "I
have said time and again that Almighty God intended this great Nation to be the leader of
what is right and what is well for the world, and He indicated that in 1920 after the First
World War. But there were certain men who felt that that was not the proper thing to do,
and then we had to go through World War II.,,32 When there was talk of the United
States withdrawing from the world scene after the Second World War Truman argued
that Americans were too smart to embrace, once again, isolationism.
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This conviction

dovetailed with FDR's rather nebulous vision of a world organization in which the
United States, Britain, Russia and China would work to secure world peace while
expanding free trade around the globe. 34 Later, Truman would say in his memoirs, "I still
believe in Woodrow Wilson's philosophy of self-determination.,,35 This attitude, linked
with his desire to follow FDR's foreign policy, influenced Truman's outlook on the world
order and the role of both the United States and the European empires.

ANTI-IMPERIALISM

A point that Truman made in speeches was that the United States' goal in World War
Two was, " ... for peace and for the welfare of mankind. We are not fighting for
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conquest. There is not one piece of territory or one thing of monetary nature that we
want out of this war.,,36 As a display of Truman's beliefs one can point to the fact that
the Philippines received independence from the United States on 4 July 1946 despite the
opposition of some members of Congress and military leaders who felt that it was far too
soon?7 Furthermore, his desire to promote freedom and democratic principles extended
well beyond the shores of the United States. In one of Truman's final speeches he spoke
ofthe inevitable demise of European empires and the end of their colonial rule with
pride, "Just in the years I have been President, 12 free nations, with more than 600
million people, have become independent: Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, Korea,
Israel, Libya, India, Pakistan and Ceylon. ... These names alone are testimony to the
sweep of great force which is changing the face of half of the world.,,38 Of the new
postwar world that Truman imagined he said, "The old imperialism-exploitation for
foreign profit-has no place in the concepts of democratic fair dealing.,,39 Truman helped
the growth of freedom within the European empires through a variety of methods.
Within these actions, one can find evidence of his dislike for colonialism and support for
the right of self-rule.
As previously discussed, Truman was not an isolationist as one would probably have
assumed based on his background, rather he was pro-Open Door in his outlook. He
described his feelings on the subject saying, "We are moving toward our goal of world
peace in many ways. ... The most important efforts which we are now making are those
which support world economic reconstruction .... To restore world trade we have
recently taken the lead in bringing about the greatest reduction of world tariffs that the
world has ever seen. ,,40 He was a long-time supporter of free markets and when the
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Trade Agreement Act of 1934 passed the Congress, he called it a major legislative feat. 41
Truman believed that the 1920s' restriction of trade, with its tariffs and other barriers,
was a terrible thing for the world. He perceived the problem as being that leaders of
government and commerce were acting to protect their own producers but, in turn, they
excluded others who depended upon that trade to buy their products. As global trade
slowed, rather than trying to stimulate it, nations instead practiced trade reprisals and
even increased the restrictions such as Britain's Imperial Preference System. 42 Truman
put it this way, "They ignored the fact that the whole world suffers when each country
tries to make itself a tight little island with high walls all around.'.43 In large measure the
economic problems of the 1920s and 1930s, and the suffering that occurred during the
Great Depression, drove his anti~imperialist sentiment quite apart from his philosophical
reasoning. In 1944, Truman joined with other Senators to call for more internationalism
and free trade. He and his fellow Senators cautioned that the harmony of the postwar
world "depends on the abandonment of political nationalism and economic imperialism
and autarchy.'M President Truman's address about America's foreign economic policy,
given at Baylor University on 6 March 1947, summarized his belief that the restrictive
trade practices of the 1930s led not only to the Great Depression but also to a de facto
economic war waged with tariffs and trade restrictions prior to the start of the shooting
war. 45 In particular, he blamed Nazi Germany and the British Empire for being the main
practitioners of the malicious form of economic warfare that destroyed the world's
economy.46 He concluded the speech by presenting the idea that international free trade,
orchestrated by a globally minded rather than an inward looking United States, was the
true salvation for the future. 47 He did more than just pay lip service to this view when he
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and his administration fought the Republicans to protect the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In a speech after a political battle ended in approval of The
Reciprocal Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1949, which allowed the extension of the
trade deals in the GATT, Truman said that the Act "extends ... our trade agreement
program, free of the crippling restrictions imposed on it in 1948 by the 80th Congress. ,,48
In the same speech, he also talks about recent agreements made with Canada and Great
Britain to open the Commonwealth to outside trade. 49 Truman had backed all the efforts
at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, most notably the GATT accord and the proposals
to establish an International Trade Organization (ITO), International Monetary Fund
(lMF) and World Bank. 50 Spurred by the successful launch of the IMF and World Bank
Truman remained steadfast in his continued support for the ITO proposal until finally, in
1950, he deemed passage impossible.
Truman's legislative efforts concerning GATT and the ITO were not his only attempts
to end the protectionist trade practices of European imperial rule. In the spirit of free
trade, Truman used his prominence to call upon the nations of the world to " ... devise
their economic and financial policies to support a world economy rather than separate
nationalistic economies.,,51 He also used the economic might of the United States to
provide aid and extend Lend-Lease programs to England since "Extension of this credit
will enable the United Kingdom to avoid discriminatory trade arrangements of the type
which destroyed freedom of trade during the 1930's.,,52
Truman's anti-imperial attitude enjoyed popular public support especially when the
target was the British Empire, a point not lost on this perceptive politician. Following the
war, anti-British feelings lurked within America's psyche. 53 Many Americans felt that
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the British, along with the other European allies, were not sufficiently grateful for the
support they had received during the war. Additionally, they suspected that any aid
provided to the war-ravaged European nations would enable the European empires to
reestablish themselves in the postwar period. 54 One example of such an attitude was a
telegram in 1947 from a private citizen, Jack Hess, to President Truman expressing his
anti-British perspective, "IF BEVIN WANTS TO SHARE THE FT KNOX GOLD
WITH US HOW ABOUT OUR SHARING ENGLANDS COLONIAL EMPIRE WITH
THEM HERES ONE VOTER REPRESENTING A GROUP WHO IS AGAINST IT"
[emphasis from original].55 A poll conducted in February 1945 found the majority of
Americans thought that the United States would have more problems with imperialist
Britain than Communist Russia.
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At the same time, the State Department and other

governmental agencies were more than willing to renew efforts to end the British Empire
and obtain" ... preferential trading rights in British colonies. ,,57 Minutes from a 1947
National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems
highlighted ongoing efforts by the State Department to maintain the open markets
conceded in exchange for a loan by Britain's Ambassador to the United States, Lord
Halifax, in 1945. At that juncture, Lord Halifax's letter had prohibited Britain and her
colonies from trade discrimination against external countries. 58 American's fundamental
distrust of British imperialism, linked with the Open Door philosophy embedded in the
American character, served to keep the issues and rhetoric about colonies in the spotlight
and part of the political vocabulary of the time. 59 Thus, it seems reasonable that Truman
considered the issue of ending Europe's historic stranglehold on undeveloped parts of the
world a matter of right and wrong. In Truman's own words, "We wanted to give them a
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better sort of government and do away with colonialism.,,6o All the same, one cannot
ignore the practical aspects of Truman's Open Door policies that allowed American
businesses valuable economic access to foreign markets. Nonetheless, just because the
United States profited by lowering tariffs this result does not refute the fact that Truman
thought ending imperial protectionist trade practices would benefit all of humanity and
promote freedom in the former colonies. 61 In the context of supporting global open trade,
Truman's rhetoric and actions show continuity between his position and FDR's and fit
with his desire to follow the wishes of the former President.
Truman declared, "I had always been opposed to colonialism. Whatever justification
cited at any stage, colonialism in any form is hateful to Americans. America fought her
own war of liberation against colonialism and we shall always regard with sympathy and
understanding the desire of people everywhere to be free of colonial bondage. ,.62
Truman's rhetoric, here and elsewhere, makes it clear that, for him, the issue of
colonialism was black and white without the normal ambiguities found in foreign affairs.
Yet, implementing this philosophy would prove to be much more complex, in fact well
nigh impossible, in the face of competing goals and ideas. In order to provide a structure
for Truman's straightforward beliefs on colonialism, and to help him navigate the
unfamiliar and convoluted art of diplomacy he required assistance and advice.

TRUMAN'S ADVISORS

To comprehend the foreign policy differences between Roosevelt and Truman it is
important to understand their familiarity with the subject. FDR had been in office a long
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time and his vast experience and background knowledge of people and prior events
makes the contrast between him and his newly elected Vice-President even more blatant.
The inexperienced Truman moved into the post overnight and did not even have the
normal two-month preparation period that President-elects routinely enjoy. In fact,
Truman was Vice-President only eighty-two days before Roosevelt died. Of those
eighty-two days, FOR was in Washington D.C. with his new Vice-President for just thirty
days.63 Truman's selection as the Vice-Presidential nominee had been politically
expedient and no closeness existed between the two men. There was nothing in their
relationship that caused the secretive FOR to embrace and confide in Truman. 64 For
instance, when FOR and his closest advisors went to Yalta for his last conference with
the Allies in February of 1945 he left Truman behind to tend to ceremonial duties and
preside over the Senate. In addition, none saw a need to invite Truman to attend any high
level foreign briefings at the White House during his brief period as Vice-President. 65
Totally unprepared, Truman was plunged headlong into a situation where he had to
address the multiple activities and emergency situations of a nation at war while still
learning how to do hisjob. 66 Early on, he told one of his cabinet members, "I know
nothing of foreign affairs and I must acquaint myself with them at once.,,67 Additionally,
he had no advisors or trusted contacts of his own about matters of foreign policy prior to
taking over in the White House. 68 Truman's lack of experience and preparation forced
him to rely heavily on FOR's advisors. 69
Truman's personality was such that he felt obligated to consider all available facts and
then coordinate his decisions. This propensity reinforced his reliance upon advisors. In
spite oflater gaining a reputation for decisiveness, Truman's policy pronouncements
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were" ... the product of careful political or diplomatic planning and group consensus,
not individual whim.,,7o Thus Truman's style forced him to rely far more heavily on
foreign affairs advisors than had Roosevelt. 71 This reliance on advisors was especially
true at the beginning of his time in office. The first day on the job, he called in Edward
Stettinius, the Secretary of State, to prepare primers covering all foreign policy issues and
the upcoming United Nations' Conference that was to be the first item in the queue.72
Therefore, to understand Truman's foreign policy actions one must also understand his
advisors and their positions. While President Truman's advisors were many and varied,
the following agencies and people had the most influence and impact upon shaping the
President's official colonial position.

TRUMAN'S VIEW OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Truman belittled the State Department membership as a bunch of pretentious, selfserving elitists. 73 He referred to State Department personnel as the "striped pants
boYS.,,74 Nevertheless, he relied upon them either through necessity or, at least in some
cases, close personal relationships that developed based on respect and admiration such
as the associations he had with Secretaries of State George Marshall and Dean Acheson. 7s
When pressed by reporters about foreign policy decisions, Truman explained that he did
not want to follow FDR's method of internalizing foreign affairs rather, " ... the State
Department is set up for the policy of handling foreign policy operations, and the State
Department ought to take care ofthem.,,76 The early State Department's goals were
familiar they" ... wanted the British to reform their imperial practices, dissolve the
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sterling bloc, accept full convertibility of the pound into dollars, and adhere to the
principles of open and nondiscriminatory trade.,,77
An example that shows pursuit of these goals comes from one of Truman's early State
Department advisors Loy Henderson, Director of Near Eastern Affairs, who articulated
the Department's position on European colonies in the Middle East. Henderson argued
that the United States had failed in 1919 with the establishment of the League of Nations
and had failed again in stopping the French and British from securing colonies in the
aftermath of the First World War thereby closing those markets to outside competition.
He put forth the opinion that the United States should assert itself and prevent a similar
situation from developing in the Middle East with the Soviet Union and European powers
by pursuing an Open Door policy in the region. 78 The Truman administration adopted
this approach for future dealings in both the Middle East and Iran. The next set of
advisors would turn out to be more problematic.
Besides officials in the State Department, Truman also received advice early in his
tenure on the issue of colonialism from another profession, members of which he both
maligned and praised, Generals. 79 According to an early-unpublished draft of Truman's
memoirs, in May and June of 1945 Ambassador to China, Patrick J. Hurley, a former
Army General, and General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Commander of American forces in
China provided Truman an assessment of the true situation in the Far East. They also
provided some rather pointed recommendations on how to handle the imperialist powers
of Europe. 80 They included the following,
The paramount political issue in Asia for many years has been the issue between
Democracy and imperialism. We supported Chinese Democratic aspirations
against the imperialism of Japan. The question is will we now permit British,
French and Dutch imperialists to use the resources of the American democracy to
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reestablish imperialism in Asia. ... The appointment of Lord Louis [Lord Louis
Mountbatten, British Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia Theater] or any
other imperialist as Commander in China would constitute nullification of
American principles and achievements in China. . .. All the Imperialist nations
have done has been in an endeavor to recover their colonial possessions largely by
the use of American and Chinese resources and reestablish the prestige of
.
'al'Ism. 81
Impen
This same series of cables from Hurley include particulars on Hong Kong and Indochina.
In the case of Hong Kong Truman received the following advice:
We have two major pressing controversies affecting the present military
situation and the future of democracy and imperialism in Asia that are still unsettled
. . .. Last March 8th President Roosevelt said to Wedemeyer and me ... he still
insisted that the British return Hongkong to China. Roosevelt said that if Churchill
refused to agree to this he would go over Churchill's head to the King and to
Parliament. . .. Churchill told me that Hongkong would be returned to China only
'over my dead body' ... , My opinion is that if we have a firm policy on Hongkong
Britain will yield ... in China we may find that another great power that claims to
be anti-imperialistic may adopt imperialism as a policy ... to combat British
imperialism in China ... , You could also say that no credit or additional gifts at
the expense of the American taxpayer [more Lend Lease] would be given to Britain
until Britain shows a more understanding attitude towards the American policy on
Hongkong and towards Democracy the world over. I think you would find Britain
still amenable to reason. 82
Later Hurley goes on to discuss Indochina, another colonial issue that would cause angst
for the United States for decades to come:
1944 President Roosevelt directed me to inform General Wedemeyer that no
policy would be promulgated on Indochina until after a forthcoming combined staff
conference. The President also directed me to keep him informed as to activities of
British-French-Dutch missions in Southeastern Asia. The President had already
discussed the Indochina situation with me personally. He was not pleased with the
fact (1) that Vichy French ofIndochina had collaborated with Japan (2) he was in
favor of establishing a United Nations or international trusteeship under whose care
and tutelage Indochina could secure independence according to the principles of the
Atlantic Charter. Neither General Wedemeyer nor myself has ever been given a
definite ""Titten directive on Indochina political policy. ... The French
Ambassador and military mission have become exacting in their demand for
American support for French activities in Indochina. The French demand
American war supplies as a matter of right. ... In my last conference with
President Roosevelt I informed him ... the French, British and Dutch were
cooperating to prevent the establishment of a United Nations Trusteeship for
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Indochina. The imperialist leaders believe that such a trusteeship would be a bad
precedent for the other imperialistic areas in Southeast Asia. 83
Hurley goes on to explain that he had requested written instructions from FDR with
respect to Indochina and was renewing that request with the new President. Roosevelt's
only response to Hurley's request for clear and explicit directives had been that the San
Francisco Conference would set up some kind of trusteeship program under the auspices
of the United Nations who would help develop the trustee and grant them independence
with they were ready. Hurley sought clarification about the apparent change by the
United States at the San Francisco Conference where the old imperial powers received
trustee control and not the United Nations. Since this result contradicted, what he had
understood from FDR Hurley was anxious to know the current guidelines. He had
queried the State Department but had not received any clarification. Hurley said the
troubling aspect of the situation was that Lord Mountbatten, Commander South East Asia
Theater, was already using Lend-Lease and numerous other American resources and
supplies to reestablish the French in Indochina. 84 Truman replied in June 1945, "I fully
appreciate the frank statement of the military situation in China ... and your equally
frank estimate of the world wide political intentions of those European Nations that are
allied with us in this war. You may be assured that these matters are receiving full
consideration in America's planning for the future .. ,. Many of the questions presented
in your above noted communications may be discussed in the forthcoming tripartite
conference.',85 As seen from this series of messages, Truman was aware early on about
the imperialist intentions of the European powers in Asia, FDR's position on the subject,
the use of American resources to augment English and French efforts in Indochina and
the lack of clear guidance for those in the field. In this case, the new President did not
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heed the advice as he and his administration moved into the immediate postwar period
and the beginnings of the Cold War. While Hurley provided some advice on foreign
policies and issues dealing with colonial territories of the European empires, other betterknown advisors also weighed in on the subject to varying degrees. First examined are the
Secretaries of State that served as Truman's primary advisors on foreign affairs.

TRUMAN'S SECRETARIES OF STATE

Unlike the long-serving Roosevelt, who ran his own foreign policy and had little need
for a Secretary of State other than to oversee the State Department's bureaucracy, the less
experienced Truman relied on the men who occupied that position. In fact, Truman
ended up appointing four different men to the post while in office. The first two, Edward
Stettinius and James Byrnes had limited influence on the new President. Truman wrote
of Stettinius, his first Secretary of State, as "a fine man, good looking, amiable,
cooperative, but never an idea new or 0Id."s6 Stettinius had limited experience in the job
since Roosevelt appointed him late in 1944 as caretaker for the department. Truman
replaced Stettinius within a few months with Byrnes, his personal candidate for the
office. 87 Byrnes had served as an unofficial sub-president for domestic affairs during
Roosevelt's third term and he commanded such respect around the nation's capital that he
warranted some cabinet level position in the new administration. Truman's association
with his second Secretary of State was initially cordial even though Byrnes had competed
with Truman for the job as Roosevelt's Vice-President in the 1944 election. 88
Nevertheless, their relationship soured over time. Byrnes' obvious belief that he was

63

much better qualified for the job of President than Truman, his subsequent mediocre
running of the State Department and his disregard of Truman's wishes finally ended with
his systemic marginalization. He submitted his resignation in early 1947.

89

The next two

Secretaries of State had different associations and long-term relationships that would
fundamentally influence Truman's foreign policies and related issues of colonialism.
Truman's third Secretary of State, who he described as "one of the most astute and
profound men 1 have ever known,,90 was the universally admired General George C.
Marshall. Truman always treasured Marshall's friendship and this closeness produced a
great rapport between the two men during both the Four-Star General's time at the State
Department and later when he took over the Department of Defense. 91 For example,
when Marshall asswned the role as Secretary of State Truman said, "I am hoping that
Gen. Marshall will take the striped pants boys for a ride.',92 Truman often referred to
Marshall as one of the greatest Americans ever and never had a disparaging remark to say
about him during or after his time in office. 93 One of the few points of contention
between the two men was on an issue of colonialism. Marshall opposed ending the
British mandate in Palestine to allow the founding of a Jewish State in the region.
Marshall felt that the presence of an official Jewish country in the Arab-dominated oilrich region would be a source of unending conflict and a threat to the United States' longterm security.
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Despite this disagreement, Truman and Marshall worked well together

and fought to end American isolationism. In fact, as time went on Truman went well
beyond what FDR had envisioned during the Second World War as America's role in the
postwar world.
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A close aide, Clark Clifford, said that the new President had one great

aptitude and that it "was Harry Truman's capacity to groW.,,96
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Truman and his evolving foreign affairs team came up with a number of unheard of
diplomatic policies. Some of these policies affected the issue of European colonialism.
For instance, Truman was talking about the Marshall Plan and the issue of granting
freedom to lands under colonial rule when he said, "In all the history of the world ... we
are the first great nation to create independent republics from conquered territory, Cuba
and the Philippines.,,97 Truman also had serious disagreements with Churchill in the
early development stages for the Marshall Plan according to Joseph O. Feeney, an
assistant to Truman in the White House. Truman had explained that the British
government and Churchill particularly, did not like the plan for they sensed that it would
allow the United States to interfere in their internal affairs. Feeney described the
situation, ~' ... they met quite frequently ... But each time, they'd have an argument, and
a strong one, and Mr. Churchill was not very happy about the Marshall plan. He wanted
to keep the British Empire as it was, and he wanted nothing to interfere with it.
Moreover, there was some talk at that time about India, you know, breaking away from
the empire. Mr. Churchill was violently opposed to that -- violently opposed -- at that
time.,,98 The Marshall Plan actually helped the European powers with their colonial
holdings by providing supplies that cost millions of American dollars that the empires
then administered to the 10cals.99 Management of the Marshall Plan by the State
Department in reality produced an American policy that placed the welfare of European
powers, and restoration of their former worldwide eminence, ahead of concerns about
other regions of the globe.

Ioo

The next clos~ advisor examined was Truman's longest running Secretary of State,
Dean Acheson. Acheson's influence on Truman as his chief advisor on foreign policy is
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well known and their relationship with respect to foreign affairs may even have eclipsed
that of General George Marshall. Their rapport far exceeded any bond that Tnunan had
established with Edward Stettinius or James Byrnes. Initially, along with other senior
State Department advisors such as W. Averell Harriman and Robert Lovett with their Ivy
League backgrounds, this key advisor seemed to be an Anglophile and by inference proimperialist. 101 Acheson even admitted that he was unabashedly supportive of the British
as a people and said, "My own attitude had long been, and was known to have been, proBritish.,,102 Moreover, Acheson often stated he believed that American and British aims
were the same and in the best interests of Westem Civilization. 103 However, Acheson's
feeling about Great Britain and any possible collusion with friends in the British
government to influence Truman was blunted by the fact that when he became the United
States' senior diplomat the British were under Labour Party control. That same Labour
Party had been trying for years to divest itself of some of the more bothersome colonies
and reestablish itself as the heart of a Commonwealth of Nations. 104 Besides, Acheson
said in reference to a question about special treatment for Great Britain, "Of course a
unique relation existed between Britain and America-our common language and history
insured that. But unique did not mean affectionate. We had fought England as an enemy
as often as we had fought by her side as an ally.,,105 More relevant to the United States'
colonial policy and the Truman administration was his perpetuation of the belief that
Europe was the centerpiece of American foreign policy. John Cady, an associate in the
State Department, described him as conservative and European oriented. 106 This Eurocentric outlook would not produce rejection of the Truman White House's anti-colonial
stance but would instead marginalize its importance. 107
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ELEANOR ROOSEVELT

Eleanor Roosevelt was one of the few champions for the rights of people in the
various colonies around the world who advised Truman regularly. By this time, she was
a powerful Democrat Party elder who could mobilize voters on behalf of candidates.
Many Americans admired her for her social causes and considered her the public keeper
ofFDR's legacy. These attributes made her an influential person in the nation's capital
and across the country. She regularly received invitations to important events around the
world, the national press often quoted her, and she had direct access to key governmental
leaders to include the President. lOS Eleanor Roosevelt was a person that politicians
disregarded at their peril. As a show of respect, and in recognition of her universal
popularity,I09 Truman had appointed the former First Lady as a delegate to the United
Nations General Assembly in 1946. 110 He also developed a close friendship with her
based upon mutual respect and kept up regular correspondence with her throughout her
life. She and Truman ended up exchanging 254 private letters from 1945 to 1960. 111 She
was always ready with advice in those letters and scolded Truman one time for wasting
time writing a lengthy letter in longhand when newly in the job and feeling overwhelmed
by the position. In the same letter, she told him to trust in his own counsel over others
around him.112 Later, at a low point in the Presidency. she told friends that Truman's
problem was that "he had the wrong sort of people around him."lI3 EVen so, she had no
compunctions about sending Truman her own advice concerning foreign affairs.
In a series of letters to Truman in the White house a number of times she raised the
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issue of rights for people subjected to colonial rule and the general issue of imperialism.
Truman, in turn, talked to her about his efforts in the international arena, for instance
assuring her that he was trying to draw the British out of their imperialistic Sterling Bloc
and into more open trade practices. I14 In a 1947 letter, Eleanor Roosevelt told Truman
that the United States should not assume the imperialistic policies of Churchill in the
Near East for it would undermine the spirit of democracy in the region. She also warned
Truman of the future failure of French imperialism, "France has been so long in North
Africa and accomplished so little in raising the standard of living and in giving the people
education that I do not know how long they can hope to keep their power
unchallenged."II5 While serving in the United Nations she warned Truman that,
The race question has become a very vital one since much of the feeling is that of
the colored races against the white race. We are classed with the colonial powers as
having exploited them because our businessmen in the past have exploited them, so
we have no better standing than the United Kingdom or any other colonial power. I
think we have to reckon with this in our whole world outlook because we will need
friends badly and it surprising how few we have in spite of all we have done for other
people in the past. 116
She also voiced concern that Acheson and other advisors were too sympathetic to the
British cause and urged Truman to take care. II7 She was also able to use these advisors at
other times to influence indirectly Truman to side against the colonial desires of the
. European powers. For instance, she urged Acheson in the early 1950s not to yield to
French pressure in Tunisia when the French were trying to hold onto that colony in spite
of international press. IIS Lastly, on the related concept of her husband's Four Freedoms
she was an exceptionally active advocate for the United Nations' Declaration of Human
RightS. 119 She pressured Truman about the declaration when the vote was coming up for
ratification in the United States and Truman approved of her casting the United States'
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affirmative vote for the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights that indirectly supported an
end to colonialism. 12o Eleanor Roosevelt was perhaps the single most successful of the
Truman advisors in bringing the colonial issue to the President's attention. However,
none of his closest foreign policy advisors, Acheson or Marshall, supported the return of
European imperial domination to the international scene. Nor did they appear to argue
that there was a need to perpetuate colonial rule. However, the Euro-centric view of the
world found in Truman's State Department and among his key advisors sometimes
worked to the disadvantage of other regions of the world. These same State Department
officials and Ambassadors backed policies to break the European empire's economic
stranglehold on their colonies and expressed support for FDR's anti-colonial outlook.
Truman drew upon the counsel of these foreign policy advisors and it seems apparent that
no one backed the permanent reinstatement of the colonial empires. Other events also
conspired to bring the issue of imperial rule up in the course of policy-making in the
administration.

POTSDAM

At the Potsdam conference from 16 July to 2 August 1945; Admiral Ernest King, an
early and influential advisor said of Truman, "Watch the President ... This is all new to
him but he can take it.,,121 Even before the start of the conference, Churchill was
pressuring Truman to occupy Yugoslavia. Truman's reply was that the territorial issues
needed to be settled in an organized manner unlike the post-First World War
"uncontrolled land-grabbing.,,122 Years later Truman wrote Dean Acheson that in coming
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to the conference he had wanted to coordinate with the other powers and arrange
benevolent approaches on the subjects of free waterways, and self-governance for all
enemy nations, conquered lands and territories. 123 Additional discussions beyond spheres
of influence and atom bombs l24 did occur but not in the idealistic tones that Truman had
hoped. For instance, Churchill tried to secure American support for imperial interests by
offering basing for American forces in colonial ports around the world. As Churchill
said, "We could add 50 percent to the mobility of the American fleet.,,125 As for former
Italian colonies, from the beginning Churchill had expressed a desire for the British to
maintain control of those regions until final disposition.1 26 The destiny of Libya, Eritrea
and Somaliland remained vague because the conference attendees decided that their fate
should be resolved as part of a later 1947 peace treaty for Italy. 127 During the later treaty
talks, the United States' position was that the colonies should become British-supervised
trusteeships while the French wanted to return the colonies to Italian control rather than
let the British administer them. 128 As for Truman's stance at the treaty talks, a senior
State Department official observed that Roosevelt and Truman's position regarding to the
Italian colonies was that they should be trusteeship territories and eventually receive their
independence. 129 Libya would gain its independence in 1951 but Somaliland would have
to wait until 1960. 130 Participants also discussed the disposition of Indochina, which
forces of Japan still occupied at the end of the war. The plan was to hand over the
northern part to the Chinese and the southern to the British who would then tum it back
over to France, a fellow European empire. 131 This arrangement was a natural outgrowth
ofFDR's earlier agreement to let the British take over Theater Command in the region
and therefore not considered a major policy change by the new President. In a similar
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vein, the United States and Soviet Union would divide control of Korea. These decisions
seemed to be a practical and temporary solution as Japanese forces departed the
battlefield but no one could foresee the lasting effects they would have for United States
policy. These choices put a pro-colonial face on Truman's foreign policy though in
actuality, the Truman administration was pinning its hopes on the United Nations as the
forum to resolve such international problems in a rational and peaceful manner.

UNITED NATIONS

Another early indicator of President Truman's intentions concerning European
colonialism was the establishment of a new world body to replace the failed and ridiculed
League of Nations. In fact, Truman's first foreign affairs decision on 13 April 1945, his
first day in the Oval Office, was to go forward with the United Nations program as
planned. 132 That choice was to continue with the scheduled San Francisco Conference
intended to form the United Nations that ran from April through June of 1945. 133 This
decision was not surprising since in 1943 then-Senator Truman had gone on a crosscounty speaking tour promoting internationalism sponsored by the United Nations
Association.
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Further, he believed that, " ... it was what Roosevelt had wanted, and it

had to take place if we were going to keep the peace.,,135 Truman also said in his
memoirs, "I was trying to profit by the mistakes of Woodrow Wilson .... I hoped that
we would come out of this war with a going world organization for peace .... ,,136
Repeatedly, President Truman told members of the State Department that the United
Nations was "the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy . .,)37 Moreover, Truman's hope was
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that establishing the United Nations would make amends for the United States' failure to
join the League of Nations in 1919. As with other initial foreign policy decisions Truman
saw his role as continuing FDR's vision; a new world body led by the United States, that
could produce a new world order. 138 At the time there was also the tacit desire on the
part of the American people for the United States to be able, through this new world
body, to intervene between other powers like the Soviet Union and British Empire. 139
As for the European empires in general, Truman was concerned about ongoing actions
in the underdeveloped regions of the world as well as developing events. In his memoirs
regarding his first year in the White House, he explained the situation,
Violent resistance movements were developing in North Africa, the Middle East.
and the redeemed areas of Asia, all in the name of liberation. They sought immediate
freedom from established colonial powers, who were, of course our allies in the main
war. We, as a people, have always accepted and encouraged the undeniable right of a
people to determine its own political destiny. ... But the real problem, as I saw it in
its application to immediate events, was not one of principle. ... The real problem
was that of procedure and method. Amid the shambles of a world breaking down, we
were desperately in need of machinery not only to deal with international disputes but
also to provide assistance and encouragement to peoples in their peaceful aspirations.
I was thinking primarily of a world organized for peace and of our plans for the
United Nations. 140
In this telling statement, Truman not only expressed a desire to see the end of colonialism
but also articulated the quandary facing the United States government. Administration
officials, including Truman, were aware of the social forces of growing rebellion in the
European colonies energized by the Second World War. While philosophically
supporting the right to freedom for all peoples they feared the instability that could occur
in a fragile world just coming out ofa devastating world war. Additionally, national selfinterest by the United States, as well as others, encroached on Roosevelt's idealistic
wartime hope that the United Nations would be strong enough to administer order. 141
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Truman's initial hope, at least according to his public words, was that the United Nations
was the right tool to bring about the changes needed in the underdeveloped regions of the
globe in a slow and orderly manner that would not sacrifice stability in the postwar
world. In a 1948 speech, Truman boasted that the United Nations had succeeded in
getting the British and French to withdraw from Syria and Lebanon, and the Dutch to
secure a truce with the Indonesians, though he did not mention anything about the
pressure the United States had exerted in these situations. 142 In a 1950 report to Congress
Truman stressed that the United Nations continued to be "Point I of our foreign
policy.,,143 In the same speech Truman emphasizes that the mechanism to provide
"advancement of trust areas and other non-self-governing territories is steadily being
fostered through the cooperation of administering states and the United Nations."I44 In
his memoirs years after his Presidency, Truman continued to assert that the United
Nations was the only appropriate mechanism for solving problems in territories overseen
by the Europeans since they were the ones capable of addressing the transition from
colony to independent state in a rational, systemic manner that would avoid chaos.
Additionally, when he talked about the British-administered Palestine and the resulting
birth of Israel he felt that the UN should have dealt more forcefully with the issue and
claimed that the United States only became involved because of external pressures. 14S
Scholars can argue that the UN's policies during this time were simply an extension of
the United States' due to its overwhelming power in the world. However, as seen in the
next section the United States lacked a cohesive strategy to direct its national might at the
problem of undeveloped areas still under colonial control. In addition, though the
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European empires were weaker they were not without influence in the new world body
and they united to prevent any programs that were not in their national interest.

TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM

In addition to the better-known bodies of the United Nations, the Security Council and
the General Assembly, there was the Trusteeship Council. The Trusteeship Council
evolved from the old League of Nations' Mandates Commission designed originally to
control territory previously governed by nations defeated in World War One. FDR saw
the transformation of the Mandates Commission into the Trusteeship Council as the
answer to what he perceived as being the biggest world threat, Europe's system of
imperial rule. The intent was for the council to manage the peaceful transition of
European colonies to independent states. 146 Under Roosevelt's direction, the State
Department had worked on the concept as one of their major wartime initiatives and they
continued to push for adoption in the postwar period. 147 "By the spring of 1944,
Department of State officials were ready ... They gave the UN a decisive role in
controlling trust areas, with provisions for inspections and mandatory reports on
conditions. ... Roosevelt believed that the provisions for inspection and pUblicity would
be a powerful inducement for more liberal colonial policies.,,148 The State Department
also included independence as the chief goal for the system. However, as previously
discussed, FDR was under considerable pressure to reduce the scope of the concept and
delay any tInal decision until after the war. 149 No one will ever know what Roosevelt's
intent may have been when he yielded to the British at Yalta. Nonetheless, by agreeing
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to the delay, his sudden death put the trusteeship issue at Truman's feet to deal with as
soon as he took office. The actual establishment of the Trusteeship Council during
Truman's early administration would prove to be a glaring example of the President's
rhetoric not matching his actions. The American delegation to the 1945 San Francisco
Conference forming the United Nations allowed the European participants to change the
wording of the plan from the clear word independence to the more ambiguous word selfrule and then left it to the discretion of the Europeans which of their colonies to include
in the trusteeship program. 150 The trusteeship was only official for mandates that had
existed under League of Nations' agreements and recently captured enemy territories. In
Truman's defense, considerable pressure existed to weaken the trusteeship's scope of
operation. There was even fear that Churchill, and the British government, would be
successful in having the whole trusteeship concept thrown out if the word independence
remained in the language of the plan. lSI Despite agreeing to the weakening of the plan,
the State Department did take the lead in insisting on establishment of the trusteeship
program during the San Francisco Conference. 152 Truman's draft memoirs also indicate
that he took a far more active role in this process than is implied in the finished version,
which only specifies that Truman approved a series of instructions for the American
delegates. 153 The draft memoirs include statements such as this personally issued
Truman directive, "On April 18 I issued a directive to the delegation on the American
policy on trusteeship. I stated that at San Francisco it was not proposed to place any
particular territory under a trusteeship system:,154 Truman then pointed out that at the
Yalta Conference it had been agreed that non-League of Nation and non-captured
territories of the war would become part of the program with the approval of the ruling
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colonial power. 155 Another example of Truman's hands-on approach to the issue of
trusteeship, not found in the final version of the memoirs, includes "On April 27, I
received a draft proposal on trusteeship prepared by the American delegation. This draft
conformed to my general directive of April 18 on trusteeships. This was one of the key
issues of the conference and I wanted it to be as clear as it could be in every detail of
technical and legal phrasing.,,156 Even weakened in scope the Trusteeship Council still
provided a useful forum to help end colonialism by providing a sense of legitimacy to the
cause of returning self-rule to local people. ls7 Further evidence of the eventual
magnitude of the program came in a 1951 article that claimed at that time the program
included 85 different geographical entities, covering almost nine million square miles,
and a hundred and seventy million individuals in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean. ls8
The trusteeship concept did have adversaries both in and out of the Truman
administration. As discussed, Churchill had been an enemy of the trusteeship program
since its conception and successfully fought at Yalta to remove the European colonies
from inclusion. 159 Nevertheless, the British had to fight the battle allover again during
the formation of the UN. During this altercation, the French delegates collaborated with
the British to resist the mandatory addition of their colonies and they received support in
their efforts from the United States military. 160
The American military wanted to retain control over Guam, Samoa l61 and "Japanese
islands seized during the war including the Marshalls, the Marianas, and the Carolina,,162
island chains (See Figure 1)163. Controlling these geographic assets would give them
complete control over the lines of communications in that part of the Pacific and the
ability to control strategic access to a large part of the Asian continent. 1M These bases
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Figure 1
would also enable the United States to continue to project air and sea forces well beyond
its continental boundary. 165 Early on, Pentagon officials had argued against discussing
the disposition of captured Pacific islands while the war was still ongoing and had
convinced the Department of State to exclude them from the trusteeship talks at
Dumbarton Oaks and later at the Yalta Conference. At the United Nations Conference to
get around the all-or-nothing approach to inclusion of territories in the trusteeship
program a compromise idea arosc. Certain strategic areas within regions initially
designated as trusteeships, such as certain islands in the Pacific, would now fall outside
of the Trusteeship Council ' s direct influence.
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Some 1948 news conferences addressed

Truman's public position on the subject of the islands when he said, "Those that we do
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not need will be placed under a U.N.O. [United Nations Organization] trusteeship.,,167 he
said moreover, "that the national defense necessities of the United States will not be
sacrificed.,,168 The Truman administration did attempt to create a pathway to freedom for
these island holdings and by 1948 devices such as the South Pacific Commission,
established under the auspices of the United Nations' Trusteeship program, included the
mission to prepare the islands for ultimate independence. 169 In addition, the Trusteeship
Council served as a public forum for colonial issues and was later successful in applying
pressure on the British government. 170 The issue of trusteeship is a fine example that
Truman's policy on colonialism is a mixed bag. Truman at first supported the trusteeship
concept but yielded to internal and external pressures and compromised his position in
order to address other, higher priority concerns, such as national security issues.
Another of Truman's advisors, not discussed earlier, played a pivotal role in the
American military's weakening of the trusteeship program. James Forrestal, Secretary of
the Navy and the first United States Secretary of Defense, was the leading advocate to
retain control of the Pacific islands until his departure from the Department of Defense
and his sudden death in 1949. Forrestal's diaries layout the Department of Defense's
case for keeping the islands and describe the infighting within the administration. He
chronicles the idea that the islands were not colonies but "rather 'defense posts'
necessary to the big power responsible for the security of the area, and their disposition,
along with that of other strategic frontiers and territorial acquisitions, should be settled by
the big powers in advance instead of through the proposed trusteeship mechanism."l?l
The contention that the islands would not be colonies but only controlled by the United
States because they were strategic defensive positions seems to be rather specious. The
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end result is still a foreign power controlling a country though the Department of Defense
argued that the islands could not be considered colonies because the local population
would be free from the exploitative economic and cultural arrangements that marked
traditional colonies held by the European empires. l72 The idea of using the islands as
defense posts first circulated at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and Forrestal's diaries
provide depth to the administration's behind-the-scenes wrangling over the issue. A 21
January 1946 entry captured Forrestal's surprise upon finding out that Secretary of State
Byrnes, with Acheson's encouragement, had pushed Truman to announce that the Pacific
islands would shortly become part of the Trusteeship program under the control of the
United Nations. The State Department's thinking on the subject was that following the
military's lead would result in "reservations of other territory by other nations until the
non-aggrandizement plan of the Atlantic Charter would be a mockery .... "I73 An
incensed Forrestal saw Truman that afternoon to counter Byrnes' attempt to change what
he thought had been settled at the earlier San Francisco Conference. Forrestal also
criticized Acheson's actions as being unprofessional according to the entry, which is
sympathetic to Truman. 174 In later entries, Forrestal talks about the need to keep the
islands out of the trusteeship program and implies that the State Department is working to
thwart him.17s From Forrestal's dairies it is clear that the issue of colonialism was not a
static process and that Truman's advisors did not speak with one voice. Truman's
memoirs reinforce this picture of infighting and conflicting objectives when he says, "In .
. . meetings with Cabinet members on the question of trusteeships, I found that the State
Department held views that differed from those of the War and Navy Departments .... In
the end I sustained the Army and Navy chiefs on the major issue of security of the
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bases.,,176 This exclusion of strategic areas from United Nations' control would translate
to changes in the United States position on colonialism even though Truman would have
preferred to do otherwise.
Even while agreeing with the military's stance about continued control of the Pacific
islands Truman was of two minds. In a 6 November 1946 statement, Truman said, "The
United States is prepared to place under trusteeship ... Japanese Mandated Islands and
any Japanese Islands for which it assumes responsibilities as result of the Second World
War.,,177 Yet in the same statement, he talks about the strategic area concept for the
islands and its presentation to the United Nations' Security Council. 178 Nevertheless,
after weighing the options Truman decided that retention of these islands was in the
United States national interest. Regardless of the reasoning behind the decision, the
exclusion of the islands from the United Nations' trusteeship mandate still troubled
Truman years later when wrote his memoirs. He explained his feelings, "My attitude was
always that while it was necessary for us to control certain islands in the Pacific until
peace was established, these territories should not be closed to the rest of the world. I
believed we should set up civil governments as soon as possible to replace the military
governments. Some of the military objected, but while I remained President I intended to
try to get as near to self-government as we could wherever we had the responsibility.,,179
The impression one gets is that Truman felt the duty to ensure national security but was
uncomfortable holding onto the islands indefinitely therefore he attempted to rationalize
his position by saying that he still supported the Pacific islanders' right to independence
at the earliest feasible date.
One should note that the captured islands of the Pacific were not the only holdings of
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the United States. The future States of Hawaii and Alaska were still territories during
Truman's administration but did not fit the definition applied to the European colonies.
Though these territories did not become States until 1959, they were in the process of
joining the Union. Truman noted in a 1950 public address, "One of the principal reasons
why I am anxious to see the Territory of Hawaii and the territory of Alaska become
States is because of their vital importance to the defense and to the welfare of the United
States of America.,,180 Truman was pushing independence for another territory even
more rapidly, "The intention of President Roosevelt and the Congress to give early
freedom to the Philippines ... was the will of the American people, and I was determined
to carry it through to speedy fulfillment. ... I hoped that by making the Philippines as
free as we had made Cuba it would have an effect on British, Dutch, and French policy in
their Far Eastern affairs.,,181 Others in the government also hoped that the European
imperial powers would emulate the orderly and controlled decolonization of the
Philippines as practiced by the United States. 182 Independence for the Philippines came
via Presidential proclamation in 1946 with the caveat that the United States could
maintain twenty-three military bases on Filipino soil on a ninety-nine year lease. 183
Truman boasted about the United States' actions in a speech about Puerto Rico's future,
"It is our pride that this policy was faithfully pursued in the case of the Philippines. The
people of the Philippines determined that they desired political independence, and the
Government of the United States made provision to this effect.,,184
Truman also supported the idea that the citizens of Puerto Rico should have the same
right to choose their own destiny. In the just mentioned speech, Truman was trying to
persuade Congress that "It is now time ... to ascertain from the people of Puerto Rico
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their wishes as to the ultimate status which they prefer, and .... Congress, to grant to
them the kind of government which they desire.,,185 At the time, various island groups
advocated diverse options: the right to elect a governor, the ability to become a State in
the Union, full independence, or designation of Dominion status much like Canada's
position in the British Commonwealth. 186 Truman's steady and sympathetic view of
Puerto Ricans remained in spite of the infamous 1950 assassination attempt by Puerto
Rican separatists. At a press conference after their failed effort Truman said, " ... the
people of Puerto Rico should have the right to detennine for themselves Puerto Rico's
political relationships to the continental United States.,,187 He did more for the island
than any other President had to that point, naming the first native Puerto Rican to be
Governor, extending Social Security privileges to the people and authorizing the 1951
referendum at which the people overwhelmingly voted to establish their own Constitution
and proclaim the Commonwealth of Puerto RicO. 188 Neither Roosevelt nor Truman
considered placing these territories under United Nations Trusteeship Council control as
they staunchly advocated for other's colonial territories. Perhaps the reason was that, at
least according to their rhetoric, both Presidents believed they had a viable plan to permit
the territorial populace decision-making power over their own destinies unlike the
subjugation and exploitation demonstrated by the European empires. Truman also
seemed intent on doing what he could while in office, if unable to confer their freedom he
pushed for future autonomy.
The first years of the Truman administration were anti-colonial in both rhetoric and
policy decisions. Truman saw the United Nations' trusteeship program, not United States
foreign policy, as the legitimate means to make the anti-colonial program work. Some
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people may view this as Truman practicing a hands-off policy on the issue but his own
words indicate that he saw this role as appropriate for the UN, a role that Wilson's
League of Nations was fated never to have a chance to fulfill. In spite of major
compromises regarding strategic areas, the core concept of the United Nation's
trusteeship structure had the constant support of Truman. Moreover, Truman continued
advocating self-determination for United States' territories, including Pacific islands, and
supported their right to decide their own fate if in a rather unhurried and methodical way.

COLD WAR / SHIFTING POLICIES

As time passed and other foreign policy issues, such as the Cold War, presented
themselves the issue of colonialism became more difficult for Truman and his
administration. These new issues encompassed more than just the discussed points that
focus on the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The world was
different than it had been before World War Two and, more importantly, had
fundamentally changed from the world at war that FDR had understood. The situation
was thus, " ... within the past thirty-five years the world had gone through ... the passing
of five empires and the drastic decline of two major imperial systems, the French and
British. These events had altered the historical distribution of power until now there were
only two major centers of power remaining, the United States and the Soviet Union." I 89
As the climatic events of the Second World War receded, it was natural for the United
States to reassess its foreign policy. In the midst of this reassessment, the administration
had to prioritize competing objectives to include the issue of colonialism and the
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European empires.
One of Truman's major policies related to colonialism was a break from FDR's policy
ideal of reducing Europe's power and significance. The World War had degraded the
international influence of Europe, reducing it to a level few at that juncture could
comprehend, including the President of the United States. 190 The European empires,
were attempting to restore their colonial holdings around the globe even before the war
ended. However, their efforts to resume control of their colonies in the postwar period
were proving problematic and Truman, along with others in the American government,
watched the Europeans with growing concern. The war had devastated home countries
and reconstruction was essential, a point that troubled the Truman administration.
Acheson spoke in an interview about the condition of postwar Europe and the United
States' aid programs to Europe during the Truman administration, "It didn't really strike
home to us that the British Empire was gone, the great power of France was gone, that
Europe was made out of four or five countries of 50,000,000 people. I still looked at the
map and saw that red on the thing, and, by God, that was the British Empire, the French
Senegalese troops in East Asia and in Germany--all of this was gone to hell. These were
countries hardly much more important than Brazil in the world.,,191 The empires had not
yet vanished but their power had dwindled, they were not the same empires that had
started World War Two.

WINTER 19471 A WEAKENED BRITAIN AND EUROPE

Both Europe and Great Britain were still near collapse two years after the end of the
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war. The war had virtually destroyed the British merchant fleet, and English companies
had lost foreign capital investments. By 1947, one-half of the factories in Britain had
shut down and the remaining factories had to close for up to three weeks during the
winter due to a shortage of fuel. 192 By this point, unemployment had jumped to fifteen
and halfpercent 193 and on the diplomatic front the British had begun informing the
Truman administration that they were withdrawing from the world scene. 194 A British
economic white paper at the time described their financial problems as "extremely
serious" and said the need to reduce troop strength rapidly was self-evident. 195
The European continent was in even worse shape than Britain with productivity at one
third of pre-war levels and infrastructure recovery at a snail's pace. 196 The French
economy had suffered under Nazi control and even with prodigious efforts at steel
production; there still was only half of the amount needed to begin rebuilding. More
importantly, most of France's meager finances bought food to supply the population
rather than reconstruction and the other countries in Europe were in no better shape. 197
Later the Marshall Plan would aid reconstruction on the Continent, but in 1947 even the
United States recovery efforts were not complete and in the end, Britain received no
economic support at all via the Marshall Plan.
The devastating winter of 1947 illuminated the dire condition of Europe, particularly
Britain, to the American people. The winter was exceptionally severe and a late frost
destroyed millions of acres of wheat and other critical food crops. 198 Weather conditions
were dreadful and brought countries to a virtual standstill. On l3 February 1947, Truman
acknowledged the emergency and announced that he was sending fuel oil, coal and wheat
shipments to the British Isles and Europe. 199 In a later interview about the winter, he
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pointed out that Europe had not seen such a crisis since the Middle Ages. He described
their plight, "People were starving, and they were cold because there wasn't enough coal,
and tuberculosis was breaking out . . .. The British were broke .... ,,200 At the time there
was a feeling that Europe's problems were the epicenter of a huge crisis, " ... not only
had the international system not been rebuilt-it seemed about to collapse entirely.,,201
The winter of 1947 served to drive home two points about Europe's circumstances.
First, that Britain, by far the largest colonial power, was not going to regain the
international might it had enjoyed at the height of the British Empire. Second, that
France and the other nations of Europe, even with help from the United States, would not
recover any time soon. These realizations would affect American foreign policy in broad
terms. From the aspect of imperialism, the Truman administration had to readjust their
thinking and view the European empires, including Great Britain, not as being in a
position of strength but rather in a state of weakness that threatened world order. The
danger of European empires drawing the rest of the world into their conflicts had
vanished. The continuing plight of a weakened Europe, highlighted by the winter of
1947, was the catalyst that produced competing objectives for American foreign policy,
the need to stabilize and rebuild Europe versus ending European colonialism. These
competing aims were further heighten by Truman's Euro-centrists foreign policy
advisors. Another factor that played a role in Truman's evolving decision-making
process was the status of the colonies themselves where the war and postwar
circumstances destroyed the old European-controlled social order thereby opening the
way for nationalist movements. These movements increased the instability of the regions
since they sought immediate self-rule and independence.
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EUROPEAN COLONIES

In addition to the Truman administration's concerns with the problems of Europe,
events in current and fonner colonial holdings also demanded their attention. The newly
created Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) undertook a series of assessments regarding
the underdeveloped areas of the world to address this need. Truman's personal copies of
CIA reports compose the material examined in this section. A general impression
garnered from the reports was that the disintegration ofthe empires had left fonner
colonies unprepared for independence or in open conflict with European attempts to
reassert control. Another general aspect that the reports dealt with was the issue of access
by the United States' to the resources found in those colonies and fonner colonies. The
reports are broken down into the major European colonies, first the British, and then
French and Dutch Empires and they cover some of the major underdeveloped regions in
the Middle East, Asia and Africa.
First, a look at the big picture and the general condition ofthe European empires'
grasp on colonies around the world as described in the intelligence reports. The CIA's
1948 assessment of European colonialism was that its demise was inevitable. Overall,
colonies around the globe had increased their efforts to secure freedom since the end of
the Second World War. Some reasons for the increased nationalism included Japan's
success during the war in driving European imperialists from the Pacific region, the
postwar weakness of the Colonial powers, internal socialist movements, general support
for colonial freedom by other nations including the Soviet Union, and the creation of the
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United Nations as a means and forum for the liquation of colonial rule. Furthermore,
every effort by the Europeans to reassure the colonial populations had failed and it was
unlikely that the breakup would be a controlled and orderly process. The instability in
these colonies and former colonies was spreading to the rest of the world and perceived
as a direct threat to American national security. The threat to security was comprised of
three elements; the loss of military bases, the further weakening of already exhausted
European allies, and the loss of strategic materials needed by America's economic sector
and military. The last factor was especially troubling because many strategic materials
were exclusive to the colonial regions. 202 Additionally, the United States' overall foreign
policy endeavors were at a disadvantage because conflicts between the Europeans and
colonial populations had tainted local attitudes toward any western nation, including the
United States. CIA reports in 1951 and 1952 also raised the specter of communism's
growth, especially in South Asia. As for the Near East, the European powers were trying
to retain their influence that caused problems for American efforts. The CIA was more
dismissive of the threat of communism in the Near East than the Far East. 203
The majority of the CIA reports dealt with the biggest and most powerful of the
European empires. The overall assessments of the British focused not on how to end the
British Empire but on the affects, its ultimate decline would have on the international
scene. The CIA's opinion was that without its colonies Great British lacked the natural
resources to maintain a position as the number three world power or even a second tier
power.204 Additionally, they asserted that Britain's problems were economic and grew
out of a growing loss of industry in the British Isles.

205

Furthermore, the ties that bound

the Commonwealth countries to Britain were weakening and the British no longer
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exercised their past influence on these former colonies. 206 The agency also noted that
there were fundamental differences in administrating the colonies between the British
Empire and other colonial powers, especially the French. The report says, "In contrast to
French colonial theory, which makes representation in the parliament of the metropolitan
country the goal of colonial political development, the British in general offer their
colonial peoples a gradual process up the ladder of increasing self-government with
Dominion Status [sovereign Nation within the British Empire] at the top .... ,,207 The
overall tone of the CIA reports is sympathetic to Britain, an ally in decline.
Individual reports about various portions and colonies of the British Empire focused
on their possible impact on American foreign policies. For example, the CIA points out
that the newly independent state of India was pursuing a course of neutrality in the
United StateslUSSR conflict. Additionally, the new nation was redirecting its anger over
British colonialism towards the United States.20R In the Near East, residual anger of the
people towards Britain and France had led to general anti-Western feeling making
American efforts problematic at best. 209 In 1948, the CIA held that in spite of problems
with the British presence in Malaya it nevertheless ensured American access to the area's
rubber, tin and strategic ports. CIA analysts also predicted that within the next five years
the British would grant Malaya more independence. 2IO Finally, a 1950 report on the
British colonies of West Africa focuses on strategic materials such as columbite and
manganese. This report is dismissive oflocal efforts to attain autonomy citing the apathy
of a large portion of the popUlation. The report said that this apathy, combined with
efforts by the British to increase the tempo of granting of self-government, would
preclude any serious problems in the region?)) As with the general reports concerning
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Great Britain, the specific CIA reports about the colonies or regions are positive in their
treatment of the British government while focusing on the American perspective.
The CIA also analyzed France and its colonial holdings in the postwar period. First
was a 1947 report on the general state of France in which the CIA revealed that the
French government was attempting to recover international stature lost during World War
Two. The study said that French leaders considered reestablishment of the French
Empire the key to regaining the prestige of the worldwide community.212 The report
stressed this point by saying, "France views its colonies as indispensable to its
prestige.,,213 The report also pointed out that France was of great strategic importance to
the United States even though currently in a weakened state as a leader in Western
Europe?14 A 1950 report on France noted that despite their declared aim of establishing
a more tolerant policy toward colonies that, "The reforms promised but not implemented
by the French are being countered by far-reaching native nationalist demands for greater
freedom, extending in some instances to complete independence and autonomy.,,215 The
overall view of the French situation is much more negative than the coverage found in
CIA reports on the British Empire.
As for French colonies, a series of CIA reports paints a pessimistic picture of their
future as well as the efforts of the French government. In Tunisia, nationalists were
increasingly asserting themselves in the affairs of the country and in opposition to the
French?16 Another description of the rest of Northern Africa said, "While there is no
immediate danger of a successful revolt in French North Africa, increasing nationalist
intransigence and continuing French failure to institute a sincere program of reforms may
tum what is now a political problem into a situation dangerous to peace and to the
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security of the US.,,217 On the other side of the world, the picture was even gloomier for
the French Empire. A northern Vietnam Communist movement, with ties to the Chinese
Communists, was threatening the French presence in Indochina, Vietnam, Cambodia, and
Laos. The CIA concluded that unless the French appreciably increased the number of
military forces in the area they would lose control of the region and most assuredly
Vietnam. The Communists of the Viet Minh movement, augmented by Chinese troops
and successfully exploiting popular nationalist feelings, were proving more than a match
for colonial forces. The report continued that given the current situation it was unlikely
that France would even be able to maintain their strength long enough to establish an
autonomous Vietnamese govenunent around which the anti-Communist elements could
rally.218 A CIA estimate during the last year of Truman's Presidency forecasted " ... the
French will continue their war effort in Indochina. ... However, while insisting upon the
protection of French interests, the French will attempt to limit their commitments in
Indochina by demanding additional US financial assistance and by seeking commitments
for US-UK military support in the defense oflndochina.,,219 The same report predicted
that the Chinese would not directly intervene in the conflict but would continue to
increase aid to Viet Minh.22o The CIA reports found in Truman's files were collectively
negative about France's ability to direct a peaceful and systematic transition to autonomy
for their colonies, unlike their overall assessment for the British controlled territories.
The awareness of the CIA reports kept Truman focused primarily on Britain and
France's colonial problems and therefore the other colonial European powers received
scant mention. The CIA analyzed the holdings of Belgian, Spain and Portugal in central
and southern Africa but not to the degree that Britain and France were covered. For
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example, a report assessing Portugal was blunt when it said the country and its colonial
holdings, with the exception of airfields in the Azores, could do little militarily or
economically for the United States. 221 Only the Dutch colonies in Indonesia warranted
any degree of in-depth scrutiny when compared to the French and British assessments.
The United States' strategic interests in the area, according to the CIA reports, was
because Indonesia had large oil reserves and provided the majority of the world's
supplies of tin, rubber, and quinine?22 Furthennore, the Dutch had launched some illadvised and ill-fated military operations in the region in an attempt to quell the
insurrection and reestablish their power. The ramifications from Dutch actions caused
strategic problems for both the United States and the United Nations. 223 The tone in the
CIA report, "Consequences of Dutch 'Police Action' in Indonesia,,224 is akin to the
dismal predictions about French colonial efforts. Another point made in both the French
and Dutch reports was the alarming growth of communism in the underdeveloped regions
of the world and the consequences this expansion could have upon American foreign
policy objectives. 225

BIPOLAR WORLD

An examination of the period, and Truman's Presidency, would be incomplete without
a look at the Cold War aspects ofthe colonial question. The description of this
timeframe is one of" ... opposing trends ... development of a bipolar world, and
continued breakup of old European empires.,,226 The frequency with which the subject of
communism came up in Truman's 1951 speeches and press conferences indicated that the
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issue dominated his foreign policy agenda in his later Presidency.227 In a 1948 press
conference, when asked about world communism, Truman went so far as to say that the
single source of the world's postwar volatility, " ... lies largely in the attitude of one
nation-the Soviet Union:,228 As Truman and his administration were abandoning hope
for cooperation with the Soviet Union and advancing towards a full-blown Cold War the
question of colonialism, and the United States' approach towards it altered. As the
European empires lost influence in their colonial regions, the focus shifted to the power
vacuums created in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. The problem of Communist
influence at flrst seemed minor but when they successfully exploited the chaos caused by
precipitous withdrawal of European colonial rule the Truman administration's concerns
soon grew to eclipse other considerations. 229 Some argue that, especially in Africa:
In the decades after World War II ... the United States refused to press for
independence and the end of colonialism. The government attempted to follow what
it considered a middle course, assuring colonial peoples of American sympathy and
good will while supporting or acquiescing in the continuation of European control ....
While the search for security pushed anti-colonialism into the distant background in
the early years of the Truman administration ....230
The late 1940s saw public outcry from some of the Black Leadership, centered in the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, claiming that the
government was not aggressively pursuing the end of colonialism. However, their
complaint did not gamer much public support since Cold War rhetoric was intensifying
across the nation. 231 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Chief of Staff at the time
perceived the problems Congress had charting a course through conflicting foreign policy
objectives:
We were pushed hard by the colonial powers to support their position in the
United Nations and not to encourage the independence of the developing areas too
soon. And we were pushed hard by others who wanted independence for all of the
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colonies and the trust territories as rapidly as possible. The United States tried to be
reasonable -- to chart a middle course. We recognized that if the colonies got their
independence too soon this would put them in a difficult position because they
wouldn't be able to maintain their economies, they wouldn't have the experience and
the education and training for their people to survive as new states, at least not to
make the kind of progress that we had hoped. 232
In the State Department fear of uncontrolled change led many to realize that "They were
not ready to see the colonial powers give up their colonies as quickly as they ... have.,,233
Truman rationalized his growing resistance to nationalism by noting that in some cases it
led to negative consequences under Communist-inspired "extreme nationalism.,,234
The issue of colonialism also turned into a Cold War propaganda tool. The
administration grew concerned that the Communists, the Russians in particular, were
attempting to sway the popular opinion in colonial regions against the United States. The
former Prime Minister of Greece said, " ... the colonial powers did not consider
advisable immediately after the war, to admit even to a certain degree that colonialism
could any longer survive. They thus opened the way for Communists to make the best of
what Lenin had already marked out: that is, for the Russians to become the champions of
the peoples' right for self-determination and the pioneers of the abolishment of
colonialism ...235 The second part of the Russian message was that the Americans were de
facto imperialists because of the United States alliances with the European powers. A
letter from Secretary of State Acheson to Truman about Russian politics playing out in
the UN General Assembly said, "They have lumped the British and The French together
with us as the Atlantic warmongers, and have made strenuous appeals ... to the ArabAsian bloc.,,236 The Soviet's hijacking of the anti-colonialism message served to weaken
European power while building Russian goodwill with the people of the colonial
regions. 237 The Soviet anti-colonial message also helped shift the Truman

94

administration's efforts to focus on defeating perceived Communist-sponsored nationalist
movements such as Ho Chi Minh's in Vietnam. While United States' foreign policy
simultaneously supported nationalist movements such as in Indonesia that the
administration portrayed as democratically inspired. 238
Cold War rhetoric also changed the meaning of colonialism and imperialism with
Truman's public attacks on communism referring to it as Communist imperialism.239
Truman described communism as having assumed the mantel of the imperialist with all
the evils inherent to the role. While speaking publicly of the Soviet Union he said, "That
imperialism seeks to gain its ends by intimidation, by fomenting disorder, and by
attempts to force internal collapse.,,24o One of Truman's speeches talked about the
Russians having imperial aspirations,

In the Far East, Communist imperialism presents us with another threat. There
we see many new nations emerging, as our own countries once did, from colonial
status to full independence .... But Communist imperialism has fallen upon these
new nations with its weapons of internal subversion and external attack. It seeks
to overpower them before they are strong enough to stand alone?41
In yet another speech Truman spoke of Russia as creating a new brand of colonialism, "It
embarked on a new colonialism--Soviet style. This new colonialism has already brought
under its complete control and exploitation many countries which used to be free
countries.,,242 The 1950 capstone document of the Truman administration's fight against
communism, NSC-68, also defined the Soviet Union's actions in negative terms as
"Russian Imperialism.,,243 With all the Cold War rhetoric, the American people's stance
about colonialism altered. The British Ambassador to the United States at the time said,
"Anti-colonialism in the United States today is a traditional attitude rather than an active
crusading force ... the broad masses of the American people, including the liberals, are
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convinced that the supreme danger confronting their civilization is not old-fashioned
. ,,244
. I'Ism but mo dem conunumsm.
coIoma

LATER TRUMAN POLICIES

Even in the midst of the all-encompassing Cold War, there were several foreign policy
programs directed at the problems of European colonialism or as Truman called it "The
old Imperialism.,,245 At the end of his tenure, Truman spoke with pride about his
administration's anti-colonial stance, "In the far East we have helped to create and
strengthen a ring of new and independent nations from India to Japan. We have helped
600 million people to make their way from colonial subjection or dependency to
independent self-govemment.,,246 Truman's response to the international problems of the
latter 1940s was development of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Moreover,
he launched the Point IV Program for regions of the world that had formerly been
European colonies?47 Professor Robertson's book calls the Point IV Program "an
acknowledgement that the nineteenth-century era of empire was over, a recognition of
desire of independence for new states and of the social revolutions within them as people
began to ask ... for something more than subsistence and subservience,,248
The Point IV Program was first unveiled in Truman's 1949 inaugural address. This
program was the fourth point offered as part of a series of foreign policy initiatives to
provide support to the undeveloped and colonial regions of the world. 249 Truman
described the Point IV Program as a way to "share our store of know-how and capital to
help these people develop their economies and reshape their societies.,,25o He went even
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further to say that, the Point IV Program had "nothing in common with either the old
imperialism of the last century or the new imperialism of the Communists.,,251 In
addition to serving as an altruistic alternative to imperialism, the program had other
benefits. Truman personally described the Point IV Program as a way to counter
"Communist propaganda,,252 and increase the underdeveloped countries' ability to
"produce strategic materials which are essential to the defense and economic health of the
free world.,,253 By the last year of Truman' s Presidency, he boasted of the success of the
Point IV Program with "technical and economic missions in 40 countries.,,254 Indeed, the
program spent millions of dollars during Truman's Presidency and ultimately evolved
into additional aid programs?55 The underlying objectives of the Point IV missions, in
Truman's words, were to " ... encourage stabilized governments in underdeveloped
countries in Africa, South America, and Asia, we could encourage the use of the
development of those areas some of the capital which accumulated in the United
States.,,256 In his memoirs, Truman would say that the positive effect from the capital
and technical support of the Point IV Program would be similar to the European empires'
investment in early America without the colonial baggage. 257 Regardless of the
reasoning behind the program, Truman felt that:
Point Four was aimed at enabling millions of people in underdeveloped areas H'
raise themselves from the level of colonialism to self support and ultimate
prosperity. All of the reports which I had received from such areas of the world
indicated that a great many people were still living in an age almost a thousand
years behind the times. In many places this was the result of long exploitation for
the benefit of foreign countries, of developments for foreign benefit rather than for
the interest of native peoples. This was the curse of colonialism, and I, for one,
have always hoped to see it disappear. 258
The Point Four Program was the centerpiece of Truman's self-described anti-colonial
foreign policy in the latter period of his Presidency. The Point IV Program was also
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evidence that Truman did not forsake Roosevelt's legacy of anti-colonialism. Rather,
Truman and his administration amended the policy to address current events and the
changing foreign policy priorities of the new Cold War era. The effectiveness of the
Point IV Program was debatable259 but at least its rhetoric was against both the old
European colonialism and the new Communist imperialism.

INDIVIDUAL EUROPEAN EMPIRES

In addition to a general foreign policy program dealing with native aspirations around

the world, Truman's foreign policy also responded to individual problems arising from
the various European colonies and territorial holdings. This section looks at three major
European empires and the Truman administration's response to each of the countries'
colonial policies. The three major powers, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and France,
each had sizable colonial holdings and each dealt with colonial crises during the latter
part of the Truman administration. The United States' decision in each crisis provides
insight not only into the administration's thinking but also offers some suggestions as to
Truman's feelings on the subject.

Great Britain

The first nation examined is Great Britain, by far the largest and most powerful
empire. As noted, Britain was the United States' closest ally and had the distinction of
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going through political upheaval and changing political parties in the postwar period.
Gone were the Conservative Party and its leader Churchill, the great defender of the
British Empire. Replacing him was Clement R. Attlee and his Labour Party.
The Labour Party assumed power before the end of the Potsdam Conference in 1945
and set about to change the empire. 260 Their objective was to transform the British
Empire into a Commonwealth and do away with colonial rule in a number of
territories. 261 Besides the professed benevolent aspects of this program by the Labor
Party, this effort was really a practical attempt by a British government with limited
resources to preserve the nation's international standing by leading a modem
Commonwealth instead of an archaic empire.

262

Early in 1946, the Labour Party-led government announced that in 1947 it would grant
independence to India, their most important colony, thus beginning the nation's first
mcYor postwar wave of decolonialization.

263

Moreover, by 1948, Burma and Ceylon

achieved statehood. During this same period, the British were engaged in military
operations in Malaya264 but by the early 1950s, the Malayan troubles had been resolved
to the point that successful talks for independence began. 265 Britain also announced plans
to reduce their presence in the Middle East and they removed various military forces
from Syria and Egypt along with a complete withdrawal from Jordan and Palestine
(Israel).266 Finally, on Christmas Eve 1951 Libya gained its independence. 267 By the
time Churchill returned to the role of Prime Minister in late 1951, the breakup of the
British Empire was irreversible though he did try to slow the process while in office. 268
The Labour Party's efforts to transform the British Empire left little for the Truman
administration to do regarding ending British colonialism. Churchill, self-described
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defender of the British Empire and bane to Roosevelt's anti-colonial efforts, was
temporarily out of power. For the next few years, Churchill would operate as the
opposition party leader focusing on domestic politics and select initiatives such as his
Iron Curtain Speech in Fulton Missouri where he tried to raise international concerns
about the growing Communist threat from Russia. 269 Nevertheless, while Truman and his
administration were publicly supportive of Attlee's efforts to convert the British
Empire270 at the same time the Department of State continued to push Britain to comply
with their 1945 agreement to open British colonial markets to American businesses and
end the imperialist trade bloc.271 A British diplomat of the period said that the American
State Department was single-minded regarding the liberalization of trade. 272 Similarly,
the administration kept up the pressure to open markets in the British-dominated Middle
East. 273 During a series of riots in 1949, the State Department applied diplomatic
pressure to accelerate independence for Libya, and the British came to believe that the
Americans were trying to use Libya to spark independence movements in the region. 274
The Truman administration tried unsuccessfully to convince Britain to negotiate an
orderly transfer of power with Egyptian nationalists while still maintaining a lasting
military presence, in the form of basing for aircraft and naval access, in the region.

275

The decline of the British Empire and associated withdrawal of forces from Greece
precipitated Truman's deVelopment of the Truman Doctrine that called for the United
States to fill the growing power vacuum while combating communism. 276 British
withdrawal from other regions ultimately also played a role in Truman's decision to exert
the power of the United States. Yet, Truman did not mean for this change to establish the
United States as a replacement who would continue European colonialism. Rather, he
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intended to use this new approach as a means to pursue his well~documented anti~
Communist agenda. 277

Netherlands

The Netherlands provided a different story from the British efforts to divest
themselves of colonial rule. The Dutch had experienced brutal treatment under the
Nazi's, the countryside was devastated and during the course of the war they had lost
control oftheir colonies to Imperial Japan.278 Dutch recovery efforts included restoring
their dominion over Indonesia colonies after the British had secured the region?79 By
1947, their efforts had turned into open warfare with the natives and in 1949 the Dutch
colonial administration finally admitted defeat and withdrew from the region. 28o
In this case, the United States put significant pressure on the Dutch government to end

its military efforts to reestablish control. 281 This diplomatic pressure by the United States
occurred despite the powerful European-first bloc in the State Department that initially
tried to thwart American diplomatic efforts to end Dutch colonial rule. The motivation
behind supporting the Dutch in regaining imperial power included the desire to help the
Netherlands recover from the war and a belief that the Dutch could better extract
important raw materials from the region. 282 In this case, one of Truman's closest
advisors, then Secretary of State Marshall, was the person who overruled the
Department's Euro-centrists who saw the Netherlands as a client state. 283 A senior State
Department official at the time remembered Marshall's guidance, "he felt that we had to
live up to the policies of the U. N. Charter with respect to Indonesia, and to affirm -- call
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it anti-colonial, perhaps it was -- the need for the independence of Indonesia.,,284
American policy towards Indonesia had originally been one of encouraging both sides to
compromise but the United States became overtly anti-colonial when the Dutch failed to
agree to reasonable demands of the Indonesian nationalists.z 85
In late 1949, Truman publicly granted the newly formed United States of Indonesia
one hundred million dollars of Point IV Program funds to aid the country in its transition
to self-government. 286 The fact that American intelligence agencies deemed the
nationalist movement in Indonesia to be free of Communist influences made support by
the Truman administration and the American public that much easier. 281 This situation is
also a good example of some of the unintended consequences that can occur in foreign
policy. As American and international public opinion swung to support the Indonesian
nationalists the United States government pressured the Dutch to accede to the
nationalists demands. This pressure was partly due to the government reflecting the will
of the people but the fact that the belligerent Dutch military was dressed and equipped
with American Lend-Lease supplies also embarrassed the administration. 288 In this
particular case, Truman and his administration put an anti-colonial policy into action that
helped to secure Indonesia's independence?89

France

France had suffered as much or more than the Netherlands and fared worse than many
other parts of a dysfunctional Europe. The country endured German subjugation and the
fighting had devastated a large part of its countryside. Additionally, like the Dutch, the
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French had lost colonies to the Axis Power's conquests. Despite hopes for a quick
recovery, dire problems confronted the French people for many years after the war. In
the extended postwar period, the French were trying to simultaneously reestablish a
national government, create some kind of viable economy that would provide subsistence
to the population, and regain their former standing as a world power. Central to their
national goals was the restoration of the old French Empire in Africa and Asia and at the
center of the French imperial efforts during the Truman administration were the colonies
in Indochina?90 Shortly after the end of the war, French administrators and soldiers
began to filter back into the colonies while Allied forces looked on. At the same time,
many in Washington hoped the situation would somehow resolve itself without direct
United States inference. 291
The greatest argument that Truman had pro-colonial tendencies was the United States
policy concerning French colonial efforts in Indochina.292 During the first years of the
postwar period, the Truman administration's response to France's return to Indochina
was mute. Part of the reason was a continuation by the Truman administration of
Roosevelt's policy of putting off the problem ofIndochina independence until a more
auspicious time. Another facet was that the United States lacked direct military
involvement in the region. At the end of the war, the British military controlled the
Theater of Operations where Indochina was located and other postwar issues occupied
the Truman administration's attention more fully.293 Moreover, there was a fear within
the United States government that if the United States pressed for immediate
independence for the colonies in Indochina that the domestic politics within France might
veer even more towards the Communist Party, which had already become the largest
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party in France by 1946.

294

The Truman administration's position on the issue was a

middle-of-the road approach; they would not interfere with the French's return but would
pressure France to establish a firm plan for the region's independence. 295 As noted in the
earlier dispatches from Ambassador Hurley, there was concern about colonial forces
using issued Lend-Lease equipment. Yet, American military supplies were ubiquitous
among the Allies so it would have been difficult for the United States to preclude their
use from occurring.296 Nevertheless, the United States' official policy was that French
colonial forces would receive no assistance. For example, there was a ban on "American
flag vessels to carry troops or war material to Vietnam.,,297
As the Cold War intensified in the late 1940s, the administration's decision not to
pursue the divisive issue of Indochina independence received reinforcement since they
were trying to secure French and British support for an anti-Soviet European coalition. 298
Once again, Truman's position was in some ways similar to FDR's attitude when he
chose alliance unity over the thorny Indochina problem. Additionally Truman, and others
in the administration, perceived Indochina as a place where the French had been fighting,
not nationalists, but rather "Communist Rebels" since the Allied occupation ended and
the French returned to power in 1946. 299 This anti-Communist vision no doubt prevented
any positive response to the Soviet-tainted Ho Chi Minh's requests for aid, unlike the
later United States' response to the nationalists in the Dutch colonies. 30o According to
Truman's memoirs, he feared a vast Soviet-sponsored scheme to seize control of all of
Asia. He said, "After Korea, it would be Indo-China, then Hong Kong, then Malaya.,,301
While opposing Communist-inspired nationalists, Truman and his administration
never advocated that the French colonial rule should continue in perpetuity. The
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pennanent solution envisioned was to end colonial rule and replace it with a nationalist
government favorable to the United States. Acheson described the administration's
policy "As we saw our role in Southeast Asia, it was to help toward solving the colonialnationalist conflict in a way that would satisfy nationalist aims and minimize the strain on
our Western European allies.,,302 Acheson would later couple greater issues, obtaining
French support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and efforts to restore Gennan
military might, in exchange for United States support in Indochina. 303 Nevertheless, by
1950 the administration's idea of minimizing the strain on France would include direct
American support to French forces in Indochina against an alleged Soviet-sponsored
insurgency.304 This support, more than any thing else, has tied Truman to French
colonialism. Yet, nothing indicates that this support intended to reestablish a pennanent
French Empire in the region but rather served to oppose Communist imperialism305 and
secure stability. Acheson said that United States intentions for the French " ... meant a
much more rapid transfer of responsibility and authority to indigenous institutions than
the French had in mind and .... Although these types of talks went on for three years,
they had no effect and the drain on France continued until the effort failed in 1954.,,306
Reinforcing this view ofa more active role for America in Indochina's stability was a
1950 report generated by the State and Defense Departments that raised the issue of the
economies and political stability of the Indochina and Indonesia regions. This joint
report pointed out that for the area to recover from the war it needed stability and
economic growth for the region's emerging nations rather than the closed markets found
in Communist-dominated regions. 307 This need ior open markets was especially true for
Japan, which lacked the raw materials required to restore their economy.
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The combined issues of communism. stability in the colonial regions, and the interests
of allies no doubt drove Truman and his administration from a position of
noninterference to a more active roll in ensuring the security of the colonies in Indochina.
Moreover hindsight, as revealed by countless books and articles about the Vietnam War,
has shown that Truman and his people failed to resolve the issue of Indochinese
independence by convincing the French to be willing partners in real reform.

308

For

instance in 1949, the French promised to grant future independence to Vietnam, but only
because they bowed to United States pressure. 309 When working with France the Truman
administration sought a nationalist solution to the Indochina problem rather than settling
for a continuation of imperial power. The preferred solution was " ... France to fight the
anti-communist war and win ... and ... when battlefield victory was assured to
magnanimously withdraw from Indochina.,,310 The administration even viewed the "Bao
Dai Solution" as a better alternative in Vietnam than colonial rule.

3ll

This French-

inspired solution convinced an ineffectual Emperor Bao Dai to return to Vietnam in 1949
to serve as Head of State to a new government in South Vietnam.

312

This change in

Vietnam's colonial status was in no small measure a response by the French to the
Truman administration's renewed pressure to resolve the nationalist problems. 313 The
grant of United States aid in the form of supplies, money, and personnel to Indochina in
1950 immediately followed the French ratification of Vietnam's independence and
Truman's recognition of the Bao Dai government. 314 Until China fell to the Communists,
along with other setbacks in 1949, the Truman administration had been reluctant to agree
to the Bao Dai Solution. However, the official endorsement ofNSC-68's more militant
containment policy, an ongoing Korean War and tougher anti-communism rhetoric
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throughout the government in 1950 overrode earlier anti-colonial considerations.
Therefore, Truman and his aides felt that they had little choice other than to support the
Boa Dai government. 315 Still, the ill-advised recognition ofBao Dai and the grant of aid
in 1950 were more representative of the Cold War policy to contain communism than a
sign of Truman's latent approval ofcolonialism. 316
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

Harry Truman is a subject well worth studying since he was in a unique position to
establish the underpinnings of a national containment policy that lasted throughout the
decades-long conflict with the USSR. Moreover, he was the first to handle the diverse
facets of that late twentieth century global contest which included a massive arms race,
proliferation of defensive alliances, proxy wars, economic warfare, and propaganda wars.
As a result, historians have made a thorough and detailed study of Truman's response to
the challenges in the period after the Second World War.
The following conclusion is similar to the blending of ideas found in the Postrevisionism school, in that it supports elements from the two earlier schools of thought
regarding Cold War history, the Traditional and the Revisionist. First, bolstering the
traditional view is the fact that Truman espoused the ideals of independence and self-rule
for colonies and pushed for those goals where possible, whereas the Communists
practiced a different type of subjugation of native peoples. On the other hand, the
revisionists appear correct in contending that national security goals ultimately won out
over universalism. Roosevelt and Truman's ideology advocated the end of colonialism
but concerns about maintaining the military alliance in World War Two, and containing
communism during the Cold War, impeded the advancement of independence for the
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European colonies.
Another subject of interest, though not studied as extensively as the Cold War, was
Truman's management of the repercussions caused by the decaying European empires.
The analysis included Truman's private correspondence, public rhetoric and actual
policies employed when dealing with the Europeans. Specifically, the paper studied
Truman's attempts to either advance or undermine the European empires' colonial
control. A different feature of the inquiry was the attempt to determine the consistency of
the administration's foreign policy on the issue of Europe's external colonies. The last
aspect considered was the connection between Truman's personal beliefs about
colonialism and his administration's conduct of foreign affairs. These were the main
issues examined and the search for their answers required scrutinizing many different
areas of research.
The methodology used to study Truman must position him within the greater context
of his times. The analysis must consider the ongoing war activities at the time of his
elevation to President, the existing state of the European empires, the anti-colonial legacy
of Roosevelt and the changes occurring in the postwar world. While examining these
factors in an attempt to obtain a clear sense of Truman's point of view concerning the
world in general, and colonialism in particular, it became obvious that the study needed
to include Truman's closest foreign policy advisors. The ultimate determination of this
research and analysis is that Truman was in fact opposed to colonial rule in both word
and deed though events later in his Presidency caused his administration to implement
policies that contained a pro-colonial flavor.
The following summation of supporting observations will help amplify the thesis
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about Truman's animosity to the institution of colonialism and the idea of imperialism.
First, despite the large volume ofinfonnation about FDR's position of profound
condemnation for colonialism questions still exist about what his future intentions were
in light of his equivocation on the return of France to Indochina. Historians agree that
Roosevelt left no clear guidance for Truman and therefore it is difficult to know with any
degree of certainty whether Truman deviated from FDR's desired end state with respect
to colonialism. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that Roosevelt practiced an overall anticolonial policy within the constraints of other, more important, foreign policy objectives
such as winning the war and maintaining the indispensable coalition of allied nations.
This reasoning coincides with the conclusions arrived at by Hess, Miscamble and
Thomas in their books. Despite the absence of clear guidance and different management
styles, the two Presidents shared similar philosophical outlooks on the evils of
imperialism and the need for a world organization of nations to resolve problems without
conflict. This philosophy was the guiding light of Truman's anti-colonial policies; yet
the environment in which Truman found himself was far from static.
The condition of the world in the postwar period was different from what FDR had
faced just months before. Britain and the nations of Western Europe were far frailer than
anyone in the United States would have believed possible. Instead of the European
empires again becoming dominant players in world politics, as they had been before the
war, postwar Britain and Europe required American support just to keep from sliding into
chaos. Indeed the world economy was in such dire circumstances and the financial
weaknesses of Europe so great that together they threatened any real future economic
progress. Additionally, the increasing volatility and calls for nationalism in regions of
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underdeveloped countries made the continuation of European rule unlikely in the eyes of
many. The realization of European decline crystallized in the United States when
Churchill, whom many had called the defender of the British Empire, failed to win
reelection and had to leave office. The newly empowered Labour Party then spent the
next seven years downsizing the British Empire. Many people had a sense that FOR's
efforts had succeeded and that the tipping point for the demise of imperial colonialism
had happened. President Truman certainly felt this way and his speeches referred to the
empires as outdated and not relevant to the modern world. He even said that it was a " ...
historic fact that colonialism had run its course and could no longer be made to work for
a few favored nations."! Close on the heels of this idea was the realization that if the
process was not approached in a controlled, systemic manner it could lead to anarchy in
the underdeveloped regions of the world.
The recognition that the European powers were alarmingly weak impacted America's
evolving Cold War foreign policy. Truman and his administration needed to keep the
United States allies strong enough to confront communism in many regions of the world,
which meant the issue of independence for colonies assumed a position of lesser
importance. Truman relied upon his advisors and preferred thoughtful interaction and
consensus building when making foreign policy decisions. With the exception of Eleanor
Roosevelt, few Truman advisors granted ending colonialism a higher priority than
maintaining regional stability that was first good for trade and later benefited the conduct
of the greater Cold War. The primary colonial issue was the opening of markets to
American trade, particularly in the vast British Empire, which the State Department
worked hard at during most of the administration. This concern, breaking down
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economic barriers and forcing the opening of markets, is consistent with LaFeber and
Ferrell's assertion that closed markets are antithetical to American foreign policy. The
Truman State Department was Euro-centric and largely supported the British and French
Empires, and lesser European colonial holders, yet this same apparatus still possessed
FDR's anti-colonial mindset and pushed these same countries to develop long term plans
to divest themselves of colonial holdings. Therefore, the fact that Truman's advisors
were Anglophiles was not as big an influence in dealings with the British as implied in
Isaacson and Thomas' book. Even the Department of Defense's push to keep control of
the Pacific islands did not reflect a desire to establish a colonial structure in the manner of
the European empires. Rather, their focus was limited to the concepts of military
presence, basing, lines of communication, tactical tripwires and strategic reach.
Truman's rhetoric, as witnessed by his memoirs, correspondence, and public speeches,
demonstrated that he personally opposed colonialism. As he said so succinctly, "I had
always been opposed to colonialism.,,2 If considered from an oratory perspective Truman
was no doubt anti-colonial and anti-imperial. If one contemplates his foreign policy
decisions with respect to the United Nations, Philippine independence, the Trusteeship
Program, the Point Four Program, the attempts to open British colonial markets and the
efforts to end Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia, one can find a clear trend against
European imperialism. In the case of France, Truman's early position was middle-of-theroad due in part to the mindset that European colonialism was dying a natural death and
the hope that the problem would resolve itself without direct United States inference.
After all, even FDR had believed that the transition from colony to independent nation
would take many years if not decades. Problems arose when the Cold War devolved into
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a clash of surrogates and with France's intransigent insistence upon a system of colonial
rule. Still, Truman's actions do not indicate that he wanted to maintain colonialism but,
rather, that the Cold War's crisis management overshadowed the issue of independence
for the region. Truman's choices are analogous to FOR's earlier decisions to curb anticolonial policies in order to pursue greater wartime goals. Truman firmly believed that
colonialism was ending and he judged that the growth of world instability, the need to
ensure access to strategic resources, and the fight to curb Communist imperialism were
the new dangers for the future.
Many historians and authors have noted that the Cold War changed everything in the
way of foreign policy to include priorities. American foreign policy beyond a doubt
underwent a fundamental change as conduct of the Cold War overwhelmed all other
considerations for the United States. Truman went so far as to transform the issue of the
imperialism and anti-colonialism of the old world order into Cold War rhetoric. The idea
of colonialism was anathema to American ideals and Communists' forays into the
underdeveloped parts of the world faced condemnation in much the same way that the
outmoded concept of European colonialism had previously. Truman's speeches were a
rallying cry for the United States public; communism was the new, malevolent form of
imperialism and Americans must be steadfast in opposition in the name of democracy.

113

NOTES

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
I Robert

H. Ferrell, Harry S. Truman: A Life (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1994), 1-

401.
2Alonzo L. Hamby, Man of the People: A Life ofHarry S. Truman (New York: Oxford University Press,
1995), 1-641.
3David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 1-992.
4Ronald J. Horvath, "A Definition of Colonialism," Current Anthropology 13, no. 1 (February 1972):
45.
5Ib id.,
6

46.

Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006, 10111 ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill,

2008),2.

7H. L. Wesseling, The European Colonial Empires: 1815-19/9, trans. Diane Webb (Harlow, England:
Pearson Education Limited, 2004),144.
8 Horvath,

"A Definition of Colonialism," 50.

"wesseling,234-235.
IOIbid., 229-234.
II I bid.,

247.

12Douglas Johnson, review of Elementary Imperial Military Geography: General Characteristics of the
Empire in Relation to Defence, by D. H. Cole, Geographical Review 15, no. 3 (July 1925): 507.
13McIntyre, 2.
14Luke Johnson, "A Nation of Shopkeepers and World Beaters," Financial Times (London), 16 January
2008, 14.

CHAPTER II: HISTORIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW
lEdward Crapol, "Some Reflections on the Historiography of the Cold War," The History Teacher, 20,
no. 2 (February 1987): 252-253.
2I bid.,

253.

114

3Ibid., 254.
4Ibid., 255.
~Ibid., 257.

6Ibid., 258.
7 Ibid.,

259.

SWarren F. Kimball, reviews of The United States and the Origins ofthe Cold War, 1941-1947, by John
L. Gaddis; The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954, by Joyce Kolko
and Gabriel Kolko; and The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War, by Robert 1. Maddox, The
American Historical Review 79, no. 4 (October 1974): 1123-1124.
9McCullough, 326.
IOIbid., 991.
I1Ibid., 287.
12Hamby, 324-325; Wilson D. Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the
Cold War (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2007),89.
13 Hamby,

14 Ibi d.,

638.

641.

I~John L. Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Group, 2005), 1-333.

16Rudolfvon Albertini "The Impact of Two World Wars on the Decline of Colonialism," Journal of
Contemporary History 4, no. I, (January 1969): 17-35.
11Gaddis,

121.

18[bid., 123.
19LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 12.
2°Ibid., 58.

u.s.

Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad 1750 to the Present, 2d
21Walter LaFeber, The American Age:
ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994), 1-842.
22Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy: A History, 3d ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
Inc., 1975), 1-881.
21 Ibid.,798-799.

24LaFeber, The American Age, 351.
25Ibid., 432.
26Ibid., 418, 433, 437.

115

27 Ib id.,

520.

28Charles Robertson, International Politics Since World War /I: A Short History, 2d ed. (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1975), 1-465.
29 Ib id.,

12.

30Ibid., 29, 37-52.
JI 1bid.,81.
32John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War /I, 12th ed. (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1991), 1-443.
3J Ibid., 80.
34Ib id., 48.
JSIbid., 172.
36William Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan, and Constance G. Coblenz, United States Foreign Policy 19451955 (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1956), 1-535.
37Ibid., 45-46.
38Ibid., 102.
39Ibid., 221-222.
40Joan E. Spero, The Politics of International Economic Relations, 4th ed. (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1990), 154-155; Schuyler Foerster and Edward N. Wright, eds., American Defense Policy, 6th ed.
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1990). 179, 181,237,355.
4l Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency o/Harry S Truman, 1945-1948 (New York:
W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1977),1-473.

42 Tbid., 6.
43 Tb id., 43.
44 I bid.,

61.

4s Ibid.,87.
46Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made (New York:
Touchstone, Simon & Schuster Inc., 1988), 1-853.
47 Ibid.,

•18

256 .

Ib id., 255-257.

49 Ib id.,

386-387.

sOTbid., 393.

116

51 Ibid., 478.
52Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the
Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 1-689.
53Ibid.,9.
54 Ib id.,
55

30.

Ib id .• 16.

56 Ib id.,

17.

57Ibid., 94.
58Ibid.,

166-167.

59I bid.,

92.

6OIbid., 97.
61Ibid., 165.
62John J. Sebrega, "The Anticolonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Reappraisal," Political
Science Quarterly 101, no. 1 (1986): 77; Foster R. Dulles and Gerald E. Ridinger, "The Anti-Colonial
Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt," Political Science Quarterly 70, no. I. (March 1955): 1.
63Thomas G. Paterson, ed., Major Problems in American Foreign Policy Volume II: Since 1914, 3d ed.
(Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1989), 1-721.
64Paterson, 246-260: Gary R. Hess, The United States at War, /941-1945 (Arlington Heights, J\l: Harlan
Davidson, 1986), 102-26.
65 Ib id., 247.
66I bid., 240.
67Ibid., 247.
68Ibid., 258-259.
69Thomas C. Howard and William D. Pederson, eds., Frank/in D. Roosevelt and the Formation ofthe
Modern World (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2003), 1-261.
7°Ibid., 157.
71Ibid., 162.
72Gary R. Hess, "Franklin Roosevelt and Indochina," The Journal ofAmerican History 59, no. 2.
(September 1972): 365,367.
73 M iscamble, 1-393.
74 I

bid .• 42.

117

75Ibid., 35-38.
76 Ibid., 39.
77Sebrega, "The Anticolonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt," 82.
78John L. Gaddis, Strategies o/Containment: A Critical Appraisal o/Postwar American National
Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 11.
79Walter LaFeber, "Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina: 1942-45," The American Historical Review 80,
no. 5. (December 1975): 1277.
SOMiscamble, 47.
81Brian Lapping, End o/Empire (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985),5.
82W. David McIntyre, British Decolonization, 1946-1997: When, Why and How did the British Empire
Fall? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 1-176.
83Ibid., 90.
84 Lapp ing,

1-560.

85 Ib id., xvi.
86Ibid., 123.
87Terry H. Anderson, The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War: 1944-1947 (Columbia, MO:
University of Missouri Press, 1981), 1-256.
88Ibid., 5.
89I bid., 63.
9OIbid., 64.
91 I bid" 118.
92Ibid., 179.
93Ibid., 123.
94Peter L. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in
the Early Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 1-376.
95Ibid., 20-21.
96Robert J. McMahon, ed. Major Problems in the History o/the Vietnam War: Do<-'Uments and Essays,
3d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2003), 1-539.
97 Ibid., 75.
98Mike Gravel, introduction to The Pentagon Papers: The De/ense Department History of United States
Decisionmaking on Vietnam Volume 1, The Senator Gravel ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 2.

118

99 Jbid.,

49-50.

l~oren Baritz, Backfire: A History ofHow American Culture Led Us Into Vietnam and Made Us Fight
the Way We Did(1985; repr., Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1998),1-393.

IOIIbid., 62-73.
102LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 2, 172.

CHAPTER III: FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT / WORLD WAR TWO
IPaterson, 289.
2Anderson.2.

4Bailey,376.
sibid.
6Ibid.,3.
7Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1979), 324.
8M cIntyre,

90.

9 I bid.

'<>William R. Louis, "American Anti-Colonialism and the Dissolution of the British Empire,"
International Affairs 61. no. 3. (Summer 1985): 399.
II"An Open Letter from the Editors of LIFE to the People ofEngJand, " Lift Magazine. 12 October 1942,
34.
12Anderson,5.

l3I bid.,

183.

l4 Ibid.,5.
ISlbid.
l6Paterson, 258.
l7Elbert G. Mathews, interview by Richard D. McKinzie, transcript, 13 June 1975, Oral History
Collection, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 17.
18Paterson, 264.
19LaFeber,

The American Age, 351.

119

20John M. Leddy, interview by Richard D. McKinzie, transcript, 15 June 1973, Oral History Collection,
Truman Library, Independence, MO, 18-21.
21McMahon, Major Problems in the History o/the Vietnam War, 61.
22Howard, 157.
23Sebrega, "The Anticolonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt." 65.
24Da ll ek,

7.

2slbid.,109.
26I bid.,283.

27Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History ofthe American People (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall
Inc., 1974),767; Miscamble, 40.
28Paterson,247.
2~ailey, 729.
30 McMahon,

Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War, 74.

31MiscambJe, 42.
32Bailey,728-729.
33Dulles, "The Anticolonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt." 4.
34Anderson, 5.
3'Gaddis, Strategies ofContainment, 11.
36 Ro bertson,

14.

37Paterson,264.
38 M cIntyre,89.

39Du ll es, "The Anticolonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt," 16.
4O

M iscamble,43.

4lLaFeber, The American Age, 418.
42 Francis L. Loewenheim. Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas, eds., Roosevelt and Churchill: Their
Secret Wartime Correspondence (New York: Saturday Review Press and E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1975),
176.

43Louis, "American Anti-Colonialism," 402.
44 Howard,

158.

120

45Mclntyre, 24.
46Loewenheim, 184.
47 Ibid ., 192.
48 M iscamble,

44, 46.

4~cMahon, Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War, 74-75.
5~oward, 162.

5IPaterson,258.
52LaFeber, The American Age, 437.
530all ek,459.
54Paterson,259.
55 0allek,

459; Sebrega, "The Anticolonial Policies of Franklin o. Roosevelt," 79.

56Paterson,259.
57McMahon, Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War, 74.
58 Mark A. Lawrence and Fredrik Logevall, The First Vietnam War: Colonial Conflict and Cold War
Crisis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 74.

59Howard, 164.
6OGeorge M. Kahin, INTERVENTION: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1986),4; Sebrega, "The Anticolonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt," 69-70.
6lHoward, 165.
62 I bid.

63Sebrega, "The Anticolonial Policies of Franklin o. Roosevelt," 76.
64McMahon, 75.
65Paterson, 259-260; Gary Hess, "Franklin Roosevelt and Indochina," 360.
66 Miscamble,

35.

67Sebrega, "The Anticolonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt," 79.
6ijMcMahon, 75; Paterson 259.
69 Sebrega,

"The Anticolonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt," 77.

7°lbid., 74.
7lPaterson, 260.

121

72Miscamble, 38.
73 M iscamble, 38.
74Paterson, 258.
7SSebrega, "The Anticolonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt," 72.
76Gaddis, The Cold War, 121.
77 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman Volume One: Year of Decisions (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday and Company, 1955),237.

78 Andreas Dorpalen, Europe in the 2dh Century: A History (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1968),431.
7'LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 58.
8°I bid.

CHAPTER IV: HARRY S. TRUMAN
IAnderson, 53.
2Miscamble,

31.

3Anderson, 54; Miscamble, 31.
4McCullough,355.
5Miscamble,

83.

6McCullough, 355.
7Miscamble,

8 Anderson,

104.

55.

9Robert H. Ferrell, Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman (New York: Harper Row
Publishers, 1980), 187.

IODallek,3.
II Anderson, 54.
12

Re itzel,45-46.

I3 Miscamble,

31.

14Ibid., 36-38.
15Hamby, 13.

122

16Miscamble, 10.
17Ibid., 89.
18Isaacson, 256-257.
l'Miscamble, 93.
2~amby, 572.

2l M iscamble, 33.
22Miscamble, 13.
23Henry Pirtle comp., Kentucky Monitor: Complete Monitorial Ceremonies ofthe Blue Lodge, 17th ed.
(Louisville, KY: Grand Lodge of Kentucky Free and Accepted Masons, 1979),4; Miscamble, 13.
24MerIe Miller, Plain Speaking An Oral Biography ofHarry S. Truman (Berkley, CA: Berkley
Publishing Corporation, 1973), 155.
25Miscamble, 33.
26Ibid., 187.
27Miscamble, 8.
28Ibid.,7.
2~arry S. Truman, Public Papers of the Presidents ofthe United States: Containing the Public
Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President January 1 to December 31, 1948 (Washington, D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1964), 928.
3~jscamble, 11.

3lAnderson, 54; Isaacson, 256.
32 Truman,

Public Papers 1948, 343.

33Harry S. Truman, Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States: Containing the Public
Messages, Speeches, and Statements afthe President January 110 December 31, 1950 (Washington, D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1965), 404.
34Miscamble, 323.
35Truman, Year of Decisions, 275.
36 Ibid.,

362.

37Ibid., 275.
38Harry S. Truman, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Containing the Public
Messages, Speeches, and Statements ofthe President January 1, 1952, to January 20, 1953 (Washington,
D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1965), 1124.

123

3'>Jlarry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman Volume Two: Years of Trial and Hope, Garden City,
NY: Doubleday and Company, 1956,228.
40Truman, Public Papers 1948, 8.
4I Anderson, 53.
42Truman, Public Papers 1950,402-403.
43Ibid., 402.
44Miscamble, 26.
45Harry S. Truman, Public Papers ofthe Presidents of the United States: Containing the Public
Messages, Speeches, and Statements ofthe President January 1 to December 31, 1947 (Washington, D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1963), 167-172.
46Truman, Public Papers 1947,170.
47Ibid., 171-172.
41Harry S. Truman, Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States: Containing the Public
Messages, Speeches, and Statements ofthe President January 1 to December 31, 1949 (Washington, D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1964),486.
49Ibid.
SOMiscamble, 41, 107.
SITruman, Public Papers 1947, 32S.
52Harry S. Truman, Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States: Containing the Public
Messages, Speeches, and Statements ofthe President January 1 to December 31, 1946 (Washington, D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1962), 4S.
53 Anderson,

S4LaFeber,

181.

America, Russia, and the Cold War, SO.

55 Jack Hess, telegram to the President, 3 September 1947, President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers,
Truman Library, Independence, MO.

56Isaacson, 270.
57Anderson, 63.
58 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1947: Volume III The British
Commonwealth; Europe (Washington D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Oftice, 1972),34-3S.
59Richard S. Kirkendall, ed., The Truman Period As A Research Field: A Reappraisal, 1972 (Columbia,
MO: University of Missouri Press, 1974), 164; LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 172; Hamby,
394.

~arry S. Truman, Excerpts of a Conversation with Mr. Harris, n.d. transcript, Post Presidential Files
Box 644: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 4.

124

61Truman, Year of Decisions, 480.
62Ibid., 275.
63Ibid., 195.
64Leffier, A Preponderance of Power, 26.
65Isaacson, 254.
66McCullough, 354.

67Miscamble, 96.
68McCullough,355.
69 Anderson, 54.
7~iscamble, 89.
71

Miscamble, 10,37, 142.
bid., 92.

72 I

73 Hamby, 314.
74Hamby, 314, 409; Miscamble, 142.
7SHamby, 409.
76McCullough, 619.

77Leffier, A Preponderance of Power, 62.
78Peter Hahn, 20.
79McCullough, 399-400.

811-Jarry S. Truman, "Excerpts from Draft Memoirs," 966-979.
81

Ibid., 966-967.

82Ibid., 969-972.
bid., 972-974.

83 I

84Ibid., 974-978
85Ibid., 979-980.
8~amby, 306.
87

Letller, A Preponderance of Power, 27-28.

125

88 Leffier,

A Preponderance of Power, 27; Hamby, 279-284.

89Truman, Year of Decisions, 549-552; Isaacson, 245-346, 390; Hamby, 388.
9OTruman,
9l Leffier,

Years of Trial and Hope, 112.

A Preponderance of Power, 28, 142, 174; Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 112-115.

92Hamby, 409.
93 MiIler,

84-85, 169.

94McCullough, 61~20.
QSMiscamble, 308.
~cCullough, 589.

97McCullough,583.
9SJoseph G. Feeney, interview by Jerry N. Hess, transcript, 20 September 1966, Oral History Collection,
Truman Library, Independence, MO, 124.
~ffier, A Preponderance of Power, 165; Robertson, 77.
I~iscamble, 311.
10 IIsaacson,

270.

102Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton
& Company, Inc., 1969),387.
103 John T. McNay, "Imperial Paradigm: Dean Acheson and American Foreign Policy," (Ph.D. diss.,
Temple University, 1997), 6.

10400novan, 87.
105 Acheson,

Present at the Creation, 387.

I06John F. Cady, interview by Richard D. McKinzie, transcript, 31 July 1974, Oral History Collection,
Truman Library, Independence, MO, 56.
I07LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 116.
108Allida M. Black, Casting Her Own Shadow: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Shaping ofPostwar
Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996),3-4.
I09Hamby, 319, 355-356.
IIOMargaret E. Galey, "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: The Role of Congress," PS:
Political Science and Politics, 31, no. 3. (September 1998),524.
J I IGeoffrey C. Ward review of ELEANOR AND HARRY: The Correspondence of Eleanor Roosevelt
and Harry S. Truman, ed. Steven Neal. New York Times, 25 August 2002, 9.

126

II2 M iller,

220.

\l3McCullough, 482.
114Eleanor Roosevelt Letter to President Harry S. Truman, 20 November 1945, President's Secretary's
Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
mEleanor Roosevelt Letter to President Harry S. Truman, 6 May 1951, President's Secretary's Files:
Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
\I~leanor Roosevelt Letter to President Harry S. Truman, 14 December \950, Official File: Truman
Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.

117Eleanor Roosevelt Letter to President Harry S. Truman, 17 April 1947, President's Secretary's Files:
Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
1I8Acheson, Present at the Creation, 638.
lI~avid P. Forsythe, "Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect," Political
Science Quarterly 105, no. 3 (Autumn 1990), 436.

12oGaley, 524.
12l Mc Cullough,991.
l22 Anderson,

73.

I23 Harry S. Truman, Strictly Personal and Confidential: The Letters Harry Truman Never Mailed, ed.
Monte M. Poen, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), 32-33.

124 M iscamble, 211·214.
125Anderson, 127.
126Truman, Year of Decisions, 374.
I27U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, ORE 39: Significant Considerations Regarding the Disposition of
the Italian African Colonies (Declassified), President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library,
Independence, MO, 25 July 1947, 1.

128 Ibid., 8.
129John W. Jones, interview by Richard O. McKinzie, transcript, 8 June 1974, Oral History Collection.
Truman Library, Independence, MO, 36-37.
13~cIntyre, 1.

1310onovan. 102.
I32Truman. Strictly Personal and Confidential, 153; Miller, 199.

127

I33Robert P. Watson, Michael J. Devine, and Robert J. Wolz, eds., The National Security Legacy of
Harry S. Truman: Volume 1 (Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press, 2005), 144-145.
134McCullough, 287.
135MilIer 199.
136Truman, Year of Decisions, 323.
137Harding F. Bancroft, interview by Richard D. McKinzie, transcript, 25 June 1974, Oral History
Collection, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 34.
138Miscamble, 27, 90.
139Isaacson, 269.
14<Truman, Year of Decisions, 237-238.
141Thomas M. Campbell, ''Nationalism in America's UN Policy, 1944-1945," International
Organization 27, no. 1 (Winter 1973): 26.
142Truman, Public Papers 1948, 542.
143Truman, Public Papers 1950,434.
144Ib id.,435.

WMiIler, 216.
146Robertson, 17; Howard, 158-159.
147 Howard, 162.
148Campbell, "Nationalism in America's UN Policy," 32.
149paterson, 239-240; Howard, 165.
1500ary Hess, "Franklin Roosevelt and Indochina," 365-367.
ISIStephen C. Schlesinger, Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 2003), 235.
mTruman, Public Papers 1946, 121.
153Truman, Year of Decisions, 273.
154Truman, "Excerpts from Draft Memoirs," 820.
155Ibid.
156 Ibid.,

833.

157Schlesinger,235-236.

128

1~8John E. Orchard, "ECA and the Dependent Territories," Geographical Review 41, no. 1 (January

1951): 66.
mpaterson, 240.
160Sc hlesinger, 234.
161Truman, Public Papers 1947,287.
'62 Sc hlesinger,

232.

163 U.S. Department of State, "Official Trust Territories of the Pacific," map, reprinted from the map
collection of the University of Hawaii's Manoa Hamilton Library, this map is a work of the United States
Federal Government and under the terms of Title 17, Chapter I, Section 105 of the US Code is in the public
domain, 1962.

IM-rruman, Year of Decisions, 274.
165Leffier, A Preponderance of Power, 56.

'66Schlesinger, 79; Campbell, "Nationalism in America's UN Policy," 32.
167Truman, Public Papers 1946,20.
168 Ib id., 92.
169Michael J. McDermott, Memorandum to Charles G. Ross, Draft Press Statement on the Establishment
ofthe South Pacific Commission, 21 January 1948, President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman
Library, Independence, MO.
'7'lIoward, 165.
171 James Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, ed. Walter Millis with collaboration ofE. S. Duffield (New
York: The Viking Press, 1951), 28.
172Schlesinger, 79; Kahin, 4; Truman, Year of Decisions, 274-275.
I73 James N. Murray Jr., The United Nations Trusteeship System (Urbana, IL: The University of Illinois
Press 1957),29.

174Forrestal, 131.
175Ibid., 213-214.
176Truman, Year of Decisions, 274.
177Truman, Public Papers 1946,474.
178 1bid.
17~ruman, Year of Decisions, 275.

180Truman, Public Papers 1950,671.

129

181Truman, Year of Decisions, 275.
182Leffier, A Preponderance ofPower, 94.
183Bailey, 787.
184Harry S. Truman, Public Papers of the Presidents ofthe United States: Containing the Public
Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President April 12 to December 31, 1945 (Washington, D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1961),397.
185Ibid.
186Ibid.
187Truman, Public Papers 1950,695.

u.s.

188McCullough, 812; Walter LaFeber, The American Age:
Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad
1750 to the Present, 2d ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994),212; John Garraty and Peter
Gay, eds., The Columbia History ofthe World (New York: Harper & Row, 1972),936-937.
189Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 311.
l~iscamble, 325.

191Dean Acheson, interview by Theodore A. Wilson and Richard D. McKinzie, transcript, 30 June 1971,
Oral History Collection, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 5.
1925panier, 48; McIntyre, 84.
193Anderson,166.
194Michael Lind, Vietnam: The Necessary War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999),6.
195McCullough, 540.
196Robertson,37.
1975panier,49.
198Ibid.
I99Press Release, Statement by the President, TD, apparently written by the President's staff in the White
House, 13 February 1947, President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence,
MO.
200M iller,

241.

20 I Robertson, 42.
202U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, ORE 25-48: The Break-up of the Colonial Empires and its
Implications for US Security (Declassified), President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library,
Independence, MO, 3 September 1948, 1-3.
203U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE-26): Key Problems Affecting
US Efforts to Strengthen the Near East (Declassified), President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers,

130

Truman Library, Independence, MO, 25 April 1951, 1; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Special Estimate
(SE-32): Consequences o/Communist Control Over South Asia (Declassified), President's Secretary's
Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 3 October 1952, 1-7.
204U .S. Central Intelligence Agency, Special Report (SR-25): United Kingdom (Declassified),
President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 7 December 1949, 1-8;
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, ORE 79-49: US Security and the British Dollar Problem (Declassified),
President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 31 August 1949,1-5;
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, ORE 93-49: The Possibility o/Britain 's Abandonment o/Overseas
Military Commitments (Declassified), President'S Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library,
Independence, MO, 23 December 1949, 1.
205U .S.

Central Intelligence Agency, SR-25, 2.

206Ib id.,

6-7.

207 Ibid.,

7.

208U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE-23): India's Position in the
East-West Conflict (Declassified), President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library,
Independence MO, 4 September 1951,2.

2°'11.S. Central Intelligence Agency, NIE-26, 1.
21Oo.S. Central Intelligence Agency, ORE 33-49: Current Situation in Malaya (Declassified),
President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 17 November 1949, 1-

2.
21IU.S. Central Intelligence Agency, ORE 46-50: The Cu"ent Situation in British West Africa
(Declassified), President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 29
September 1950, 1.
212U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, ORE 64: The Current Situation in France (Declassified),
President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 31 December 1947, 1,

6.
213 Ibid., 6.
214Ibid., 1.
21S U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Special Report (SR-30): France (Declassified), President's
Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 17 March 1950, 17.

21~.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum/or the NSC Senior Staff Prepared to Supplement
NIE-69, Probable Developments in North Africa: The Current Situation in North Africa (Declassified),
President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 12 September 1952, 1.
217 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, ORE 63: The Current Situation in French North Africa
(Declassified), President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 18
December 1947, I.

218U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE-5): Indochina: Current
Situation and Probable Developments (Declassified), President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers,
Truman Library, Independence, MO, 29 December 1950, 1-2.

131

21~.S. Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE-35/1): Probable Developments
in Indochina through Mid-1952 (Declassified), President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman
Library, Independence, MO, 3 March 1952, 1.

22<1bid.
22IU.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Special Report (SR-31): Portugal (Declassified), President's
Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 13 October 1949,1.
222U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Office of Reports and Estimates, ORE 26-48: The Prospects for a
United States ofIndonesia (Declassified), President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library,
Independence, MO, 4 June 1948, 1.
223u.S. Central Intelligence Agency, ORE 40-49: Consequences of Dutch "Police Action" in Indonesia
(Declassified), President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 27
January 1949, 1-4.
224Ib id., 1-4.
22SIbid., 4.
22~obertson, 106.
221Truman, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Containing the Public Messages.
Speeches. and Statements ofthe President January I to December 31. 1951 (Washington, D.C.: United
States Government Printing Office, 1965),4, 11, 13, 18,20,54,59,68,70,76,78,80,83,90,96, 107, 114,
116,123,138,144,167,170,174,191, 197, 199,209,213,225,253,279,293,297.

228Truman, Public Papers 1948, 337.
22~cMahon, 85.

230James L. Roark, "American Black Leaders: the Response to Colonialism and the Cold War, 19431953," African Historical Studies 4, no. 2 (1971): 260.
23I Ib id., 263-264.
232Francis 0. Wilcox, interview by Donald A. Ritchie, transcript, 13 April 1984, Oral History
Collection, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 190.
233Bancroft,25.
234Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 237.
23SSpyros Markezinis, interview by Theodore A. Wilson, transcript, 22 July 1970, Oral History
Collection, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
236Acheson, Present at the Creation, 765.
237Reitzel, 102.
238Ibid., 257.
239Truman, Public Papers 1950,446,609,613,705; Truman, Public Papers 1951, 267.

132

2'"Truman, Public Papers 1950,446.
24i Harry S. Truman, "Address Opening the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American
Republics," (speech presented at the fourth meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of
American States, Washington, D.C., 26 March 1951).

242Harry S. Truman, "Address at the San Francisco War Memorial Opera House," (speech, San
Francisco, CA, 17 October 1950).
24~ational Security Council Report, NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs/or National
Security (Declassified), President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO,
14 April 1950, 14.

244Ebere Nwaubani, "The United States and the Liquidation of European Colonial Rule in Tropical
Africa, 1941-1963," Cahiers d'Etudes ajricaines 171 (2003): 519.
24STruman, Years of Trial and Hope, 228.
2~arry S. Truman, "Campaign Speech at Campagnone Memorial Common," (speech, Lawrence, MA,
17 October 1952).
247Edwin P. Reubens, "Asia and Truman's Fourth Point," Far Eastern Survey 18, no. 6 (March 1949):
61-67.
248Robertson, 81-82.
24~etller, A Preponderance o/Power, 267; "Point Four and the U.N.," New York Times, 12 November
1949, 14.
2S~ruman, Public Papers 1952 to 1953, 1124.

251Truman, Public Papers 1950, 5.
252Truman, Public Papers 1950,623.
2s3Truman, Public Papers 1951, 304.
2s4Truman, Public Papers 1952 to 1953, 185.
2.55 Samuel P. Hayes, "Statistics in the Point IV Program," The American Statistician, 4, no. 1. (February
1950),4-5.

2S6Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 23 1.
257Ibid.
2S8Ibid., 232.
259Acheson, Present at the Creation, 264-266; Isaacson, 732.
2~onovan, 87.

261Anderson, 123.

133

262Peter Weiler, "British Labour and the Cold War: The Foreign Policy of the Labour Governments,
1945-1951," The Journal 0/British Studies 26, no. 1 (January 1987): 70; James T. H. Tang, "From Empire
Defence to Imperial Retreat: Britain's Postwar China Policy and the Decolonization of Hong Kong,"
Modern Asian Studies 28, no. 2 (May 1994): 319.
263McIntyre, 21.
264Robertson, 51.
265Dorpalen, 431.
266Anderson, 123; Dorpalen, 431.
267McIntyre, 1.
268McIntyre, 38; Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 259.

~enry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994),442-443,466-467;
Miscamble, 203, 281.
270Truman, Public Papers 1949, 121,556; Truman, Public Papers 1950, 129.
271 U.S.

Department of State, Foreign Relations 1947: Volume III, 35-45, 144.

272Roger Makins, interview by Theodore A. Wilson, transcript, 10 August 1970, Oral History
Collection, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 12.
273Peter Hahn, 21.
274Louis, "American Anti-Colonialism," 404.
275peter Hahn 18,39,51; Leffier, A Preponderance o/Power, 113; Weiler, "British Labour and the Cold
War," 70.
276Lind, 6; McCullough, 539-540; Isaacson, 387.
277Hamby, 390; Anderson, 142, 178-179.
278Reitzel,200.
27~obertson, 98.

28'Dorpalen, 432.
28lReitzel, 201, 225.
282Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, 165.
283Bancroft, 23.

28SLeffler, A Preponderance of Power, 259.
286Truman, Public Papers 1950,336.

134

287Reitzel, 224-225; Robertson, 100.
288Reitzel, 226.
28'1.aFeber, The American Age, 520.
2~cMahon, 64.

2910onovan, 252.
292Lefiler, A Preponderance ofPower, 166.
293Perrell, American Diplomacy, 798-799.

29SGravel, 1-2; McMahon, 64.
2~efiler, A Preponderance ofPower, 93.

297Gravel,3.
298Ibid.
299Trwnan, Years of Trial and Hope, 437.
3~efiler, A Preponderance ofPower, 166.

30lLaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 126.
302Acheson, Present at the Creation, 671.
303Ferrell, Harry S. Truman: A Life, 357; LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 136; Spanier,
172.

304Trwnan, Public Papers 1950, 531.
3osGravel, 4.
306Acheson, Present at the Creation, 553.
307Mc Mahon, 71.
308Leffier, A Preponderance ofPower, 166.
3<l'1.aPeber, The American Age, 520; Gravel, 32.
3IOGravel,54.
311Ibid.,3.
312Ac heson, Present at the Creation, 335.
313 Acheson,

Present at the Creation, 257, Gravel, 53.

135

314Gravel, 6; Kahin, 36-37.
mGravel, 53-55; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 335.
3i6Miscamble, 318-319; Gravel, 51, 53.

CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION
iTruman, Years of Trial and Hope, 239.
2Truman, Year of Decisions, 275.

136

BIBLIOGRAPHY
PRIMARY SOURCES

Memoirs
Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. New York:
W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969.
Attlee, Clement. Twilight of Empire: Memoirs ofPrime Minister Clement Attlee. compo
Francis Williams. New York: A.S. Barnes and Co., 1960.
Forrestal, James. The Forrestal Diaries. ed. Walter Millis with collaboration ofE. S.
Duffield. New York: The Viking Press, 1951.
Truman, Harry S. Memoirs by Harry S. Truman Volume One: Year ofDecisions. Garden
City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1955.

_ _ _. Memoirs by Harry S. Truman Volume Two: Years of Trial and Hope. Garden
City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1956.

Interviews
Acheson, Dean. "Oral History Interview with Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of
State, 1941-45; Under Secretary of State, 1945-47; and Secretary of State, 1949-53."
Interview by Theodore A. Wilson and Richard D. McKinzie, transcript, 30 June 1971,
Oral History Collection, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Achilles, Theodore. "Oral History Interview with Theodore Achilles, Foreign Service
Officer, U.S. Department of State, 1931-62." Interview by Richard D. McKinzie,
transcript, 13 November and 18 December 1972, Oral History Collection, Truman
Library, Independence, MO.
Andrews, Stanley. "Oral History Interview with Stanley Andrews, Chief of Food,
Agriculture and Forestry Division of the American-British Control Group in Germany,
1948-49; Director, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of
Agriculture, 1949-51; and Director, Technical Cooperation Administration, Point IV

137

Program, 1952~53." Interview by Richard D. McKinzie, transcript, 31 October 1970,
Oral History Collection, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Baker, George P. "Oral History Interview with George P. Baker, U.S. Member Transport
and Communications Commission, United Nations, 1946-56; Chairman, Commission
on Aero Research and Development Board, National Military Establishment, 194849." Interview by Richard D. McKinzie, transcript, 24 July 1974, Oral History
Collection, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Bancroft, Harding F. "Oral History Interview with Harding F. Bancroft, U.S. Deputy
Representative to the United Nations Collective Measures Committee with personal
rank of Minister, 1950-53." Interview by Richard D. McKinzie, transcript, 25 June
1974, Oral History Collection, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Cady, John F. "Oral History Interview with John F. Cady, U. S. Department of State,
Chief of the South Asian Section, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, 19451949." Interview by Richard D. McKinzie, transcript, 31 July 1974, Oral History
Collection, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Campbell, John C. "Oral History Interview with John C. Campbell, U.S. Department of
State, Officer in Charge of Balkan Affairs, 1949-55." Interview by Richard D.
McKinzie, transcript, 24 June 1974, Oral History Collection, Truman Library,
Independence,MO.
Cohen, Edgar. "Oral History Interview with Sir Edgar Cohen, British Board of Trade,
1932-53; Chairman of United Nations Interim Coordinating Committee for
International Commodity Arrangements, 1953-54." Interview by Theodore A. Wilson,
transcript, 12 June 1970, Oral History Collection, Truman Library, Independence,
MO.
Coppock, Joseph D. "Oral History Interview with Joseph D. Coppock, U.S. Department
of State Economic Advisor on International Trade Policy, 1945-53; Member, U.S.
delegation to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, 1946-52."
Interview by Richard D. McKinzie, transcript, 29 July 1974, Oral History Collection,
Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Dennison, Robert L. "Oral History Interview with Admiral Robert L. Dennison, Naval
Aide to President Harry S. Truman, 1948-53; Commander in Chief of the Atlantic
Command, Commander of the Atlantic Fleet, and Supreme Allied Commander,
Atlantic, 1960-63." Interview by Jerry N. Hess, transcript, 2 November 1971, Oral
History Collection, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Ensminger, Douglas. "Oral History Interview with Douglas Ensminger, U.S. Department
of Agricultural, including a period in the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations,
1939-1951." Interview by Harry S. Taylor, transcript, 16 June and 7 July 1976, Oral
History Collection, Truman Library, Independence, MO.

138

Feeney, Joseph G. "Oral History Interview with Joseph G. Feeney, Legislative Assistant
to the President, 1949-52; Administrative Assistant to the President, 1952-53."
Interview by Jerry N. Hess, transcript, 20 September 1966, Oral History Collection,
Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Fetter, Frank W. "Oral History Interview with Frank W. Fetter, U.S. Department of State,
1944-46." Interview by Richard D. McKinzie, transcript, 22 July 1974, Oral History
Collection, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Jones, John W. "Oral History Interview with John Wesley Jones, U. S. Department of
State, First Secretary Rome Embassy, 1945-48; Embassy Counselor, Nanking, China,
1948-49; Embassy Counselor, Madrid, Spain, 1949-53." Interview by Richard D.
McKinzie, transcript, 8 June 1974, Oral History Collection, Truman Library,
Independence. MO.
Kenney, W. John "Oral History Interview with W. John Kenney, Under Secretary of
Navy, 1947-49; Chief of Mission, England, 1949-50; Deputy Director for Mutual
Security, 1952." Interview by Richard D. McKinzie and Theodore A. Wilson,
transcript, 29 November 1971, Oral History Collection, Truman Library,
Independence,MO.
Leddy, John M. "Oral History Interview with Ambassador John M. Leddy, U. S.
Department of State, and participant in the negotiations to conclude the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the International Trade Organization, 1945-58."
Interview by Richard D. McKinzie, transcript, 15 June 1973, Oral History Collection,
Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Makins, Roger. "Oral History Interview with Sir Roger Makins, British Assistant Under
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1947-48; British Deputy Under Secretary of
State, 1948-52; British Ambassador to the United States, 1952-56." Interview by
Theodore A. Wilson, transcript, 10 August 1970, Oral History Collection, Truman
Library, Independence, MO.
Marjolin, Robert. "Oral History Interview with Robert Marjolin, French Secretary
General, Organization for European Economic Cooperation, 1948-55." Interview by
Theodore A, Wilson, transcript, 2 July 1971, Oral History Collection, Truman Library,
Independence, MO.
Markezinis, Spyros. "Oral History Interview with Spyros Markezinis, Greek Prime
Minister, October-November 1973, Greek Minister for Coordination and Economic
Planning, 1949-1954." Interview by Theodore A. Wilson, transcript, 22 July 1970,
Oral History Collection, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Martin, Edwin W. "Oral History Interview with Edwin W. Martin, U. S. Department of
State Vice consul Leopoldville, Belgian Congo, 1944; Vice consul Peiping, China,

139

1946-48; Vice consul Hankow, China, 1948-49; Consul Taipei, Formosa, 1949-50;
Consul Rangoon, Burma, 1950-1951." Interview by Richard D. McKinzie, transcript,
3 June 1975, Oral History Collection, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Mathews, Elbert G. "Oral History Interview with Ambassador Elbert G. Mathews, U. S.
Department of State Assistant Chief, Division of South Asian Affairs, 1947-48; Chief,
Division of South Asian Affairs, 1948-49-; Director, Office of South Asian Affairs,
1950-1951; Consul General, Istanbul, 1951-52." Interview by Richard D. McKinzie,
transcript, 13 June 1975, Oral History Collection, Truman Library, Independence,
MO.
Matlock, Clifford C. "Oral History Interview with Clifford C. Matlock, U. S. Department
of State, Economist and Political Officer, 1946-62." Interview by Richard D.
McKinzie, transcript, 29 October 1973 and 6 June 1974, Oral History Collection,
Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Nolting, Frederick. "Oral History Interview with Frederick Nolting, U. S. Department of
State Assistant Chief of North European Affairs, 1948-49; Officer in Charge of SwissBenelux Affairs, 1949-1950; Coordinator, Air Programs for Far East, 1950; Member,
U. S. Delegation to 6th Session United Nations General Assembly, 1951; Assistant to
Deputy Under Secretary of State, 1950-53." Interview by Richard D. McKinzie,
transcript, 30 June 1975, Oral History Collection, Truman Library, Independence,
MO.
Snyder, John W. "Oral History Interview with John W. Snyder, Secretary of the
Treasury, 1946-53." Interview by Jerry N. Hess, transcript, 3 April 1968, Oral History
Collection, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Snyder, John W. "Oral History Interview with John W. Snyder, Secretary of the
Treasury, 1946-53." Interview by Jerry N. Hess, transcript, 15 January 1969, Oral
History Collection, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Stikker, Dirk U. "Oral History Interview with Dirk U. Stikker, Netherlands Minister of
Foreign Affairs, 1948-52." Interview by Theodore A. Wilson, transcript, 14 July 1970,
Oral History Collection, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Trezise, Philip. "Oral History Interview with Philip Trezise, U. S. Department of State
Deputy Director, Office Intelligence Research, Intelligence Activities, 1943-56."
Interview by Richard D. McKinzie, transcript, 27 May 1975, Oral History Collection,
Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Warren, George L. "Oral History Interview with George L. Warren, U. S. Representative
to the General Council and Executive Committee, International Refugee Organization,
1948-52." Interview by Richard D. McKinzie, transcript, 10 November 1972, Oral
History Collection, Truman Library, Independence, MO.

140

Wilcox, Francis O. "Oral History Interview with Francis O. Wilcox, Chief of Staff,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1947-55." Interview by Donald A. Ritchie,
transcript, 13 April 1984, Oral History Collection, Truman Library, Independence.
MO.
Wilson, Evan M. "Oral History Interview with Evan M. Wilson, Second Secretary and
Vice Consul and later First Secretary and Consul, Tehran, Iran, March 1947-June
1949." Interview by Richard D. McKinzie, transcript, 18 July 1975, Oral History
Collection, Truman Library, Independence, MO.

Unpublished Sources
Abbot, W. Wright letter to President Harry S. Truman. 12 February 1947. President's
Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Acheson, Dean. Memorandum for the President. "Subject: de jure Recognition of the
Governments ofIsrael and Transjordan." 27 January 1949, President's Secretary's
Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Astreas, C. telegram to President Harry S. Truman. 15 October 1945. President's
Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Bengeri, K. R.letter to United Nations Secretary General. 3 June 1947. President's
Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Elwood, George O.letter to Mr. Harry S. Truman. 7 March 1946. President's Secretary's
Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Faldecker, R. letter to the Honorable Harry S. Truman. 2 December 1951. President's
Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Gillette, Guy M. telegram to the President. 25 February 1947. President's Secretary's
Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Grady, Henry telegram to the President. 28 June 1951. President's Secretary's Files:
Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Hannegan, Robert E. letter to the President. 14 November 1946. President's Secretary's
Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Hassett, William D. letter to Mr. James H. Lewis. 25 November 1946. President's
Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Hassett, William D. letter to Mr. S. S. Larmon. 11 February 1947. President's Secretary's
Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.

141

Henderson. memorandum to Mr. McDermott. "Subject: Public Statement by President
Truman in Connection with the Assassination of Mohandas Gandhi." 30 January
1948. President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence.
MO.
Hess, Jack telegram to the President. 3 September 1947. President's Secretary's Files:
Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Hopkins, William J. "Communique". 9 January 1952. President's Secretary's Files:
Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Keplinger, Henry telegram to the President. 19 November 1951. President's Secretary's
Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Kyprianos, Bishop letter to President Truman. 28 October 1950. President's Secretary's
Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Lipsky, Louis telegram to the President. 22 July 1947. President's Secretary's Files:
Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Marshall, G.C. memorandum for the President. "Subject: Proposed Exchange of
Ambassadors with Dominion of Pakistan." 17 July 1947. President's Secretary's Files:
Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
McCroden, N. G.letter to Mr. Charles Ross. 15 October 1946. President's Secretary's
Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
McDermott, Michael J. memorandum to Charles G. Ross. "Draft Press Statement on the
Establishment of the South Pacific Commission." 21 January 1948. President's
Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Michael, Archbishop telegram to the President. 12 October 1950. President's Secretary's
Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Mossadegh, Mohammed letter to President Harry S. Truman. 10 November 1951.
President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Mulumba telegram to the President. 20 March 1950. President's Secretary's Files:
Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Murphy, Carl telegram to the President. 26 August 1947. President's Secretary's Files:
African American, Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Murray, James E. letter to President Harry S. Truman. 28 January 1952. President's
Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.

142

Null, Eugene J. letter to President Harry S. Truman. 11 February 1947. President's
Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Pahlavi, M. R. letter to President Harry S. Truman. 24 August 1951. President's
Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Press Release. "Agreement announced with the United Kingdom with respect to the
Supply of Scarce Materials." TD, apparently written by the President's staff in the
White House. 18 January 1952. President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman
Library, Independence, MO.
Press Release. Statement by the President. TD, apparently written by the President's
staff in the White House. 13 February 1947. President's Secretary's Files: Truman
Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Roosevelt, Eleanor letter to President Harry S. Truman. 20 November 1945. President's
Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO .

- - - -. letter to President Harry S. Truman. 17 April 1947. President's Secretary's
Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.

____. letter to President Harry S. Truman. 28 May 1950. President's Secretary's
Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
_ _ _. letter to President Harry S. Truman. 14 December 1950. Official File:
Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
____ . letter to President Harry S. Truman. 6 May 1951. President's Secretary's
Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Short, Joseph letter to Mr. Ulric Nisbet. 11 December 1951. President's Secretary's Files:
Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Summers, D. B. letter to Senator Edwin C. Johnson. 30 Ju1y 1951. President's Secretary's
Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Truman, Harry S. "Address at the San Francisco War Memorial Opera House." San
Francisco, CA, 17 October 1950. President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers.
Truman Library, Independence, MO.
____ . "Address Opening the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American
Republics." Speech presented at the fourth meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs of American States, Washington, D.C., 26 March 1951. President's
Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.

143

____ . "Address to the National Council of Negro Women." Speech presented at the
annual meeting of the National Council of Negro Women, Inc, Washington, D.C., 15
November 1949. President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library,
Independence,~O.

____. "Excerpts from the First and Second Drafts of Truman's ~emoirs, 1953(?),"
T~s (photocopy), Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, ~O.
____. "Excerpts of a Conversation with ~. Harris." n.d. transcript. Post Presidential
Files Box 644: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, ~O,
____ ' memorandum. "Subject: Special Rank Recommended for Charles W. Lewis,
Jr., in Connection with Pakistan Ceremonies." 11 August 1947. President's
Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, ~O .

- - - -. "News Conference." Washington, D.C., 30 November 1950. President's
Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, ~O.

____. "Remarks to a Group of~ethodist ~inisters." Washington, D.C., 7 February
1951. President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence,
~O,

____. "Campaign Speech at Campagnone ~emorial Common." Lawrence, ~, 17
October 1952. President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library,
Independence,~O.

Truman, Harry S. letter to Vice President of the United States Alban W. Barkley. 9
January 1952. President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library,
Independence, ~O.
Truman, Harry S. letter to King Abdullah Ibn El Hussein of the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan. 27 ~arch 1951. President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman
Library, Independence, ~O,
Truman, Harry S. letter to Eleanor Roosevelt. 2 October 1945. Eleanor Roosevelt Papers,
Part II, 1945-1960, Roosevelt Library.
____. letter to Eleanor Roosevelt. 7 ~ay 1947. Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, Part II,
1945-1960, Roosevelt Library.
Truman, Harry S. letter to Senator Kenneth ~cKellar. 15 November 1945. President's
Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, ~O.
United Electrical Radio and ~achine Workers of America letter to the President. 13 ~ay
1946. President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence,
~O.

144

Books and Articles
"An Open Letter from the Editors of LIFE to the People of England." Life Magazine. 12
October 1942, 34.

Belair, Felix, Jr. "Truman Aid Plan is Linked with ECA." New York Times. 29 January
1949, 1.
"Britain Defended on Colonial Rule." New York Times. 20 January 1945, 5.
Ferrell, Robert H. Offthe Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman. New York:
Harper & Row Publishers, 1980.
Krock, Arthur. "Political Debate Looms on U.S. Foreign Policy: Dewey Ends Wartime
Truce by Taking a Public Position on Question ofItaly's Former African Empire."
New York Times. 22 August 1948. sec. E, 3.
Leviero, Anthony. "Truman for Truce in Palestine Fray, No Partition Bar." New York
Times. 26 March 1948, 1.
Loewenheim, Francis L., Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas, eds. Roosevelt and
Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence. New York: Saturday Review Press
and E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1975.
Matthews, Herbert L. "British Seek Funds to Assist Colonies." New York Times. 28 May
1947,8.
Miller, Merle. Plain Speaking An Oral Biography ofHarry S. Truman. Berkley, CA:
Berkley Publishing Corporation, 1973.
"Point Four and the U.N." New York Times. 12 November 1949, 14.
Sulzberger, C.L. Strictly Personal and Confidential: The Letters Harry Truman Never
Mailed. ed. Monte M. Poen. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982.

Government Publications
National Security Council Report. NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for
National Security (Declassified). President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers,
Truman Library, Independence, MO, 14 April 1950.
Truman, Harry S. Message to the Congress on the State of the Union and on the Budget
for 1947.14 January 1946. President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman

145

Library, Independence, MO.

____:, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Containing the Public
Messages, Speeches, and Statements ofthe President April 12 to December 31, 1945.
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1961,
____, Public Papers of the Presidents ofthe United States: Containing the Public
Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President January 1 to December 31,
1946.
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1962.
____, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Containing the Public
Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President January 1 to December 31,
1947.
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1963.
____, Public Papers of the Presidents ofthe United States: Containing the Public
Messages, Speeches, and Statements ofthe President January 1 to December 31,
1948.
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1964.
____, Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States: Containing the Public
Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President January 1 to December 31,
1949.
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1964.
____, Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States: Containing the Public
Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President January 1 to December 31,
1950.
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1965.

____, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Containing the Public
Messages, Speeches, and Statements ofthe President January 1 to December 31,
1951.
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1965.
____, Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States: Containing the Public
Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President January 1, 1952, to January 20,
1953. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1965.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Memorandum for the NSC Senior Staff Prepared to
Supplement NIE-69, Probable Developments in North Africa: The Current Situation
in North Africa (Declassified). President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman
Library, Independence, MO, 12 September 1952.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE-5): Indochina:

146

Current Situation and Probable Developments (Declassified). President's Secretary's
Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 29 December 1950.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE-20): Resistance
of Thailand, Burma, and Malaya to Communist Pressures in the Event of a
Communist Victory in Indochina in 1951 (Declassified). President's Secretary's Files:
Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 20 March 1951.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE-23): India's
Position in the East-West Conflict (Declassified). President's Secretary's Files:
Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence MO, 4 September 1951.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE-26): Key
Problems Affecting US Efforts to Strengthen the Near East (Declassified). President's
Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 25 April
1951.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE-35/1): Probable
Developments in Indochina through Mid-1952 (Declassified). President's Secretary's
Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 3 March 1952.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE-44): The British
Position in Egypt (Declassified). President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers,
Truman Library, Independence, MO, 15 October 1951.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE-69): Probable
Developments in North Africa (Declassified). President's Secretary's Files: Truman
Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 15 September 1952.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE-7S/l): Probable
Developments in Iran Through 1953 (Declassified). President's Secretary's Files:
Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 9 January 1953.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. ORE 6-49: Rubber Supply Situation in the USSR
(Declassified). President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library,
Independence, MO, 23 March 1949.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. ORE 25-48: The Break-up ofthe Colonial Empires and
its Implications for US Security (Declassified). President's Secretary's Files: Truman
Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 3 September 1948.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. ORE 26-48: The Prospects for a United States of
Indonesia (Declassified). President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman
Library, Independence, MO, 4 June 1948.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. ORE 27-50: South African Politics and U.S. Security

147

(Declassified). President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library,
Independence, MO, 17 November 1950.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. ORE 33-49: Current Situation in Malaya
(Declassified). President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library,
Independence, MO, 17 November 1949.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. ORE 39: Significant Considerations Regarding the
Disposition of the Italian African Colonies (Declassified). President's Secretary's
Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 25 July 1947.
u.s. Central Intelligence Agency. ORE 40-49: Consequences of Dutch "Police Action"
in Indonesia (Declassified). President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman
Library, Independence, MO, 27 January 1949.
u.S. Central Intelligence Agency. ORE 46-50: The Current Situation in British West
Africa (Declassified). President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library,
Independence, MO, 29 September 1950.
u.S. Central Intelligence Agency. ORE 54: The Current Situation in Egypt
(Declassified). President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library,
Independence, MO, 16 October 1947.
u.S. Central Intelligence Agency. ORE 61-48: The Probable Effects of Postponement of
the Italian Colonies Question (Declassified). President's Secretary's Files: Truman
Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 2 November 1948.
u.S. Central Intelligence Agency. ORE 63: The Current Situation in French North Africa
(Declassified). President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library,
Independence, MO, 18 December 1947.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. ORE 64: The Current Situation in France
Declassified), President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library,
Independence, MO, 31 December 1947.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. ORE 79-49: US Security and the British Dollar
Problem (Declassified). President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman
Library, Independence, MO, 31 August 1949.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. ORE 93-49: The Possibility of Britain's Abandonment
of Overseas Military Commitments (Declassified). President's Secretary's Files:
Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 23 December 1949.
u.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Special Estimate (SE-3): The Current Crisis in Iran
(Declassified). President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library,
Independence, MO, 16 March 1951.

148

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Special Estimate (SE-6): Current Developments in
Iran (Declassified). President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library,
Independence, MO, 22 May 1951.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Special Estimate (SE-23): Prospects for an Inclusive
Middle East Defense Organization (Declassified). President's Secretary's Files:
Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 17 March 1952.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Special Estimate (SE-32): Consequences of
Communist Control Over South Asia (Declassified). President's Secretary's Files:
Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 3 October 1952.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Special Report (SR-25): United Kingdom
(Declassified). President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library,
Independence, MO, 7 December 1949.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Special Report (SR-30): France (Declassified).
President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 17
March 1950.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Special Report (SR-31): Portugal (Declassified).
President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 13
October 1949.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Special Report (SR-48): Ireland (Declassified).
President's Secretary's Files: Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO, 1
April 1949.
U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations ofthe United States 1947: Volume III The
British Commonwealth; Europe. Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1972.
U.S. Department of State. United States Policy and Diplomacy Regarding Vietnam, July
1954-September 1956 (Declassified). Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, June 1971.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Unpublished Sources
Anslover, Nicole L. "An Executive Echo Chamber: The Evolution of America's Vietnam
Policy from Truman to Johnson." Ph.D. diss., University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS,

149

2004.
Bills, Scott L. "Cold War Rimlands: The United States, NATO, and the Politics of
Colonialism, 1945-1949." Ph.D. diss., Kent State University, Kent, OH, 1981.
Colby, Thomas E. "From Indifference to Commitment: 1945-1951; America's Altered
Perception of and Policy in the First Indochina War." M.A. thesis, Southern
Connecticut State University, New Haven, CT, 2005.
Harris, Connie K. "Fulfilling the Covenant: The Wilsonian Influence on Harry Truman's
Foreign Policy." Ph.D. diss., University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NB., 2002.
Lawrence, Mark A. "Selling Vietnam: The European Colonial Powers and the Origins of
the American Commitment to Vietnam, 1944-1950." Ph.D. diss., Yale University,
New Haven, CT, 1998.
Leff, Deborah. March 2006. Vietnam and the Presidency; How We Got In: The US, Asia,
and Vietnam. Address to the first presidential libraries conference. John F. Kennedy
Presidential Library and Musewn Boston, MA. 10-11 March 2006.
McNay, John T. "Imperial Paradigm: Dean Acheson and American Foreign Policy."
Ph.D. diss., Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, 1997.
McVety, Amanda K. "Truman's Point Four Program and the Creation of America's
Modem Diplomatic Vision." Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, CA,
2006.

Published Sources
Anderson, Terry H. The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War: 1944-1947.
Colwnbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1981.
Bailey, Thomas A. A Diplomatic History ofthe American People. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall Inc., 1974.
Baritz, Loren. Backfire: A History of How American Culture Led Us Into Vietnam and
Made Us Fight the Way We Did. 1985. Reprint, Baltimore: John Hopkins University
Press, 1998.
Black, Allida M. Casting Her Own Shadow: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Shaping of
Postwar Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.
Borstelmann, Thomas. Apartheid, Colonialism and the Cold War: The United States and
Southern Africa, 1945-1952. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990.

150

Bullock. Alan. Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945-1951. New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, Inc., 1983.
Dallek. Robert. Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1979.
Donovan, Robert J. Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency ofHarry S. Truman, 1945-1948.
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1977.
Dorpalen, Andreas. Europe in the 2dh Century: A History. New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1968.
Ferrell, Robert H. American Diplomacy: A History. 3d ed. New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, Inc., 1975.
____. Harry S. Truman: A Life. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1994.
Foerster, Schuyler and Edward N. Wright, eds. American Defonse Policy. 6th ed.
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1990.
Gaddis, John L. The Cold War: A New History. New York: Penguin Group, 2005.
_ _ _~. Strategies ofContainment: A Critical Appraisal ofPostwar American
National Security Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.
Garraty, John A. and Peter Gay, eds. The Columbia History of the World. New York:
Harper & Row Publishers, 1972; reprint n.p., Dorset Press, 1981.
Gravel, Mike, introduction to The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of
United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam Volume l. The Senator Gravel ed. Boston:
Beacon Press, 1971.
Hahn, Peter L. The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and
Diplomacy in the Early Cold War. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina
Press, 1991.
Hamby, Alonzo L. Man of the People: A Life ofHarry S. Truman. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1995.
Howard, Thomas C. and William D. Pederson, eds. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the
Formation of the Modern World. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2003.
Isaacson, Walter and Evan Thomas. The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They
Made. New York: Touchstone, Simon & Schuster Inc., 1988.

151

Kahin, George M. INTERVENTION: How America Became Involved in Vietnam. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986.
Kirkendall, Richard S. ed. The Truman Period As A Research Field: A Reappraisal,
1972. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1974.
Kissinger, Henry A. Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.
LaFeber, Walter. America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006. 10th ed. Boston:
McGraw-Hill, 2008.

____. The American Age: U.S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad 1750 to the
Present. 2d ed. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994.
Lapping, Brian. End ofEmpire. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985.
Lawrence, Mark A. and Fredrlk. Logevall. The First Vietnam War: Colonial Conflict and
Cold War Crisis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007.
Leffler, Melvyn P. A Preponderance ofPower: National Security, the Truman
Administration, and the Cold War. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992.
Lind, Michael. Vietnam: The Necessary War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999.
McCullough, David. Truman. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992.
Mcintyre, W. David. British Decolonization, 1946-1997: When, Why and How did the
British Empire Fall? New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.
McMahon, Robert J, ed. Major Problems in the History ofthe Vietnam War: Documents
and Essays. 3d ed. Boston: Houghton Miftlin Company, 2003.
Miscamble, Wilson D. From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold
War. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Murray, James N. Jr. The United Nations Trusteeship System. Urbana, IL: The
University of Illinois Press 1957.
Paterson, Thomas G. ed. Major Problems in American Foreign Policy Volume II: Since
1914. 3d ed. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1989.
Pirtle, Henry. compo Kentucky Monitor: Complete Monitorial Ceremonies of the Blue
Lodge. 17th ed. Louisville, KY: Grand Lodge of Kentucky Free and Accepted Masons,
1979.
Reitzel, William, Morton A. Kaplan, and Constance G. Coblenz. United States Foreign

152

Policy 1945-1955. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1956.
Robertson, Charles. International Politics Since World War II: A Short History. 2d ed.
New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1975.
Schlesinger, Stephen C. Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations. Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 2003.
Spanier, John. American Foreign Policy Since World War II. Ith ed. Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1991.
Spero, Joan E. The Politics ofInternational Economic Relations. 4th ed. New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1990.
Sulzberger, C.L. World War II. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970.
Watson, Robert P., Michael J. Devine, and Robert J. Wolz, eds. The National Security
Legacy of Harry S. Truman: Volume 1. Kirksville, MO: Truman State University
Press, 2005.
Wesseling, H. L. The European Colonial Empires: 1815-1919. trans. Diane Webb.
Harlow, England: Pearson Education Limited, 2004.

Articles and Newspapers
Boyle, Peter G. "Britain, America and the Transition from Economic to Military
Assistance, 1948-51." Journal of Contemporary History 22, no. 3 (July 1978): 21538.
Brewer, Susan A. review of Twisting the Lion's Tail: American Anglophobia between the
World Wars, by John E. Moser. The American Historical Review 105, no. 3 (June
2000): 956-957.
Cain, Frank M. "Exporting the Cold War: British Responses to the USA's Establishment
of COCOM, 1947-51." Journal of Contemporary History 29, no. 3 (July 1994): 501522.
Callahan, Raymond A. review of Business, Government, and the End ofEmpire: Malaya,
1942-1957, by Nicholas J. White. Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British
Studies 30, no. 2 (Surner 1998): 402-403.
Campbell, Thomas M. "Nationalism in America's UN Policy, 1944-1945." International
Organization 27, no. 1 (Winter 1973): 25-44.
Chamberlin, William H. "The Cold War: A Balance Sheet." Russian Review 9, no. 2

153

(April 1950): 79-86.
Cohen, Benjamin V. "The Impact of the United Nations on United States Foreign
Policy." International Organization 5, no. 2 (May 1951): 274-281.
Cohen, Michael J. "The Genesis of the Anglo-American Committee on Palestine,
November 1945: A Case Study in the Assertion of American Hegemony." The
Historical Journal 22, no. 1 (March 1979): 185-207.
Cohen, Warren I. review of The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India,
and Pakistan by Robert J. McMahon. Reviews in American History 22, no. 4
(December 1994): 705-710.
Crapol, Edward. "Some Reflections on the Historiography of the Cold War." The History
Teacher 20, no. 2 (February 1987): 251-262.
Curtin, Philip. "The British Empire and Commonwealth in Recent Historiography." The
American Historical Review 65, no. 1 (October 1959): 72-91.
Davis, Morris and Sidney Verba. "Party Affiliation and International Opinions in Britain
and France, 1947-1956." The Public Opinion Quarterly 24, no. 4 (Winter 1960): 590-

604.
Dobson, Alan P. "Labour or Conservative: Does It Matter in Anglo-American
Relations?" Journal o/Contemporary History 25, no. 4 (October 1990): 387-407.
Dulles, Foster R. and Gerald E. Ridinger. "The Anti-Colonial Policies of Franklin D.
Roosevelt." Political Science Quarterly 70, no. 1 (March 1955): 1-18.
Emerson, Rupert. "Colonialism." Journal o/Contemporary History 4, no. 1 (January
1969): 3-16.
_ _ _. reviews of People in Colonies, by Kumar Goshal; Mandates, Dependencies
and Trusteeship, by H. Duncan Hall; and Colonial Policy and Practice, by J. S.
Furnivall. World Politics 1, no. 4 (July 1949): 533-541.
Espy, Willard R. "Point Four and the Will to Refonn." Far Eastern Survey 20, no. 5
(March 1951): 45-49.
Fordham, Benjamin O. "Economic Interests, Party, and Ideology in Early Cold War Era
U.S. Foreign Policy." International Organization 52, no. 2 (Spring 1998): 359-396.
Forsythe, David P. "Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect."
Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 3 (Autumn 1990): 435-454 .

- - -. ~'The United Nations and Human Rights,
154

1945-1985." Political Science

Quarterly 100, no. 2 (Summer 1985): 249-269.
Galey, Margaret E. "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: The Role of
Congress." PS: Political Science and Politics 31, no. 3 (September 1998): 524-529.
Glickman, David L. "The British Imperial Preference System." The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 61, no. 3 (May 1947): 439-470.
Go, Julian. "Chains of Empire. Projects of State: Political Education and U.S. Colonial
Rule in Puerto Rico and the Philippines." Comparative Studies in Society and History
42, no. 2 (April 2000): 333-362.
Hahn, Lorna H. "French North Africa: An American Problem." The Western Political
Quarterly 8, no. 2 (June 1955): 186-198.
Hayes, Samuel P. Jr. "Statistics in the Point IV Program." The American Statistician 4,
no. 1 (February 1950): 4-5.
Herring, George C. Jr. ~'The United States and British Bankruptcy, 1944-1945:
Responsibilities Deferred." Political Science Quarterly 86, no. 2 (June 1971): 260280.
Hess, Gary R. "Franklin Roosevelt and Indochina." The Journal ofAmerican History 59,
no. 2 (September 1972): 353-368.
Horvath, Ronald J. "A Definition of Colonialism." Current Anthropology 13, no. 1
(February 1972): 45-57.
Ivie, Robert L. "Fire, Flood, and Red Fever: Motivating Metaphors of Global Emergency
in the Truman Doctrine Speech." Presidential Studies Quarterly 29 (1999): 570-591.
Johnson, Douglas. review of Elementary Imperial Military Geography: General
Characteristics ofthe Empire in Relation to Defence, by D. H. Cole. Geographical
Review 15, no. 3 (July 1925): 506-507.
Johnson, Luke. "A Nation of Shopkeepers and World Beaters." Financial Times
(London). 16 January 2008, 14.
Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline. "International History and International Relations Theory: A
Dialogue beyond the Cold War." International Affairs 76, no. 4 (October 2000): 741754.
Kimball, Warren F. reviews of The United States and the Origins of the Cold War.
1941-1947, by John L. Gaddis; The Limits ofPower: The World and United States
Foreign Policy, 1945-1954, by Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko; and The New Left and
the Origins of the Cold War, by Robert J. Maddox. The American Historical Review

155

79, no. 4 (October 1974): 1119-1136.
Kirby, Dianne. "Divinely Sanctioned: The Anglo-American Cold War Alliance and the
Defence of Western Civilization and Christianity, 1945-48." Journal ofContemporary
History 35, no. 3 (July 2000): 385-412.
Kissinger, Henry A. "Reflections on a Partnership: British and American Attitudes to
Postwar Foreign Policy." International Affairs 58, no. 4 (Autumn, 1982): 571-587.
Krozewski, Gerold. "Sterling, the 'Minor' Territories, and the End of Fonnal Empire,
1949-1958." The Economic History Review New Series, 46, no. 2 (May 1993): 239265.
Kruger, Daniel H. "Hobson, Lenin, and Schumpeter on Imperialism." Journal ofthe
History ofIdeas 16, no. 2 (April 1955): 252-259.
LaFeber, Walter. "Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina: 1942-45." The American
Historical Review 80, no. 5 (Dec 1975): 1277-1295.
Leffier, Melvyn P. "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings
of the Cold War, 1945-48." The American Historical Review 89, no. 2 (April 1984):
346-381.

- - -. "The Cold War: What Do "We Now Know?" The American Historical
Review 104, no. 2 (April 1999): 501-524.

Leigh, Michael. "Is There A Revisionist Thesis on the Origins of the Cold War?"
Political Science Quarterly 89, no. 1 (March 1974): 101-116.
Liu Xiaoyuan. "China and the Issue of Postwar Indochina in the Second World War."
Modern Asian Studies 33, no. 2 (May 1999): 445-482.
Louis, William R. "American Anti-Colonialism and the Dissolution of the British
Empire." International Affairs 61, no. 3 (Summer 1985): 395-420.
Lundestad, Guy. "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 19451952." Journal of Peace Research 23, no. 3 (September 1986): 263-277.
Mastny, Vojtech. reviews of Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America, 1944-1947,
by Robert M. Hathaway; From War to Cold War, 1942-48, by Roy Douglas; The
United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1944-1947, by Terry H. Anderson;
The End ofan Alliance: James F Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins ofthe
Cold War, by Robert L. Messer; Witnesses to the Origins ofthe Cold War, by Thomas
T. Hammond; Bitter Legacy: Polish-American Relations in the Wake of World War II,
by Richard C. Lukas; American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949, by Lawrence S.
Wittner; Strategies ofContainment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American

156

National Security Policy, by John L. Gaddis; Stalin's American Policy: From Entente
to Detente to Cold War, by William Taubman; and Soviet Foreign Policy Since World
War II, by Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson. Slavic Review 42, no. 4 (Winter
1983); 662-668.

McMahon, Robert J. "Cultures of Empire." The Journal ofAmerican History 88, no. 3
(December 2001): 888-892.
_ _ _. "United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making a Military
Commitment to Pakistan, 1947-1954." The Journal ofAmerican History 75, no. 3
(December 1988): 812-840.
Metz, Steven. "American Attitudes Toward Decolonization in Africa." Political Science
Quarterly 99, no. 3 (Autumn 1984): 515-533.
Nelson, Anna K. "President Truman and the Evolution of the National Security Council."
The Journal ofAmerican History 72, no. 2 (September 1985): 360-378.
Nwaubani, Ebere. "The United States and the Liquidation of European Colonial Rule in
Tropical Africa, 1941-1963." Cahiers d'Etudes africaines 171 (2003): 505-551.
Orchard, John E. "ECA and the Dependent Territories." Geographical Review 41, no. 1
(January 1951): 66-87.
Reubens, Edwin P. "Asia and Truman's Fourth Point." Far Eastern Survey 18, no. 6
(March 1949): 61-67.
Roark, James L. "American Black Leaders: the Response to Colonialism and the Cold
War, 1943-1953." African Historical Studies 4, no. 2 (1971): 253-270.
Rubin, Barry. "America and the Egyptian Revolution, 1950-1957." Political Science
Quarterly 97, no. 1 (Spring 1982): 73-90.
Saiya, Nilay. "The U.S. Recognition ofIsrael: A Bureaucratic Politics Model Analysis."
Concept On-line (2005), http://www.publications.villanova.edulconceptl2005.html
(accessed 18 February 2008).
Sebrega, John J. "The Anticolonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Reappraisal."
Political Science Quarterly 101, no. 1 (1986): 65-84.
Tang, James T. H. "From Empire Defence to Imperial Retreat: Britain's Postwar China
Policy and the Decolonization of Hong Kong." Modern Asian Studies 28, no. 2 (May
1994): 317-337.
Thompson, J. K. "Abolition of Colonialism." The Journal ofNegro History 37, no. 1
(January 1952): 81-89.

157

Thompson, John A. reviews of A Preponderance ofPower: National Security, the
Truman Administration, and the Cold War, by Melvyn P. Leffler; George F. Kennan
and the Making ofAmerican Foreign Policy, 1947-1950, by Wilson D. Miscamble;
Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953-1961, by
David L. Anderson; and General ofthe Army: George C. Marshall, Soldier and
Statesman, by Ed Cray. Historical Journal 37, no. 3 (September 1994): 745-755.
Thorner, Alice. "White Paper on Burma." Far Eastern Survey 14, no. 11 (June 1945):
145.
Von Albertini, Rudolf. "The Impact of Two World Wars on the Decline of Colonialism."
Journal ofContemporary History 4, no. I, (January 1969): 17-35.
Warburg, James P. "Cold War Tragedy." The Western Political Quarterly 7, no. 3
(September 1954): 325-345.
Ward, Geoffrey C. review of ELEANOR AND HARRY: The Correspondence ofEleanor
Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, ed. Steven Neal. New York Times. 25 August 2002, 9.
Ward, Jeremy K. "Winston Churchill and the 'Iron Curtain' Speech." The History
Teacher 1, no. 2 (January 1968): 15-13,57-63.
Warner, Geoffrey. "The United States and Vietnam 1945-65: Part I: 1945-54."
International Affairs 48, no. 3 (July 1972): 379-394.
Watt, D. C. "Restrictions on Research: The Fifty-Year Rule and British Foreign Policy."
International Affairs 41, no. 1 (January 1965): 89-95.
Webster, Wendy. "There'll Always Be an England": Representations of Colonial Wars
and Inunigration, 1948-1968." The Journal ofBritish Studies 40, no. 4 (October 2001)
: 557-584.
Weiler, Peter. "British Labour and the Cold War: The Foreign Policy of the Labour
Governments, 1945-1951." The Journal of British Studies 26, no. 1 (January 1987):
54-82.

158

CURRICULUM VITAE

NAME:

Timothy 1. Pifer

ADDRESS:

4712 Razor Creek Way
Louisville, KY 40299

DOB:

Wheeling, West Virginia-April 19, 1957

EDUCATION
& TRAINING:

BS., Criminal Justice
West Virginia State College
1975-79
M.Ed., Curriculum and Instruction
National-Louis University
1991-92

PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES:

Phi Alpha Theta History Honor Society

159

